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Abstract
This thesis seeks to contribute to an optimal fiscal constitution. Such a
constitution shall follow the task to constrain the power to tax. A government
may be given the power to tax to solve the free-rider problem in the provision
of local public goods. Constraints are needed, since governments are assumed
to follow their own interests. Each government behaves as a ’Leviathan’.
Part I deals with the stipulation of local tax bases into the constitution.
We theoretically analyze the properties of four distinct bases, namely: land
rent, capital rent, housing sales, and property value. We construct two-stage
models in which Leviathans offer local fiscal packages. Each household seeks
to maximize its utility from local public goods, housing, and composite pri-
vate goods. Since the households can use local public goods only where they
reside, fiscal choices have an impact on the housing market. Especially, we
analyze the reactions of housing firms, households, and housing prices on tax
rate changes. As we find out, some reactions depend in quality on a specific
condition. In a constitutional approach, we cannot assess the aggregate effect
of a tax base. However, we can derive some general and abstract rules on the
choice of a tax base. A fiscal constitution might help to protect such rules.
Citizens may react on local fiscal policy by migration. Such reaction
changes the demand for housing. In part II, we seek to estimate the impact
of local fiscal variables on the housing prices. For our estimates, we can draw
from an extensive discussion on the capitalization of property taxes. As it
shows, the given task implies several severe methodological problems. This
part assesses some of the proposed solutions. Furthermore, it seeks to find
an optimal methodology for its own estimates. The estimates will be based
on a sample of 234 US-counties in 2002 and 2003. Capitalization effects from
property taxes and from other fiscal variables are measured in four steps. As
it turns out, property taxes rather raise housing prices. However, the effects
tend to be dominated by other determinants, especially income and mobility
variables. Out of all local fiscal variables, the total public expenditure shows
the highest robustness. - Based on these results, we shall judge how effectively
the citizens constrain Leviathans by migration.
In a constitutional approach, a government is considered as a monolithic
and self-interested entity, called Leviathan. His self-interest generally con-
sists of maximizing his own fiscal revenue or surplus. Salient theoretical tools
for a fiscal constitution were introduced by Brennan and Buchanan (1980).
In particular, they maintained that there exists a negative relationship be-
tween the degree of fiscal decentralization and the power of the Leviathans.
Based on this hypothesis, some authors contrived empirical tests for the ’real
existence’ of Leviathans. In part III, we will briefly discuss those tests. It
will be argued that their approach is altogether insufficient. Therefore, a
new approach will be introduced. This approach claims that a Leviathan’s
social power can be measured by the relative deviation of his income from the
average income in his jurisdiction. His social power depends on the sources
of fiscal revenue. To estimate the dependencies, we work with samples of 234
US-counties in 1989/ 1992 and 1999/ 2002. Our main result can be put as
follows: Local Leviathans derive more social power from intergovernmental
grants than from property taxes or other sources of local public revenue.
ii
Meinen Eltern
in tiefer Dankbarkeit gewidmet
Acknowledgements
This thesis could not have been written without the support of many peo-
ple. Let me express my gratitude towards some of them for some particular
aspects. First and foremost, I wish to thank both my supervisors: Wolf-
gang Weigel and Robert Kunst. Their supervising support was surely at
an optimum. Wolfgang Weigel taught me how to consider the institutional
environment. Robert Kunst taught me how to write for the readers. Next,
I wish to demonstrate appreciation for the enormous inspiration that I re-
ceived in the courses of my doctoral program. Here, my special thanks go to:
Hildegard Dierker, Karl Milford, Manfred Nermuth, Gerhard Orosel, Klaus
Ritzberger, Gerhard Sorger, and Oded Stark. During my work on this thesis
I encountered many practical problems. I would not have solved them with-
out the help of some of my fellow-students. For this and more, I express my
kindest thanks to: Petra Amrusch, Silvia Rocha-Akis, and Gasper Tompa.
I am utterly grateful to my parents. They have supported me in so many
ways that I cannot comprehend. I dedicate this thesis to them. I am also in
debt to my sister Birgit, my brother-in-law Thomas, my niece Anne, and my
nephew Simon. Their confidence gave me a lot of strength. Finally, I wish
to apologize to all the other people who supported me but whom I forgot to
mention.
Vienna, February 2008
Ju¨rgen Go¨bel
iv
Contents
I Leviathans, Household, and Housing Firms in a
Local Economy: Tax Models 1
1 Introduction 2
2 Related Literature 5
2.1 Models and Ideas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3 Principles for an Optimal Taxation 30
4 A General Model of Local Tax Competition 34
4.1 Housing Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.2 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.3 Leviathans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.4 Market Equilibrium Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5 Two-Period Tax Models: Optimization and Comparative Sta-
tics 41
5.1 Taxation of Land Rent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.1.1 Housing Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.1.2 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.1.3 Leviathans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.1.4 Total Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.2 Taxation of Capital Rent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.2.1 Housing Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.2.2 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.2.3 Leviathans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.2.4 Total Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.3 Taxation of Housing Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.3.1 Housing Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.3.2 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
v
5.3.3 Leviathans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.3.4 Total Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.4 Taxation of Housing Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.4.1 Housing Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.4.2 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.4.3 Leviathans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.4.4 Total Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
6 The Choice of Local Tax Bases 59
7 Local Tax Competition and Intergovernmental Grants 63
8 Summary 66
II Leviathans and their Relative Influence on Hous-
ing Prices 69
9 Introduction 70
10 Related Literature 73
10.1 Models and Estimations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
10.2 Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
11 Local Governments and Housing Markets 92
12 The Data 96
13 Descriptive Statistics 98
14 Regressions 107
15 Summary 118
III Leviathans, Income Deviations, and the Sources
of Local Public Revenue 121
16 Introduction 122
17 Related Literature 124
17.1 Ideas and Estimations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
17.2 Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
vi
18 The Assignment of Functions to Local Governments 139
19 The Data 144
20 Descriptive Statistics 147
21 Regressions 155
22 Summary 161
IV Concluding Remarks 164
Bibliography 167
A Computations for the Two-Period Tax Models 181
B List of Empirical Variables 189
C List of Abbreviations 193
Zusammenfassung 194
Lebenslauf 196
vii
List of Tables
2.1 Discussed literature: summary I-A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2 Discussed literature: summary I-B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3 Discussed literature: summary I-C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4 Discussed literature: summary I-D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.5 Local policy measures: pros and cons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.1 Variables of the general model: summary . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
10.1 Discussed literature: summary II-A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
10.2 Discussed literature: summary II-B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
10.3 Discussed literature: summary II-C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
10.4 Discussed literature: summary II-D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
13.1 Housing prices in 2002 and 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
13.2 Ranking of the median housing values in 2002 . . . . . . . . . 100
13.3 Ranking of the gross median rents in 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . 101
13.4 Local fiscal variables: 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
13.5 Ranking of intergovernmental revenue per capita in 2002 . . . 103
13.6 Ranking of property tax revenue per capita in 2002 . . . . . . 104
13.7 Correlations: housing prices and fiscal variables: 2002 . . . . . 106
14.1 Simple regressions: median housing value in 2003 on fiscal
variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
14.2 Simple regressions: median gross rent in 2003 on fiscal variables112
14.3 Multiple regressions: housing prices in 2003 on non-fiscal vari-
ables: OLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
14.4 Multiple regressions: median housing value in 2003 on fiscal
variables and on control variables: OLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
14.5 Multiple regressions: median gross rent in 2003 on fiscal vari-
ables and on control variables: OLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
14.6 Multiple regressions: median housing value in 2003 on fiscal
variables and on control variables: 2SLS . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
viii
14.7 Multiple regressions: median gross rent in 2003 on fiscal vari-
ables and on control variables: 2SLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
17.1 Discussed literature: summary III-A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
17.2 Discussed literature: summary III-B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
17.3 Discussed literature: summary III-C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
17.4 Discussed literature: summary III-D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
20.1 Income levels of distinctive groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
20.2 Relative deviations of local officials’ earnings . . . . . . . . . . 149
20.3 Ranking of OFFPCI02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
20.4 Ranking of OFFHHMI02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
20.5 Sources of local fiscal revenue: per capita values . . . . . . . . 151
20.6 Sources of local fiscal revenue: budget shares . . . . . . . . . . 151
20.7 Correlations: deviations of officials’ earnings and public rev-
enue: 1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
20.8 Correlations: deviations of officials’ earnings and public rev-
enue: 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
21.1 Regressions of OFFPCI92: full sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
21.2 Regressions of OFFHHMI92: full sample . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
21.3 Regressions of OFFPCI02: full sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
21.4 Regressions of OFFHHMI02: full sample . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
21.5 Regressions of OFFHHMI02 on ln IGMREV02b: sample strat-
ified by OFFEARN02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
21.6 Regressions of OFFHHMI02 on ln IGMREV02b: sample strat-
ified by HHMINC99 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
ix
x
Part I
Leviathans, Household, and
Housing Firms in a Local
Economy: Tax Models
1
Chapter 1
Introduction
In an anarchic local economy, self-interested agents might fail to organize the
provision of local public goods. Typically, each self-interested agent seeks to
free-ride. The group as a whole thus faces a social dilemma. One central way
to solve such a dilemma is to establish a local government with a particular
social power, with the power to tax. - However, a local government may be
regarded as just another type of a self-interested agent, called ’Leviathan’.
A Leviathan seeks to use his social power in his own interest. The group
seems to exchange one social dilemma against another. But, the exchange
may be favorable to the group, because the ’new’ dilemma can be reduced
by constraints on Leviathan’s policy.
A central way to constrain Leviathan’s policy is to fix rules into a con-
stitution. Thus, the group may search for the best constitutional rules. At
the beginning of this search, the key issue is which criteria should be taken
for the choice of the rules. What is the meaning of ’best’ in this context? -
One key methodological criterion is that each agent would agree to the rules.
To exclude any strategic disagreement, we may assume that the choice of
the rules is made behind a ’veil of ignorance’. None of the agents knows her
future position within the group. Furthermore, all decisions must be taken
unanimously. The rules must be fixed for the whole life-time of the economy.
The constitutional rules will therefore be characterized by a higher degree of
generality or abstraction than other social rules.
A constitution can constrain Leviathan’s policy on two major fields: a)
the assignment of government tasks; b) the citizens’ modes of reaction.
a) In our context, Leviathan’s main task is to provide local public goods.
The constitution should help to guide his own interest to the citizens’ needs.
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Some rules could, for example, prescribe how the choice of the specific public
offering has to be made. In order to finance this offering, Leviathan has got
the power to tax. But merely following his own interest, he charges as much
as possible. Thus, some rules could specify the modes of taxation, namely in
three areas: tax base, tax rate, and tax revenue. - In this study, we are going
to focus on the choice of the tax base. The impact of a tax base might in
particular depend on the government structure. Hence, it could be another
important part of the constitution to define such a structure as a constraint
for Leviathan.
b) There are two basic modes in which the citizens can react on Levi-
athan’s policy; namely: ’voice’ and ’exit’. Some specification of these two
basic modes may be stipulated in the constitution. - By voice, a citizen seeks
to change existing (political) rules. Thus, she deliberately takes influence on
the respective decision-making process. She may for example: run as a polit-
ical candidate, vote in an election, publicly comment on the fiscal policy, and
so on. - By exit, a citizen seeks to avoid the consequences of existing rules.
In a legal manner, she merely has the option to leave the respective rule’s
domain. If the rule is defined for the group’s territory, then she needs to mi-
grate. In our context, the salient example for such a rule is a residence-based
tax.
If a citizen reacts on fiscal policy by migration, then she reveals some
true, non-strategic information on her preferences. Hence, we could think of
migration as the key ’driver’ in a mechanism for an efficient allocation of local
public goods. However, this mode of reaction has also some impact on the
housing markets. Therefore, these markets become a necessary part of the
allocation mechanism. Generally, housing markets have extreme features.
We will thus ask which functions they may take within this mechanism. For
various reasons, it may seem plausible to choose housing as a tax base. We
will discuss some possible ways; their pros and cons.
If citizens are free to migrate and able to make a positive (net) contribu-
tion to the fiscal budget, then Leviathans from different local groups compete
for them. They get incentives to adjust their fiscal policies to the preferences
of such citizens. Generally, any aspect of fiscal policy can influence a Levi-
athan’s competitiveness. In this study, however, we assume that Leviathans
are only allowed to determine the tax rates. Thus, they might cause citizens
to immigrate or emigrate due to a change of the tax rate. In this competitive
process, a key role is played by the housing markets. Thus, we will analyze
and evaluate this role. What are the pros and cons of local tax competition
as a constraint on Leviathans? - A fundamental way to correct for the cons
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of local tax competition could be to stipulate a system of intergovernmental
grants into the constitution. There are various possibilities to specify such a
system. We will search for the best specification. Then, we may ask: Does
this system of grants tend to have positive or negative effects on the results
from the local tax competition?
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Chapter 2
Related Literature
2.1 Models and Ideas
Analytical foundations for a fiscal constitution were laid by Brennan and
Buchanan in several publications (1977, 1978, 1979, 1980). The two authors
described a theoretical setting which serves to find socially optimal rules
for fiscal policy. Each agent is assumed to behave as a ’homo economicus’.
The theoretically constructed society passes through two stages: In the first
(constitutional) stage, the agents stand behind a so-called ’veil of ignorance’;
which means that they do not know their economic position in the second
(postconstitutional) stage. The agents have to make abstract predictions
about economic interactions in the second stage. While external conditions,
as resources or technology for instance, may change, the constitutional rules
have to remain the same. The essential question is: What will be the typical
patterns of economic interaction between rational agents under different sets
of rules? - The sets of rules shall be compared and assessed with regard to
two criteria: efficiency and fairness. At the end of the first stage, all the
agents have to agree on fixing a certain set into their fiscal constitution.1
In order to find optimal rules for their fiscal constitution, the (ignorant)
agents must also make predictions about the impact of a government’s ac-
tions in the postconstitutional stage. Thus, they need a clear conception
of what a government consists in. If they considered the government as a
heterogeneous network of rational individuals, then the whole constitutional
matter would likely become too complicated. For the purpose of a constitu-
1Brennan and Buchanan did not specify their setting for a fiscal constitution as nar-
rowly as Buchanan and Tullock (1965) did for a democratic constitution.
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tional analysis, it seems to be expedient to make rather rigorous assumptions
about the behavior of governments. Thus, Brennan and Buchanan suggested
to consider the government as a monolithic entity. They called it ’Leviathan’.
In the general form, Leviathan’s self-interest is to maximize his own income.
But, what is this income derived from? - Brennan and Buchanan worked with
two different specifications for Leviathan’s objective: a) the tax revenue, b)
the tax surplus.2
a) Tax revenue may simply be tax rate times tax base. If the tax base
does not depend on the amount of local public goods, then Leviathan has
no incentive to provide any such good. In a basic model, Brennan and
Buchanan (1977, 1980) assumed that the social income and local public goods
are not directly related to each other. Nonetheless, Leviathan is allowed to
tax income. Only leisure must remain untaxed. As Brennan and Buchanan
showed, Leviathan would be able then to transfer nearly all of the social
income to his own budget - namely by using a regressive tax rate structure;
and the citizens would get nothing in return. Leviathan would choose a
regressive rate structure, because it counters the incentives for the citizens
to substitute leisure for labor. As the two authors stated, the citizens’ loss can
be reduced by some constitutional constraints on the tax structure. However,
this alone hardly makes the government a worthwile venture for the society.
Brennan and Buchanan proposed to stipulate a certain amount of local
public goods into the constitution. Given such an amount, the agents could
compare different tax bases or tax rate structures by the excess burden that
each would incur. - We may doubt, however, whether this method is adequate
for a constitutional approach. In the constitutional stage, the agents would
already have to determine all the three tax variables: base, structure, and
amount of revenue. To find an optimal combination, they would need full
information about resources, technology and demand schedules, as these arise
in the postconstitutional stage. But, these conditions plausibly cannot be
met behind a ’veil of ignorance’.3
2To analyze a government as a heterogeneous network of rational individuals remains
the task of other fields within public choice theory. At present, a Leviathan model seems
to profit most from the theory of bureaucracy and the theory of dictatorship. For an
overview, see Mueller (2003), chapters 16 and 18.
3The proposed method is very close to the ’theory of optimal taxation’ in public finance.
Brennan and Buchanan used this method in several examples. These examples indicate
two weaknesses of this method (which the authors do admit). First, the assumptions of
the model have to be very strict to keep the derivations tractable (two agents only, linear
demand curves, and so on). Second, the results are very sensitive to changes in these
assumptions.
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b) If Leviathan’s objective is to maximize his tax surplus, then he will
try to minimize the costs for public goods. But, there might be a constraint
or a positive relationship between public goods and tax revenue. Thus, his
optimal amount of public goods will be greater than zero. Brennan and
Buchanan (1978) followed this idea in another model. In this model, the tax
base does directly depend on the public good: the two are complements. The
proportion of the base which can be collected as tax revenue is assumed to be
exogenous. Hence, Leviathan seeks to maximize the tax surplus with respect
to the provided amount of public goods. Brennan and Buchanan derived a
condition for which the surplus positively depends on the public good. As
they stated, this condition will be satisfied under ’normal’ parameters. The
authors finally interpreted their results as efficiency-arguments for ’earmark-
ing’: each government task should be assigned a specified tax instrument.
Thus, the fiscal constitution does not only insure a certain amount of tax
revenue, but it also generates a positive link between the task and the tax
instrument. The stronger the link the better.4
In a federal state, fiscal interventions can be assigned to different levels of
government. Following the standard theory of public finance, there are three
potential fields for fiscal interventions: allocation, distribution, and stabi-
lization. In our context, the provision of public goods principally concerns
the field of allocation. To find some optimal rules for this task, we have to
keep in mind that public goods might be different in style. In a pure form,
they have two essential characteristics: non-excludability, and non-rivalry
in consumption. If the benefits from a public good are limited to a rather
small geographical region, then we call it ’local’. Major examples are: parks,
roads, sewerage systems or fire protection. In a strict sense, pure public goods
do not really exist, namely for two reasons: First, excludability is always a
matter of costs. Sure, the costs may be prohibitively high. Second, in a
world of limited resources, every consumption causes external effects. These
effects can be described by different functional forms, which will normally
be monotonically increasing. But, individuals use to perceive crowding or
congestion, only after some point. Therefore, the optimal style of a certain
public good depends on specific circumstances. This should be taken into
consideration on the search for an optimal fiscal constitution.
The optimal federal structure is also determined by the specific styles of
the public goods, demanded by the citizens. Following this insight, Olson
(1969) sought to set up general norms for such an optimum. As a central
4As Brennan and Buchanan showed, the probability that the tax surplus and the public
good are positively correlated increases with the number of complementary tax bases.
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norm, he developed the principle of ’fiscal equivalence’: According to this
principle, for each public good, there should be a match between those who
benefit and those who pay. This could mean that each public good must be
provided by an own, separate government that rules over all specific users.
We thus could come to an extremely complicated structure of overlapping
jurisdictions. The boundaries of each jurisdiction are determined by the
number of users and the per capita production cost for the public good.
Consequently, there will be no external effects between jurisdictions in such
a government structure. But, as Olson emphasized, a serious problem arises
when a jurisdiction contains all specific users and has increasing per capita
production costs. Then, a reduction of the jurisdiction’s size would overall
increase efficiency, although it causes externalities, spillovers. Olson pro-
posed to solve this problem with the help of rules for internalization. Hence,
each jurisdiction produces at the minimum of per capita production costs.
Spillovers have to be compensated by government grants. In order to im-
plement the payment of these grants, a higher government unit might be
needed.5
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) claimed that the principle of fiscal equiv-
alence acquires little normative strength, if we take governments as self-
interested rather than benevolent. As the authors explained, the principle
only specifies a lower bound on the size of a jurisdiction: which is the size
of optimal production costs. However, there seems to be no reason why
the power to decide on the provision of a local public good should not be
transfered to a higher government level. This public good still could be
administered on the local level. Thus, the principle of fiscal equivalence
does not specify any upper (!) bound on the size of a higher level jurisdic-
tion. It seems to be fully compatible with a centralized federal structure. A
centralized structure might even have the advantage that grants incur less
transaction costs. Anyway, this principle hardly seems to leave any room for
competition among jurisdictions.6
Tiebout (1956) asserted that competition among jurisdictions could lead
to efficiency in the provision of local public goods. He assigned the leadership
of each jurisdiction to a ’city manager’. Each city manager seeks to maximize
5To derive his main results, Olson made the assumption that there is no ’complemen-
tarity’ in the production of the public goods. But, he also admitted that the problem
becomes much more complicated, if this assumption does not hold. Government grants
might not be an appropriate solution, anymore.
6The essence of the argument could be put as follows: If the government is benevolent,
then there is no reason to share its power. In the standard theory of public finance,
federalism in a strict sense must be counterproductive.
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the profits of his jurisdiction by offering a special, fixed package of public
goods. The citizens in the whole economy have heterogeneous preferences.
Each of them can choose the package that best fits her individual preferences
by moving to the corresponding jurisdiction. A package is also characterized
by a specific cost function. The city manager tries to minimize the costs
per user or resident. According to the actual number of residents, he will
promote entry or exit. He charges every resident the same contribution. The
competition between the city managers puts their profits under pressure and
allows citizens to divide into more homogeneous groups of local public goods
consumers. The intensity of competition mainly depends on: the diversity of
jurisdictions, the technological properties of the public goods, and the costs
of mobility.7
Competition among jurisdictions may take over two important functions:
First, it serves as a mechanism for revealing preferences. In that sense, if a
citizen moves from one jurisdiction to another where merely the package of
local public goods and taxes is different, then she reveals that she prefers this
offer. This is the function which Tiebout focused on. Second, competition
among jurisdictions serves as a device to discipline self-interested govern-
ments. If a government offers a comparatively bad fiscal package, then a
citizens can sanctionize this by her exit option. This is the function that
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) focused on. They asked: Can competition
among Leviathans be a substitute for explicit constitutional constraints? -
The answer surely depends on the competition’s intensity. The intensity it-
self may depend on some constitutional rules. On the one hand, they can
influence the costs for the citizens to exit, and on the other hand, they can
influence the costs for the Leviathans to collude. As Brennan and Buchanan
supposed, the rules for the federal structure might be the key factors. Hence,
they put forward the following hypothesis: Leviathans abuse their power to
tax - ceteris paribus - less, the more decentralized are the fiscal decisions,
and the more homogeneous are the separate jurisdictions.
Buchanan and Goetz (1972) examined the competition between jurisdic-
tions for its efficiency limits. They based their assessment on a highly favor-
able setting. This means, in particular, that the problems of spillovers and
the problems of discreteness were neglected. The authors showed that even in
such a setting inherent inefficiencies remain in the competitive process. The
main reason for these inefficiencies were found in the ’fact of location’. The
7Tiebout himself did not make clear what ’his’ jurisdictions distinct from private clubs.
He neither described the city managers as monopolists for land, nor he interpreted the
contributions as (head) taxes.
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authors stressed that Tiebout had deliberately avoided to deal with this fact.
Thus, his analytical object should rather be seen as an adjustment process
in a non-spatial world of voluntary clubs. In such a world, there seems to
be nothing that prevents the citizens from optimizing both separately: the
value of private goods and the value of public goods. But, in a spatial world,
a move from one jurisdiction to another affects total benefits and average
costs in both jurisdictions. The users of local public goods can generate
crowding effects. If the crowding pushes the marginal costs of public goods
above the average costs, then fiscal external effects are generated. Without
full compensation, the total allocation becomes less efficient.8
Hamilton (1975) asserted that it was possible to install a system of prices
for local public goods into a spatial world; which would lead the competition
between jurisdictions to Pareto optimal outcomes. Brennan and Goetz had
failed to consider such a system of prices. Hamilton therefore assessed their
point of critique as being rather empirical. Even in their own model, the
outcomes can be Pareto optimal, if the empirical conditions are favorable. We
could argue that the per unit cost curve for a local public good is typically U-
shaped - due to a combined effect from publicness and from crowding. Hence:
when there are only few users, the marginal cost is close to zero, while the
average cost is high. When the number of users increases, the average cost
falls and the marginal cost rises. As crowding becomes more extensive, the
marginal cost may rise above the average cost. Thus, if the cost structure
satisfies some special conditions, then a Pareto optimum may be reached
where the marginal cost equals the average cost in each jurisdiction.9
Not to depend on empirical cost conditions, Hamilton suggested to make
use of a special price system for local public goods. His model adds two
components to the basic Tiebout model. As a first, the local governments
generate revenues solely with a proportional property tax. As a second, each
government practices zoning policy, or more precisely, it dictates a minimum
of housing consumption. Hamilton described the local adjustment process as
follows: If a citizen lives in a jurisdiction where the dictated minimum hous-
ing consumption is lower than her personal optimum, then she will move to
another one where the minimum is higher. The reason is that the average
tax base in this other jurisdiction will be broader. Consequently, the corre-
sponding local government gets the option to increase its provision of local
public goods or to decrease its property tax rate. In general, a government
8A non-spatial world may exist under two key assumptions: first, there are no mobility
costs; second, all personal incomes are from dividends.
9Here, Hamilton bases his reasoning on McGuire (1972).
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will adjust its fiscal policy until its total capitalization becomes zero. At
the end of the adjustment process, Hamilton’s spatial economy obtains the
following features:
• each jurisdiction is internally homogeneous;
• the property tax acts as an efficient price for local public goods;
• local governments do not engage in income redistribution;
• the consumption structure is Pareto efficient.
In Hamilton’s model, the efficiency of competition among jurisdictions hinges
on the zoning policy. Zoning policy transforms the property tax into a head
tax, which is a user charge in this case. Due to the minimum housing require-
ment, citizens cannot choose a package of local public goods without paying
their full share of the costs. Hence, the property tax does not generate any
distortion in the public policy. In each jurisdiction, the marginal cost of the
local public goods equals their average cost.
In an extension of his basic model, Hamilton (1976) showed that his effi-
ciency result also holds, when jurisdictions are not homogeneous with respect
to the housing values. His main additional assumption is that the heteroge-
neous jurisdictions are fully developed. Then, the residents still cannot vary
their housing consumption in response to a change of the property tax. If a
disequilibrium arises, then home owners will have to offer housing for a new
price that compensates for the ’fiscal differential’ (which is the present value
of all future tax payments net of the respective benefits). Thus, fiscal policy
is perfectly capitalized; which turns the property tax into a benefit tax.10
Given that the efficiency of competition among jurisdictions depends
on the zoning policy and the development degree of the housing stock, it
seems consistent to check whether the task of housing development should
be uniquely assigned to the local government. A very instructive analysis for
this was made by Sonstelie and Portney (1978). They constructed a model in
which each local government has a monopoly on housing production. Based
on the monopoly, each government seeks to maximize its profits. It decides on
the local amount of housing and the local package of public goods. Housing
stocks will be fixed in the short run, but not in the long run. The citizens are
free to move. They try to maximize their individual utility, which depends
10Perfect capitalization within one jurisdiction also implies that the smaller a housing
unit is, the higher is its capitalization rate.
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on their consumption of housing, private goods, and local public goods. Son-
stelie and Portney came to the conclusion that competition between profit
maximizing governments leads to socially optimal amounts of local public
goods and socially optimal sizes of jurisdicitons - in the short as well as in
the long run. Governments behave equivalently to property value maximiz-
ers. But, as Epple and Zelenitz (1984) showed, the proof for this result, given
by Sonstelie and Portney, is not correct. Therefore, it seems that the neces-
sary conditions for an efficient allocation are more specific than Sonstelie and
Portney suggested. Anyway, in an extension of their basic model, the two
authors did not consider governments as dictators anymore, but as enforcers
of collective choices. Here, residents are allowed to vote on the amount of
local public goods and on the property tax rate. As it turns out, the total
allocation will not be efficient under these new assumptions - neither in the
short, nor in the long run. Zoning measures can lead to an optimum in the
provision of local public goods, but not in the housing stocks.11
Zoning measures specify which types of structures and activities are ad-
missible on a certain parcel of land. The purpose of these measures is pri-
marily to correct for both: fiscal and non-fiscal externalities. Next, we may
ask who should be in charge of the allocation of land itself.
Epple and Zelenitz (1981) took the allocation of land as exogenous. Ju-
risdictions have fixed boundaries, possibly fixed by an overall constitution.
In their basic model, each government tries to maximize its profits by choos-
ing its local public goods and its property tax rate. Housing is offered by
private, competitive firms. The citizens can costlessly move between juris-
dictions. The authors assumed that the citizens have identical incomes and
preference structures. Therefore, competition forces each jurisdiction to of-
fer the same utility level. Moreover, to reach an overall equilibrium, every
housing market must clear and every citizen must be housed (in exactly one
jurisdiction). Epple and Zelenitz derived the comparative statics for such an
equilibrium. This showed the following: If a government raises its property
tax rate, then local residents exit, the net price of housing falls. If a govern-
ment raises its supply of public goods, then other citizens enter; except that
the increase in housing demand, which is due to the increase in local resi-
dents, offsets the decrease of the housing demand, which is due to the price
increase. In a next step, Epple and Zelenitz assumed that each government
seeks to maximize its budget surplus. The authors found out that such a Le-
viathan is able to misuse some part of the tax revenue for his own purposes,
11The essential problem with collective choices in this context is that they tend to incur
unequal distributions of profits (housing owners versus renters).
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although the residents can costlessly move. The main reason is that land is
fixed. Thus, Leviathan can usurp the part of the land rent that stems from
the elasticity of the housing supply. Epple and Zelenitz showed the follwing:
The higher the number of jurisdictions in the economy is, the lower will be
the misuse of tax revenue. But, it never can be zero. Hence, competition
among jurisdictions is, by itself, not sufficient to ensure an efficient provision
of local public goods.12
Henderson (1985) advised not to treat the allocation of land exogenously,
when analyzing the provision of local public goods. He showed that inter-
jurisdictional land markets can promote efficiency in the total economy. One
necessary condition for the promotion, however, is that land developers play
an active role on the market. Sure, the total outcome may depend on the
fiscal policy, as well. Henderson examined how entrepreneurial landowners
interact with three different types of policy makers: a) the club; b) the benev-
olent dictator; c) Leviathan. To simplify his model, the author made four
assumptions (which are similar to those made by Epple and Zelenitz (1981)):
1. non-land income, non-housing production, and the cost of capital are
exogenous;
2. citizens have idential incomes and preference structures;
3. local public goods are financed solely by a property tax, which may
distort housing decisions;
4. local public goods are essentially collectively provided private goods.
Henderson derived the conditions for an intrajurisdictional equilibrium with
respect to each type of policy maker: He found out that such an equilibrium
is efficient and robust, when the fiscal policy is made by a club. When the
fiscal policy is made by a benevolent dictator, the equilibrium is efficient,
too, but very sensitive to external influences, as to migration for instance.
Leviathan will misuse some tax revenue in the respective equilibrium. - In a
next step, Henderson examined under which circumstances these outcomes
can be consistent with a long-run, interjurisdictional equilibrium. He found
out that the intrajurisdictional equilibrium is consistent in the case of clubs.
Then, the landowners can always convert their land to the use that offers the
highest rent. The land market will thereby clear at a uniform price across all
12As Epple and Zelenitz emphasized, the essential feature of the model is that jurisdic-
tional boundaries are fixed. By contrast, the governments’ strategies or objectives take
little influence on the equilibrium results.
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jurisdictions. In the case of benevolent dictators, the consistency hinges on
the income distribution and the openness of the land market. In an economy
where the income distribution is highly unequal and the land markets are
closed, the migration of citizens is generally not sufficient to equalize land
prices across jurisdictions. The economy may head toward a wide range of
inefficient equilibria. Finally, in the Leviathan case, tax revenue is misused
as long as the local land markets are closed. Otherwise, landowners will not
develop their land under a fiscal policy that exploits them.13
The idea that interjurisdictional land markets promote the efficiency of
local fiscal policy contradicts the classical theory of taxation. This theory
recommends to take those tax bases which show less reaction on tax rate
changes. Since land appears as extremely inelastic in supply, it is judged as a
most preferable tax base. Furthermore, even if interjurisdictional markets for
land threatened to raise the elasticity, governments could close these markets,
easily. Hoyt (1991), however, found some reason why governments might
rather tax property. The main assumption of his model is that public goods
are congestible. Hence, a tax should not only ensure a certain amount of
public revenues with the smallest amount of distortions, but also regulate the
use of the public goods. It seems obvious that congestability strengthens the
influence of the relative size of a jurisdiction on the efficiency of a tax. - Hoyt
made two further crucial assumptions: first, land areas are fixed; second,
governments seek to maximize their residents’ welfare.14 He examined two
cases:
a) If each jurisdiction has just a small share of the total population in
the economy, then a change in its fiscal policy does not affect prices in other
jurisdictions. But internally, a change in its property tax rate affects the net
price of housing and the gross rent of land. Residents adapt their demand for
housing, and housing producers adapt the land intensity of housing. These
responses engender entries or exits. - In contrast, a change in the land tax
neither affects the gross price of housing, nor the net rent of land. Migration
will not take place. Hence, in the given setting, the capitalization rate of the
13Henderson tried to support his assumption that land markets can be flexible even in
the short-run with some data about the development of communities in the U.S.A. from
1910 to 1970.
14The Henry George theorem states that the land tax is neutral and thus should be the
only tax in practice. - Berglas and Pines (1981) showed that this theorem may hold in
an economy with congestion-prone public goods, if three conditions are satisfied: first, the
total population can be divided into optimal consumption groups; second, a price system
supports the optimal division; third, land rents equal public expenditure minus marginal
congestion cost.
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property tax is -1, and the one of the land tax is 0. From this results that
each government will fully finance its local public goods by a property tax.
b) In the case where each jurisdiction has a large share of the total pop-
ulation, a change in its fiscal policy does affect the housing prices in other
jurisdictions. Now, the governments behave strategically. Thus, welfare max-
imization is not equivalent to land rent maximization, anymore. Internally, a
change in the property tax affects both the housing price and the land rent.
Capitalization of property taxes into the housing prices becomes incomplete,
because migration follows distorted prices. A change of a property tax rate
generates two conflicting effects: on the one hand, a positive response of
housing costs per resident, and on the other hand, a negative response of the
costs of local public goods per resident. From this, three things can directly
be concluded: Firstly, for each jurisdiction, it is optimal to finance at least
a fraction of its public expenditures by a property tax. Secondly, the size
of the fraction increases with the number of jurisdictions in the economy.
Lastly, the property tax may serve as a head tax, which causes, however,
distortions on the housing market, if migration shall not lead to fiscal budget
imbalances.
Henderson (1995) examined whether homeowners would vote for property
taxes to finance local public goods. In his model, the number of homeown-
ers in each jurisdiction is endogenously determined. Ex post, this number
corresponds to the set of voter-residents. The homeowners anticipate the
capitalization effect of their vote. Following the standard urban economic ap-
proach, residents own equal shares of the land in their jurisdiction. From this
ownership, they derive their claim on equal shares of the jurisdiction’s profit.
Henderson removed the Arrow-Debreu separation between shareholder deci-
sions and consumer decisions from his model. Homeowners decide simulta-
neously on housing, other private goods, public goods, and public revenue
instruments. Henderson showed that in an equilibrium among imperfectly
competitive jurisdictions, the homeowners will vote for an efficient level of
local public goods and a financing with land taxes or lump-sum taxes. The
property tax rate will be zero. As he could prove, this result holds for any
public good technology. It holds for the case of congestion, given that ju-
risdictions have the same sizes and external effects are the same acoss all
jurisdictions. - The author also analyzed the case in which shareholding is
ex ante fixed. Then, owners will vote for a combination of land and property
taxes, if those are the only offered instruments. Actually, they would pre-
fer head taxes or user charges, which in addition bypasses the tax incidence
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problem.15
In the classical view on tax incidence, the burden of a property tax is
borne by the local housing consumers. This view bases on a partial equilib-
rium analysis in which the return on capital is taken as fixed, as the relative
size of a jurisdiction is small and capital can costlessly move - at least in the
long run. If a local government increases its property tax rate, then the capi-
tal portion of the increase is fully shifted forward to the housing price. Hence,
the property tax distorts the housing market. - In a second view, the benefit
view, the property tax is a charge on the users of local public goods. Every
citizen chooses the residential location which offers the best fiscal package to
her. If the fiscal package changes, then citizens will costlessly move. Thus, a
change of the property tax capitalizes into the housing prices. To avoid that
migration distorts housing prices, local governments must stipulate specific
rules for housing development - in special zoning ordinances. - In a third
view, the capital tax view, the property tax distorts the local use of capi-
tal; it causes misallocations of a fixed total capital stock across jurisdictions.
This third view is based on a general equilibrium model which takes local
fiscal packages as given. In general, capital moves from higher tax to lower
tax jurisdictions. Hence, it decreases profits in the first and increases profits
in the latter. However, the increase will not fully offset the decrease. The
move of capital also affects housing prices, commodity prices, wages, and
land rents in the involved jurisdictions. These changes will, in contrast, be
largely offsetting. Hence, the property tax burden is primarily borne by the
capital owners.16
Zodrow (2001) regarded the capital tax view on the incidence of prop-
erty taxes as the most powerful out of the three. He justified his judgement
roughly as follows: On the one side, the classical view treats capital, com-
modity prices, and wages as exogenous. This view focuses on the responses
of housing prices on fiscal policy or on the effects of migration. The elasticity
of land supply and the rate of substitution in the consumption of housing
and other private goods mainly determine the extent of distortions from the
property taxes. The lower the costs of migration are, the more the tax bur-
den shifts from consumers to local land owners. Altogether, the classical
view can be regarded as a special case of the capital tax view. - On the other
side, the capital tax view allows for a deeper analysis of the production sec-
tor than the benefit view does. From the first view, we might, for instance,
15Henderson’s land tax is a ’value’ and not an ’amount’ tax.
16For a more extensive analysis of the property tax incidence, see: Zodrow and Miesz-
kowski (1983), Mieszkowski and Zodrow (1989).
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draw the conclusion that the burden of the property tax is borne by the
local production factors. Such an effect occurs, if a tax-induced outflow of
capital causes the returns of less mobile factors in the respective jurisdiction
to fall. Furthermore, the relationship between property taxation and income
distribution becomes more transparent in the capital tax view.17
As Hoyt (1999) pointed out, the distribution of a property tax burden
highly depends on the jurisdiction’s relative size. In Hoyt’s model, the econ-
omy consists of a large metropolitan area - with a fixed number of cities and
a fixed number of citizens. Since the cities differ in land sizes, the model
also allows for different population sizes. Citizens and capital can costlessly
move across the cities. Each city is governed by a Leviathan. He decides
on the property tax rate and on the amount of local public goods. While
Leviathan tries to maximize his very own benefit, he is constrained by both
’exit’ and ’voice’. Since the citizens have identical incomes and tastes, the
key equilibrium condition for the metropolis is: Every citizen reaches the
same utility level. From the total equilibrium conditions, Hoyt derived the
following comparative static result: The higher a city’s relative population
is, the lower will be the degree to which its fiscal variables are capitalized
into housing prices. Hoyt examined how this result influences the political
process. To do this, he specified Leviathan’s objective by a function in which
the expected fiscal surplus during his time in office depends on the property
tax rate, the local public goods, and the political effort by the residents. A
resident chooses her amount of effort such that the net land rent minus the
cost of effort becomes maximal. The net land rent is positively related to the
internal capitalization rate. Thus, a citizen will invest the more in political
effort, the lower the relative size of her city is. Or, a Leviathan will misuse
the more property tax revenue, the larger the relative size of his jurisdiction
is.18
As Caplan (2001) stated, land owners cannot effectively evade a property
tax by moving. As a consequence, exit would not be an effective constraint for
a Leviathan. Caplan contrived a model in which the total supply of land, the
number of jurisdictions, the jurisdictional boundaries, and the price of capital
are fixed. The production of housing is described by a Leontief function with
constant factor proportions. Citizens and capital can costlessly move. Hence,
17Zodrow believed that the explanatory power of the three views can hardly be com-
pared, empirically, although they might lead to diverging forecasts. Diverging forecasts
could arise due to many reasons, as for instance: Tiebout sorting, supply elasticities of
public goods, zoning effects, fiscal budgets, capital intensities, or capitalization effects.
18With his model, Hoyt offers an alternative explanation for the hypothesis by Brennan
and Buchanan (1980) about tax misuse and the government structure.
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the capitalization rate of property taxes into housing values is -1. There
exists a number of citizen types which differ in their tastes for public goods.
This number equals, by assumption, the number of jurisdictions. In each
jurisdiction, exactly two political parties compete for political power. Each
party is characterized by an own utility function. Based on this function,
it offers a platform that consists of a fiscal package. One party comes into
office, if it reaches a majority of votes in an election. The total economy will
be in equilibrium under three conditions:
1. no citizen wants to move to another jurisdiction;
2. no citizen wants to vote for another party;
3. no party wants to change its platform.
The game is played as follows: At first, the citizens sort themselves into
groups of the same taste for local public goods. Then, they receive equal
shares of the land in the respective jurisdiction. After that, the political
parties present their platforms. Although both parties could have platforms
that include excessive property taxation, the citizens will not relocate. This
is because the tax burden will be totally capitalized into the housing value.
If a citizen moved to another jurisdiction, then she would pay the initial tax
in the form of a lower sales price for her housing. Caplan concluded that
’exit’ is not an effective constraint for a Leviathan. Thus, we rather should
continue our search for effective constraints on the ’voice’ field.19
Wilson and Gordon (2003) set up a model in which residents control the
property tax rate and Leviathan’s salary via referendum. A Leviathan con-
trols the provision of local public goods. But, he is ’naturally’ inclined to use
the tax revenue for his personal consumption. The two authors assumed that
the citizens have identical tastes and that the total housing stock is exoge-
nously determined. They first analyzed the situation in an economy where
residents are immobile. In the first stage, the residents in each jurisdiction
choose their optimal tax rate and the optimal expenditure for Leviathan’s
salary, taking his incentives to use tax revenue for his personal consumption
into account. The optimal salary is such that a marginal change does not
affect the amount of public goods, anymore. The marginal change simply
crowds out tax waste. In the second stage, the Leviathan determines the
amount of public goods by maximizing his expected utility. This expecta-
tion depends on the probability that he loses his position by election. In such
19The capitalization rate of -1 is implied by the Leontief production function.
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an election, the residents base their decisions on a comparison between the
utility level in the own jurisdiction and a benchmark level. Thus, Leviathan
can decrease the probability of being dismissed by decreasing his misuse of
tax revenue. In the third stage, the residents decide on how to spend their
net incomes. The housing price will adapt to these decisions. As Wilson
and Gordon proved, the equilibrium amount of public goods will be below
a first-best level. - Next, the two authors analyzed the situation in an open
economy. Citizens will move to the jurisdiction that offers the highest util-
ity level to them. An increase of residents in one jurisdiction increases the
tax base, there. But, it also may incur congestion. Hence, each Leviathan
practices zoning policy. The open economy will be in equilibrium, when the
utility level in each jurisdiction is the same. As Wilson and Gordon found
out, this level will be higher than the ones in the economy without residential
mobility. Nonetheless, it cannot be determined whether the supply of public
goods will be higher or lower.20
The discussed literature is summarized in the tables 2.1 to 2.4.
2.2 Lessons
In the related literature, we can find at least six different government ob-
jective variables: fiscal revenue, fiscal surplus, own utility, votes, profit, and
welfare. The given objective variable is one major characteristic of a govern-
ment type. Another major characteristic is whether the government behaves
as a monolithic entity or as a heterogeneous network of individual agents.
Thus, we may describe a Leviathan as a monolithic entity which uses its
governmental power to maximize its fiscal revenue, its fiscal surplus, or its
own utility - given certain constraints. Such constraints can be found in
the field of revenue instruments, expenditure measures, citizens’ responses
(voice, exit), or market imperfections (incomplete knowledge, transaction
costs, time lags, etc.). The respective effects of various constraints can be
analyzed in a constitutional approach. Such an approach adopts a long-run
perspective and checks for the possibilities to impose or change a constraint
with unanimous agreement (behind a ’veil of ignorance’).21
20This model supports fiscal decentralization, even if zoning is not possible.
21The government objective might also be related to property values. Brueckner (1983)
constructed a model in which each local government chooses its packages of public goods to
maximize the aggregate property value in their community. As a result, all communities
will be internally Pareto efficient in the equilibrium. - There may be many reasons to
choose a certain objective for a particular model. Let us just mention four of them:
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publication government
objective
public revenue public expenditure housing market
Tiebout (1956) profit equal contributions specific package of lo-
cal public goods
none
Hamilton (1975) profit property tax specific package of lo-
cal public goods
zoning policy
Brennan and
Buchanan (1977)
fiscal revenue income tax;
lump-sum tax
fixed proportion of
revenue
none
Sonstelie and
Portney (1978)
profit sales of housing;
property tax
single quality public
services
local public monopo-
lies; stock: fixed in
short-run
Brennan and
Buchanan (1979)
fiscal surplus excise tax proportion of revenue none
Epple and
Zelenitz (1981)
fiscal surplus property tax publicly provided pri-
vate good
supply: firms in com-
petition; demand ←
collective good and
gross housing price
Table 2.1: Discussed literature: summary I-A
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publication equilibrium allocation distribution recommendation
Tiebout (1956) no migration local public goods:
efficient
benefit principle reduce costs of mobil-
ity
Hamilton (1975) capitalization rate
equals zero
local public goods:
efficient
benefit principle property tax plus
zoning as a price
system
Brennan and
Buchanan (1977)
tax rate follows price
elasticity of income
excess burden regressive fiscal constitution:
restrict tax base,
progressive tax rate
structure
Sonstelie and
Portney (1978)
short-run: private
consumption, public
goods; long-run: plus
housing stock
short-run: efficient;
long-run: efficient
in favor of smaller
houses
compensate due to
growth restriction;
benefit taxation
Brennan and
Buchanan (1979)
depends on tax limi-
tation
welfare loss regressive fiscal constituion: re-
strict tax base, con-
sider other tax limita-
tions
Epple and
Zelenitz (1981)
each citizen: maxi-
mal utility and ex-
actly one dwelling
independence of gov-
ernment type
Leviathans exploit
citizens ← elasticity
of housing supply
raise number of juris-
dictions
Table 2.2: Discussed literature: summary I-B
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publication government
objective
public revenue public expenditure housing market
Henderson (1985) profit, welfare, or
fiscal surplus
property tax publicly provided pri-
vate good
land: endogenous; ac-
tive land developers
Hoyt (1991) welfare land tax, property tax publicly provided pri-
vate good
coordination: gross
land rent and gross
housing price
Henderson (1995) profit and votes property tax versus
other fiscal revenue in-
struments
publicly provided pri-
vate good
housing production
function
Hoyt (1999) expected aggre-
gate fiscal surplus
in office
property tax publicly provided pri-
vate good
coordination: land per
unit of housing
Wilson and
Gordon (2003)
expected own util-
ity
property tax local public good; offi-
cial’s salary
housing value gener-
ates income; zoning in
open economy
Table 2.3: Discussed literature: summary I-C
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publication equilibrium allocation distribution recommendation
Henderson (1985) intra- and intercom-
munity: consistency?
government type,
land market, income
distribution
extra income for Le-
viathan
raise flexibility of
land markets
Hoyt (1991) no profits on housing
market; equal utility;
all land is used; bal-
anced fiscal budget
property tax: conges-
tion fee
mix: land tax and
property tax ← rel-
ative size of jurisdic-
tion
tax capital to inter-
nalize fiscal external-
ities
Henderson (1995) capital costs; rental
price for housing
’Samuelson condi-
tion’
from outside share-
holders to inside
homeowners
rather use no prop-
erty tax
Hoyt (1999) equal utility; sum of
cities’ populations
fiscal policy and
voter’s effort
voter’s effort is higher
in smaller cities
decentralize
Wilson and
Gordon (2003)
fiscal budget con-
straint; no migration
underprovision of
public goods
private income, offi-
cial’s salary or ’perks’
open borders; decen-
tralize
Table 2.4: Discussed literature: summary I-D
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A central way to constrain government power is to predetermine rules
on the allowable fiscal policy. Rules on this policy can be related to three
fields: a) the base, b) the rate structure, and c) the amount of revenue. How
effective a rule is, depends on the government level. The conditions that a
certain rule encounters on a local level may differ from those on a central level.
Some major distinctive conditions are related to the Tiebout mechanism.
This mechanism itself tends to work more effectively on a local level. Due
to that, any rule on the fiscal policy may be affected. a) The amount of
revenue that a tax instrument generates negatively depends on the related
elasticity. Normally, such elasticities are (in absolute value) higher on a local
level; the instruments will affect the market outcomes more strongly. Thus,
it seems to be advisable to allow only intrinsically inelastic public revenue
bases on a local level. b) A rate structure can be designed in a way to follow
certain redistributive purposes. The Tiebout mechanism, however, works
counter to governmental redistribution. Citizens who are supposed to pay
comparatively high rates might exit. In a Tiebout world, citizens segregate
into more homogeneous groups. Therefore, the scope for redistribution is
smaller on a local level. It seems to be advisable here to prescribe rather
’neutral’ rate structures. c) To limit the absolute amount of public revenue
seems not to be advisable in the long-run. Principally, the amount of public
revenue should be oriented towards the preferences of the citizens and the
technology of the public goods. Unfortunately, the development of these
two factors can hardly be predicted. - In the related literature, the local
public policy is usually predetermined as follows: a) the base is land (rent),
property value, housing sales, or ’heads’; b) the rate structure is flat; c) the
fiscal budget must be balanced.22
In a constitutional approach, the power of a local government can be
justified by its task to provide local public goods. Generally, we denote a
public good as local, if individuals that live outside the region can be excluded
from its use without specific costs. The local public good is pure, if there is
1) research interest, 2) research context, 3) model consistency, 4) empirical relevance.
- Brennan/ Buchanan (1983) asserted that for a model of institutional comparison, a
Leviathan objective is more appropriate than others. In essence, they gave the following
two reasons: 1) A Leviathan objective fits well the paradigma of a homo economicus.
A model of the total economy can thus become more consistent. 2) In an evolutionary
perspective, a Leviathan normally dominates other types of government. But, even if this
was not so clear, the citizens should take this as an assumption for their constitutional
rules. This norm is derived from a precautionary principle.
22An ’unusual’ way was followed by Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991). They built up a
model of local competition with a wage tax and a capital tax. The capital tax can either
be source-based or residence-based.
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no rivalry in its use, inside this region. However, in the related literature, it is
often assumed that there is total rivalry in the use of local public goods. The
total cost of such a good is proportional to the number of its users. By this
assumption, the good remains private in its character. Thus, we might better
speak of a publicly provided private good. But then the question arises:
What justifies the power of a government in that case? There seems to be no
problem to finance these goods by user charges. Publicly provided private
goods could be perfectly allocated by the Tiebout mechanism. However, as
Buchanan and Goetz (1972) stressed, Tiebout had failed to consider the fact
of location. Due to this fact, publicly provided private goods may generate
technological externalities; which might distort market outcomes.23
Typically, local public goods are prone to crowding or congestion, because
they are connected with a fixed parcel of land. The allocation of land in the
production of local public goods becomes a crucial determinant for their
use. Other crucial determinants stem from the housing market. We assume
that only those agents can use a certain local public good who live in the
region of this good. Next, dwellings are also connected with a fixed parcel
of land. Both, dwellings and local public goods, are durable. Therefore,
land markets, housing markets, and local public goods are typically highly
interrelated. Particularly strong externalities may occur between the three.
Altogether, free market prices may fail to coordinate the relevant individual
decisions in an optimal way. Government intervention seems to be necessary.
- One special way of intervention is zoning. Zoning measures specify what
decisions someone is allowed to take on a given parcel of land. Some measures,
for example, consist of prescribing the size and the form of the land area
or of the housing structure. Hamilton (1975) supported such measures in
particular. Other ways of intervention are based on the establishment of the
local government as housing monopolist. This local monopolist seeks to offer
a combination of housing stock, local public goods and taxes which maximizes
his profits. Such a setting was analyzed in particular by Sonstelie and Portney
(1978). - One rationale behind such interventions could be to strengthen
the capitalization of fiscal policy into the housing values. Capitalization is
supposed to make a local economy work more efficiently. The degree to which
23If the government is benevolent, then all administration costs can be assigned to the
costs for public goods. If the government is self-interested, then some administration costs
might be additional, as in Wilson and Gordon (2003). - To construct a local public good
as a publicly provided private good, helps to keep a model tractable; this is especially
important, if the government chooses both: the amount of public goods and the tax rate.
- In a Tiebout model which is extended by a perfect market for land, the allocation of
land to communities would presumably follow the principle of ’fiscal equivalence’.
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this is the case depends on the government’s objective function.24
Housing markets stabilize the local economy, if the housing prices reflect
the total benefit which the respective housing offers. One particular benefit is
derived from the respective package of local public goods. Differences in the
local packages may citizens cause to move. Thus, the local packages directly
influence the demand for housing. How strongly the housing prices adapt,
depends on the elasticity of housing supply. The central condition for an
equilibrium in the local economy is that each housing market clears. From
this, most other conditions can be derived. In sum, we get:
• each citizen lives in one and only one community;
• each community has a positive number of residents;
• no citizen wants to move;
• each citizen gets her optimal consumption bundle;
• there are no profits on the housing market;
• the land market clears;
• the political market clears.
Depending on the model framework, the equilibrium conditions can be more
specific. A widely spread assumption in the related literature is, for exam-
ple, that each citizen gets the same income. In this case, the economy only
reaches an equilibrium, if each citizen gets the same maximum utility in each
community. In models which include factor markets, we can often find the
condition that the price of a factor must be equal to the value of its marginal
product. Land, however, is normally a constant factor. Its price therefore
becomes a residual value. Finally, the political market usually is character-
ized by some kind of asymmetry (in power, information, endowment, and
24The property tax has also been regarded as a congestion fee which, however, distorts
the housing markets. Explanations were given by Hoyt (1991) and Krelove (1993). -
Wilson (1997) found a rule which determines the optimum amount of a congestible local
public good without property taxation. - The degree of capitalization is determined by:
the elasticity of housing demand and the elasticity of housing supply. Generally, the higher
(lower) the elasticitiy of demand (supply) is, the higher the degree of capitalization. The
two elasticities do not only depend on material facts about the various characteristics
of the housing market, but also on respective expectations. Glaeser (1996) analyzed the
effects of expectations about future amenity levels.
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so on). Such asymmetries tend to generate net losses. Hence, the political
market rather destabilizes the total economy.25
In the classical theory, the provision of public goods is optimal, if it corre-
sponds to the ’Samuelson rule’. This rule says that the sum of the marginal
rates of substitution over all users must equal the marginal rate of transfor-
mation between a private and the public good. Basically, the Samuelson rule
also applies to congestible local public goods. In this case, however, some po-
tential users have to be excluded. The cost of exclusion does not change the
character of the optimum, by itself. But, the type of implementation may
distort the total allocation. For a local economy, it seems hardly realistic
that each community is able to determine its optimal number of residents,
as it is described by the Samuelson rule. Hence, Tiebout (1956) proposed
that the citizens decide about the allocation by ’voting with their feet’. But,
as Buchanan and Goetz (1972) stressed, Tiebout had neglected the ’fact of
location’. In a next step, Hamilton (1975) suggested to extend the Tiebout
framework by a property tax and zoning policy. The essential idea is that
the zoning policy transforms the property tax into a head tax, then. The
amount of local public goods could be optimal. This policy, however, distorts
the housing market, which moves the economy away from its total optimum.
If it is impossible to finance a local public good by equal contributions, then
the alternative revenue instrument will distort the allocation. In the theory
of optimal taxation, the extent of the distortion is measured by the ’excess
burden’. However, his kind of measurement claims a high degree of knowl-
edge from the social planner. If the social planner is actually self-interested,
then he will seek to change the allocation to his own advantage. Constraints
on his actions are needed to reduce welfare losses.26
In a market economy, distribution primarily arises as a side effect of
allocation. Thus, any government intervention influences both, allocation
and distribution. However, this does not prevent a government from putting
a strong emphasis on one of the two. In a constitutional approach, the
citizens try to become aware of the general connections between allocation
and distribution. Behind the veil of ignorance, they may be able to reach a
25In a local context, it seems well justified to assume that incomes are equal. It excludes
some distributional issues from the analysis of a government level where redistribution is
rather badly assigned. - A careful and consistent derivation of the conditions for equilibria
in a local economy was delivered by Westhoff (1977). Epple, Filimon and Romer (1984,
1993) demonstrated how the assumptions on the individual preferences and technology
must be restricted to come to an equilibrium in a local model with both, flexible housing
markets and competitive political markets.
26Samuelson (1954) derived this rule for pure public goods with lump-sum taxation.
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consensus on how the connections should be corrected by the government.
However, they also need to fix rules that guide the government towards the
citizens’ consensus. - Here, we are mainly concerned about the allocational
and distributional effects of different public revenue instruments. Public
revenue instruments can be fixed into the constitution as constraints to the
government. The related literature concentrated a lot on the effects of a
property tax. The normal effects of this revenue instrument are still highly
controversial. Three major views have appeared with respect to the incidence
of this instrument: the classical, the benefit, and the capital tax view. Each
of them works with a distinct model framework. In the classical view, the
property tax burden is finally borne by the housing users, in the benefit view,
by the local public goods users, and in the capital tax view, by the capital
owners. Zodrow (2001) compared the three views and sought to reconcile
them. Nonetheless, strong discrepancies have remained, as for example: In
the classical view, the property tax mainly distorts the demand for local
public goods, in the benefit view, the housing supply, and in the capital tax
view, the capital market.27
In sum, what does the related literature recommend to citizens in the
constiutional stage? - First of all, the Tiebout mechanism is a good basis
for the provision of local public goods. Hence, a constitution should contain
rules that support the mobility of its citizens. Surely, mobility alone does
not generate an efficient equilibrium. The central reason is that local public
goods are fixed to land. This fixation creates many specific problems. Let
us mention just four of them:28
1. local public goods tend to congestion;
2. their supply is difficult to adapt;
3. technologies and externalities support strategic behavior;
4. consumption of local public goods and other goods are difficult to op-
timize, simultaneously.
The related literature recommends various measures to solve these problems.
Obviously, these recommendations are derived from models which are partly
27The frameworks of the three views have the following assumptions in common: zero
transaction costs, transparent markets, and immediate responses. The frameworks espe-
cially differ in the equilibrium concept and the supply conditions for housing. From a
series of studies, we may draw the conclusion that the empirical relevance of each view is
difficult to measure. See: Mieszkowski/ Zodrow (1989) and Zodrow (2001).
28The specific problems become more apparent in comparison to club goods.
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incompatible with each other. As a consequence, the citizens should be
careful when they intend to stipulate a combination of measures into their
constitution. It is indispensable to check whether the assumptions of a certain
model fit the long-run perspective of their economy. Starting by this, the
citizens become able to evaluate the pros and cons of different measures.
Table 2.5 summarizes some specific pros and cons.
public measure pro con
facilitate exit coordination of prefer-
ences for local public
goods
production efficiency;
crowding
facilitate voice coordination of prefer-
ences for local public
goods
strategic behavior; het-
erogeneity; instability
fiscal decentralization competition among ju-
risdictions
economies of scale;
spillovers
zoning coverage of costs for lo-
cal public goods
distortions on the
housing market; gov-
ernment power
public housing mono-
poly
coverage of costs for lo-
cal public goods
distortions on the
housing market; gov-
ernment power
support private land
development
competition among ju-
risdictions
distortions on market
for local public goods;
spillovers
Table 2.5: Local policy measures: pros and cons
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Chapter 3
Principles for an Optimal
Taxation
Any tax other than a lump-sum tax distorts the allocation; it causes some
specific deadweight loss. The economy cannot reach a Pareto optimum with
such a tax. Hence, when we analyze the effects of a distortionary tax, the
best we can find are overall second best solutions. The ’theory of the second
best’ tells us that it may be expedient to deliberately deviate from a first best
condition, if another first best condition cannot be satisfied. - The ’theory of
optimal taxation’ seeks to contrive second best solutions for economies with
distortionary taxes. This theory bases in particular on two contributions:
the one by Ramsey (1927), the other by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971).1
Ramsey asked how the overall deadweight loss can be minimized, if a
certain amount of public revenue must be generated with commodity taxes.
He set up a model in which a representative (producer-consumer) household
chooses among a finite set of commodities to maximize its net utility. The
net price that this household pays for a specific commodity corresponds to
the related tax. From this model, Ramsey derived the following rule: To
minimize the overall deadweight loss, each commodity tax rate must be fixed
in such a way that a marginal change of any single tax rate would lead to
the same marginal change in the (compensated) demand for all commodities
(’Ramsey rule’). If we exclude cross-price effects from the model, then we
can get to the following rule: In the optimum, each commodity tax rate is
inversely proportional to the (compensated) price elasticity of demand of the
1For an introductory discussion, see Stiglitz (2000), chapter 20; for a more formal
treatment, see Auerbach (1985).
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related commodity (’inverse-elasticity rule’).
According to the theory of the second best, it may be possible that some
distortions in the production sector increase the utility level in an economy in
which the Ramsey rule or the inverse-elasticity rule is satisfied. Diamond and
Mirrlees checked whether this is the case. They came to the result that this is
’normally’ not the case. Efficiency in production does support a second-best
solution. Furthermore, Diamond and Mirrlees extended Ramsey’s model
framework, especially for multiple households. Since the households may
have different utility functions and different incomes, distributional issues
enter the analysis. The essential optimization problem of their model became:
Maximize a given social welfare function subject to the condition that the
total tax revenue reaches exactly a certain level. From this extended model,
the two authors could derive the following rule: In the optimum, a marginal
change of a single commodity tax rate leads to a higher marginal change
in the (compensated) demand for the related commodity, if its demand is
concentrated among: a) households with a lower marginal social utility of
income; or b) households with a lower income elasticity of tax payments
(’Diamond-Mirrlees rule’).
The theory of optimal taxation has been further developed in many re-
spects. New models have integrated topics, as for example: the provision of
public goods, externalities, pre-existing distortions, or risk. Altogether, these
models offer a multitude of (rather) consistent recommendations. These rec-
ommendations in particular deal with: commodity taxation, income taxation,
rate structures, and vertical equity. - The theory of optimal taxation bases
on the assumption that the government is benevolent and omniscient. The
government knows all individual preference and production functions. For
any complex network of markets, it is able to exactly predict each trans-
action. This ability is necessary to compute any potential deadweight loss.
In general, the greater the substitution effects from taxation, the greater
are the deadweight losses. Nevertheless, the benevolent government might
have to weigh up allocational against distributional aspects. Based on its
perfect knowledge of preferences and incomes, the government is able to con-
struct the social welfare function in the exact form. Usually, the function is
described as a utilitarian one, with specific cardinal distributional weights.
This appears as an expedient way to integrate vertical equity norms into the
optimization problem.2
Altogether, this theory describes the government as able and willing to
2For the overview of the different types of social welfare functions, their pros and cons,
see Mueller (2003), chapters 23 and 24.
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find the second best optimum for the economy. In this optimum, the chosen
tax structure leads to a certain public revenue, the lowest possible deadweight
loss, and the relatively best vertical distribution. Normally, the tax structure
will be such that it treats each object specifically. Thus, the complexity of the
tax structure increases with the complexity of the economy. This, however,
does not create any problems for the implementation of the optimal tax
structure, since the theory of optimal taxation excludes any administration
costs.
From a constitutional perspective, it seems inexpedient to assume that
the government is benevolent and omniscient. If we regard individuals as
self-interested and limited in their knowledge, how could the government be
the opposite? - Hence, the constitutional approach assumes that the govern-
ment behaves as a Leviathan, as a maximizer of its income, having limited
knowledge. Now, the central problem becomes that a Leviathan’s maximum
does not by itself tend to coincide with the social optimum. In order to sup-
port some coincidence, a Leviathan has to be constrained. Thus, it becomes
the task of a constitutional assembly to fix optimal rules on Leviathan’s ac-
tions. There are two essential conditions under which the assembly works:
first, they stand behind a ’veil of ignorance’; second, they have to take every
decision unanimously. These two rules shall help to avoid that a member
supports a rule which is not in the common interest.
The optimal tax system highly depends on the government model. There-
fore, the constitutional approach tends to take positions which contradict the
theory of optimal taxation. First of all, the constitutional approach consid-
ers tax avoidance not only as an efficiency loss. Tax avoidance is rather a
right in itself. This right helps the citizens to constrain Leviathan and thus
to reduce his social power. Furthermore, in the constitutional approach, the
optimal amount of public revenue is not predetermined. It depends on other
endogenous variables, instead. Typically, a major role is played by the re-
lationship between the public revenue and the types of public goods. The
constitutional approach emphasizes that a certain tax system might be op-
timal only under certain conditions. Such an optimum is the best possible
result out of the given trade-offs. Therefore, the optimum might represent
a third best solution or less, compared to a model of perfect markets. Since
the constitutional approach takes a long-run position, the model conditions
should be defined in a general form. This way, the optimal tax system may
stay the same, even if some variables change. From the general model condi-
tions, one typically gets to some general and abstract rule. Such a rule can
be specified outside but in line with the constitution. The specification is
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performed by those who know the relevant specific conditions, best. Since
knowledge primarily arises in a dispersed form, the task to specify rules, as
tax rules for instance, seems to be best accomplished by some decentralized
process.3
3Hettich and Winer (1985) analyze and compare three (normative) tax approaches:
1) equitable taxation, 2) optimal taxation, 3) fiscal exchange (constitutional). - Brennan
and Buchanan (1980) pointed out that the conclusions from a constiutional approach
likely contradict those from a theory of optimal taxation. Generally, they favored the first
approach. Strangely enough, they based their constitutional conclusions on an analysis
of deadweight losses. - Buchanan (1995) examines the way to an optimal taxation in the
case where the government is dominated by a majoritarian democracy. - Hayek (1960)
in particular stressed the ’irremediable’ social fact that knowledge primarily arises in a
dispersed form. He analyzed the consequences in a constitutional perspective.
33
Chapter 4
A General Model of Local Tax
Competition
It is the task of a model to describe and explain the essence of its object.
Thus, the model needs to prescind from some ’minor’ features of its object; it
needs to simplify. The central question then becomes: Which simplifications
are most expedient? - Sure, the answers to this depend on the specific object
and the related research interest.
The object of our model is local tax competition. We are especially
interested in the role of housing markets within this object. Thus, which
simplifications shall we make?
In the related literature, local tax competition is most often described and
explained by a one-period model. The variation of causes and effects over
time is neglected. However, this simplification incurs two essential problems:
First, the property tax is based on an assessed value. It is charged on the
housing owners in every period. It works similarly to a member fee. The sales
tax - by contrast - is based on a real price. It is charged on a housing buyer.
It works similarly to an entrance fee. But in a one-period model, these
differences vanish; property tax and sales tax become identical. Second,
housing has two essential characteristics: a) it is immobile, and b) it is
durable. a) Housing is connected with a specific parcel of land. Due to
this connection, it may easily become subject to externalities. Its value thus
crucially depends on its location. b) Housing offers its services for more
than one period; whereas these services may vary in quality over time. The
qualities do not only depend on the investment of the owner. Thus, the two
essential characteristics of housing cannot be considered in a one-period time
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framework.
Next, many models in the related literature describe local public goods as
publicly provided private goods. There exists perfect rivalry in consumption.
These goods can be produced at constant costs per user. However, it seems
unclear why such goods should be provided by the government. Problems
with exclusion can hardly be relevant. Nobody could free-ride. In fact, local
public goods most often show imperfect rivalry and non-constant costs per
user, in the real world.
Finally, there exists a broad variety of government specifications in the
related literature. Even those models which define the government as a
Leviathan use various specifications. The objective variable may be: tax
revenue, fiscal surplus, (expected) personal income, or (expected) personal
utility. The choice variables may be: tax rate, or local public goods. The
choice out of these variables depends on the specific research interest. Such an
interest may lie in: voice decisions, exit decisions, tax policy, or overall fiscal
policy. Since the models are supposed to be consistent, a certain government
specification implicates specific simplifications or technical assumptions in
other parts of the model. In the related literature, one can find a tendency to
specify the government in a rather narrow manner. Its optimization problem
thus becomes rather complicated. This usually leaves little room for the
analysis of the households’ consumption decisions; though these seem to be
the key driver of local tax competition.
Thus, our general model of local tax competition looks as follows:
In this model, we have three different types of agents: Leviathans, house-
holds, and housing firms. Each type is homogeneous. The agents make their
decisions in two different stages: In stage 1, each household is endowed with
a parcel of land. Migration is not possible. Each Leviathan announces his
local fiscal package (tax rates and local public goods). Each household de-
mands housing for its on parcel of land. Housing is offered by housing firms
in competition. On a global market, they demand capital for the housing
production. The housing firms pay the land rents to the respective land own-
ers. Stage 2 is divided into periods. In each of these periods, the households
earn a wage and consume. Migration is only possible in the first period. The
Leviathans may revise their local fiscal packages. The households consume
local public goods where they reside. They consume the same housing in
each period. On a global market, they demand a non-durable composite
private good in each period.
Let us go into details, now.
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Essential parameters for our local economy are set in stage 1. The econ-
omy is divided into o = 1, 2, ..., J¯ regions, with J¯ being large. Each region
has the same size of land, L¯o, and the same number of residents, N¯o > 1.
Each resident owns an equal share of her region’s land:
l¯o =
L¯o
N¯o
. (4.1)
For the total economy, it holds that:
L¯ = J¯ L¯o and N¯ = J¯N¯o.
Based on these parameters, the agents (Leviathans, households, and hous-
ing firms) make their decisions.
4.1 Housing Firms
The housing firms merely exist in stage 1. They behave as profit maximizers
on a competitive market. In a short form, the profit from a single production
contract is described by:
πho = ρho − cho. (4.2)
The revenue (ρho) is simply the internal housing price per unit (pho) times
the individual demand for housing (ho). The cost (cho) is determined by: the
capital rent (r¯k), the capital input (kho), the capital rent tax (τko ∈ [0, 1]),
the land rent (rlo), the land input (l¯o), and the land rent tax (τlo ∈ [0, 1]).
Thus:
πho = phoho − r¯k(1 + τko)kho − rlo(1 + τlo)l¯ho.
While the firm can decide on the capital input, the land input is given by
the household’s share of land. Since the capital comes from a global market,
its rent is taken as constant. Furthermore, we assume that its marginal
product monotonically decreases. The land rent is determined as a residual
value.
4.2 Households
In stage 1, the households get rents for their land. In stage 2, they earn
wages and consume. The households seek to maximize their own utility.
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They make their decisions in a life-time perspective. There are t = 1, 2, ..., T
consumption periods. The households can move across regions only in t = 1.
The region of residence in stage 2 is described by j = 1, 2, ..., J¯ . Thus, the
utility function of a household looks as follows:
uj =
T∑
t=1
βt−1ut(xtj, hj) + ug(Gj); (4.3)
where β denotes the time preference factor with 0 < β < 1, xtj the composite
private good, hj the housing, and Gj the local public good. We assume that
the utility from the local public good is independent of the chosen amounts
of the other goods. However, the households can use local public goods only
where they reside - namely in j. We further assume that every second partial
derivative of the given utility function is negative over the whole range.
A household receives incomes from two sources: labor and land ownership.
It calculates its discounted life-time income as follows:
yo =
∑
t
wt(1 + r¯y)
−(t−1) + rlol¯ho; (4.4)
where wt is the wage. By transactions on the global capital market, the
household can distribute its income over different periods at an interest rate
(r¯y ∈ (0, 1)) without any further restrictions. Its disposable income in period
t, thus, becomes:
yto = (1 + r¯y)
t−1γtjyo.
The disposable share in period t of the life-time income is γtj > 0, with∑
t γtj = 1. Each γtj has to be chosen in such a way that yto equals the
household’s expenditure in period t, denoted by btj. Thus, the discounted
life-time expenditure function becomes:
bj =
∑
t
(1+ r¯y)
−(t−1)p¯xxtj+phj(1+ τsj)hj+
∑
t
(1+ r¯y)
−(t−1)phjτvtjhj; (4.5)
where p¯x denotes the price of the composite private good, phj the external
net price of housing, τsj ∈ [0, 1] the rate of the sales tax on housing, and
τvtj ∈ [0, 1] the rate of the property tax. While p¯x arises on a global market,
phj arises on a regional market.
4.3 Leviathans
Each region is governed by a Leviathan. A Leviathan seeks to maximize
his own fiscal budget surplus. He is allowed to choose the tax rates for four
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different bases. In stage 1, he may charge taxes on land rent and on capital
rent; in stage 2, on housing sales and on housing property. A Leviathan
produces his local public goods, by himself. Thus, he deals with the following
budget equation:
So=j =
∑
τ
Rτo=τj − Cgo=gj with (4.6)
Rlo = N¯oτlorlol¯ho;
Rko = N¯oτkor¯kkho;
Rsj = Njτsjphjhj;
Rvj = Nj
∑
t
(1 + r¯y)
−(t−1)τvtjphjhj;
Cgo=gj = Cg(Go=j).
The fiscal budget surplus in a region o and j (So=j) equals the sum of
the local tax revenues from: land rent (Rlo), capital rent (Rko), housing sales
(Rsj), and housing property (Rvj). The respective tax rates are denoted by:
τlo, τko, τsj, and τvtj. The amount of local public goods is exogenously deter-
mined. We assume that the related cost function (Cg(Go=j)) is U-shaped.
4.4 Market Equilibrium Conditions
In our general model, the three types of agents make choices on altogether
3T + 5 variables: housing firms on ko; households on xjt, hj, γt; Leviathans
on τlo, τko, τsj, τvtj. This multitude of choices must essentially be coordinated
by the internal prices for housing (pho) and by the external prices for housing
(phj). A total equilibrium will be reached in the following steps:
In stage 1, the regional boundaries are closed. Every agent is merely
informed about her own region. Every Leviathan announces his choice of the
tax rates and the amount of local public goods. Every household demands
its optimal amount of housing on its own parcel of land. The housing firms
make their offerings. A region o will reach an (internal) equilibrium, if:
The individual housing demand equals the individual housing supply for
each of the No parcels of land.
hdo = h
s
o. (4.7)
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In stage 2, two types of agents are still existent: Leviathans and house-
holds. In the first period, the regional boundaries are opened. The agents
thus become informed about the market conditions in the whole economy.
They revise their plans. The Leviathans announce their new fiscal packages.
The households first check their exit options, then, they start to consume.
The whole economy will reach an (external) equilibrium under three further
conditions:
In each region, the total demand for housing equals the total housing
stock:
Hdj = H
s
o=j. (4.8)
Every household lives in one and only one jurisdiction:
∑
j
Nj = J¯N¯o = N¯ . (4.9)
Every household reaches the same and highest possible utility level:
uj = u
∗. (4.10)
Table 4.1 gives a summary of the model’s variables.
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name interpretation
J¯ number of regions in the economy
N¯o number of households from region o (origin)
N¯j number of households in region j (consumption)
L¯o land size of region o
l¯o land size of parcel in o
uj individual utility in region j
β time preference factor
xtj individual consumption of composite private good in
period t and region j
hj individual consumption of housing in region j
Gj local public good in region j
yo individual life-time income from region o
yto disposable income in period t
wt wage in period t
rlo land rent
r¯k capital rent
r¯y interest rate
γtj share of disposable income in t in life-time income
bj individual life-time expenditure
p¯x price of the composite private good
pho internal net price of housing
phj external net price of housing
τsj sales tax rate on housing in j
τvtj property tax rate in period t and region j
πho profit from a single housing production contract
ρho revenue from housing contract
cho cost of a housing
kho capital input for housing
τko tax on capital rent
τlo tax on land rent
So=j fiscal budget surplus
Rτ public revenue
Cg costs of local public good
ατ share of specific tax revenue spent on local public goods
Hdj total housing demand in region j
Hso total housing supply in o
Table 4.1: Variables of the general model: summary
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Chapter 5
Two-Period Tax Models:
Optimization and Comparative
Statics
Our general model shall describe some major settings for Leviathans, house-
holds, and housing firms in local tax competition. But, it is still too complex
to reach clear results on the respective optimizations and comparative statics.
We therefore need to simplify further. The following additional assumptions
are made:
Firstly, the number of periods in stage 2 is restricted to two: T = 2. Thus,
a household’s private consumption is described by only three variables: hj,
x1j, and x2j. Secondly, every household has the same productivity and offers
the same amount of labor on a global market such that wt = w¯. We thus
obtain our fourth exogenous and constant variable, besides p¯x, r¯k, and r¯y.
Thirdly, the Leviathans are only allowed to use one, identical tax base. They
have only one, identical choice variable; which is either τlo or τko or τsj or
τvtj. Lastly, all Leviathans face identical incentives to spend a share of a tax
revenue on local public goods. We denote this share by α¯τ with 0 < α¯τ < 1.
Each ατ is determined by the tax base specific institutional environment.
This environment is exogenous to our model and assumed to be constant.
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5.1 Taxation of Land Rent
In stage 1 of our model, each household is endowed with a parcel of land. It
uses this as an input for housing. The land thus generates a rent without
previous investment. The land rent appears as a gain on housing production.
Via the housing price, the extent of this gain is dependent on the provision of
local public goods. Since the costs for the local public goods have to be taken
by the Leviathans, these goods appear as some positive externalities to the
land owners. Therefore, it seems expedient to allow Leviathans to impose a
tax on land rents. This way, the positive externalities from the local public
goods could be internalized.
5.1.1 Housing Firms
The housing firms are profit maximizers on a competitive market. They
choose their input of capital such that their profit can reach zero. These
firms take the input of land from the housing demanders. They pay them
a land rent, which arises as a residual. This land rent is subject to the tax.
The housing firms are identical and disappear after stage 1.
Formally, the optimization problem of a housing firm looks as follows:
max
kho
πho = pho(τlo, Go)ho(kho, l¯ho)− r¯kkho − rlo(1 + τlo)l¯ho. (5.1)
The first order condition is:
pho
∂ho
∂kho
− r¯k = 0.
As a solution for the optimal capital input, we get:
r¯k = pho
(
∂ho
∂kho
)
∗
. (5.2)
This means that a housing firm increases its capital input, until the value
of its marginal product equals the capital rent. Since there is a large number
of competitors, it holds that: π∗o = 0. For the land rent, we can conclude
that:
rlo =
pho(τlo, Go)ho − r¯kk
∗
ho
(1 + τlo)l¯ho
;
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rlo = rlo(pho(τlo, Go), τlo).
Our comparative static result of the capital input is the following:
dkho
dτlo
= −
∂pho
∂τlo
∂ho
∂kho
pho
∂2ho
∂k2
ho
< 0. (5.3)
In order to get this result, we assume that: a) the partial derivative of
the internal housing price with respect to the land rent tax is negative; b)
the marginal product of capital input is decreasing. Thus, we can make the
following statement: A housing firm decreases (increases) its capital input as
a response to a marginal increase (decrease) of the land rent tax.
5.1.2 Households
The households maximize their life-time utility, constrained by their life-
time income. They reach utility from one-period composite private goods,
housing, and local public goods. The incomes stem from a net land rent in
stage 1 and from wages in both periods of stage 2. The households distribute
their incomes over both periods. In stage 2, they can choose where to reside
between all regions. Thus, the external housing price is a function of the
vector of local public goods in the whole economy.
In formal terms, the optimization problem for a household in a local
economy with land rent taxes looks as follows:
max
x1j ,x2j ,hj ,γ1
uj = u1(x1j, hj) + βu2(x2j, hj) + ug(Gj) (5.4)
subject to
y1o = γ1yo = p¯xx1j + phj(~Gj)hj
and
y2o = (1 + r¯y)(1− γ1)yo = p¯xx2j;
where
yo = w¯
(
1 +
1
1 + r¯y
)
+ rlol¯ho
with
rlol¯ho =
pho(τlo, Go)ho(kho(pho(τlo, Go)))− r¯kkho(pho(τlo, Go))
1 + τlo
.
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We are able to solve this optimization problem in a Lagrangian approach.
Let us denote the Lagrangian function by Zl, the Lagrangian multipliers by
λ1, λ2. Then, we get as first order conditions:
∂Zl
∂x1j
=
∂u1
∂x1j
− λ1p¯x = 0;
∂Zl
∂x2j
= β
∂u2
∂x2j
− λ2p¯x = 0;
∂Zl
∂hj
=
∂u1
∂hj
+ β
∂u2
∂hj
− λ1phj = 0;
∂Zl
∂γ1
= λ1 − λ2(1 + r¯y) = 0;
∂Zl
∂λ1
= γ1
(
w¯
(
1 +
1
1 + r¯y
)
+
phoho − r¯kkho
1 + τlo
)
− p¯xx1j − phjhj = 0;
∂Zl
∂λ2
= (1 + r¯y)(1− γ1)
(
w¯
(
1 +
1
1 + r¯y
)
+
phoho − r¯kkho
1 + τlo
)
− p¯xx2j = 0.
Thus, to completely solve the household’s optimization problem, we would
need to specify its utility function. But, to derive the related comparative
statics, we can do without such a specification. The relevant results are:
dx1j
dτlo
= 0; (5.5)
dx2j
dτlo
= 0; (5.6)
dhj
dτlo
=
r¯kkho − ho
(
pho − (1 + τlo)
∂pho
∂τlo
)
phj(1 + τlo)2
< 0 if (5.7)
phoho > r¯kkho + ho(1 + τlo)
∂pho
∂τlo
;
dγ1
dτlo
= (1− γ1)
r¯kkho − ho
(
pho − (1 + τlo)
∂pho
∂τlo
)
yo(1 + τlo)2
< 0 if (5.8)
phoho > r¯kkho + ho(1 + τlo)
∂pho
∂τlo
.
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These results say the following: A change of the land rent tax does not
lead to a change of a household’s consumption of the composite private good.
However, the household changes its housing demand and its share of first-
period expenditure. These responses are always negative, since the derived
conditions must be satisfied in the general logic of our model. The response of
the housing demand is the higher, the lower the capital rent is. Additionally,
the response of the share of first-period expenditure is the higher, the lower
the wages are.
5.1.3 Leviathans
The Leviathans choose the land rent tax rates which maximize their own
fiscal budget surplus. They take into account that the land rent is dependent
on the internal housing price and the chosen tax rate. The amount of land
input is fixed. The land rent tax is charged in stage 1.
The optimization problem of a Leviathan thus looks exactly as follows:
max
τlo
Slo = τlorlo(pho(τlo, Go), τlo)L¯ho(1− α¯lo). (5.9)
The first order condition is:
∂Slo
∂τlo
= rlo + τlo
(
∂rlo
∂pho
∂pho
∂τlo
+
∂rlo
∂τlo
)
= 0.
The solution is:
τlo = −
rlo
∂rlo
∂pho
∂pho
∂τlo
+ ∂rlo
∂τlo
⇒ ǫlo = −1. (5.10)
Hence, a Leviathan sets the tax rate at the point where the elasticitiy
of the land rent is (minus) unity. The reaction of the land rent to a change
of the tax rate comes through two different channels: one is direct and the
other goes via the housing price.
5.1.4 Total Equilibrium
In our model of land rent taxes, the total equilibrium can be described by
the following two conditions, which combine and specify the four conditions
of the general model.
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First:
N¯ =
∑
j
∑
o h
d
j (yo(rlo(pho(τlo, Go), τlo)), phj(~Gj))
hso=j(kh(pho(τlo, Go)))
. (5.11)
This means that the total number of households in the local economy must
equal the sum of all housing consumers. The individual housing demand in
region j depends on the household’s land rent from region o and the housing
price in region j. The number of households in j must equal the total housing
demand divided by the individual housing supply. The housing supply is
determined by the optimal capital input, as it appears in stage 1.
Second:
u∗ = vj(yo(rlo(pho(τlo, Go), τlo)), phj(~Gj), Gj). (5.12)
Every household in the economy must reach the same, maximum level of
utility. The indirect utility depends on the household’s land rent from region
o, the housing price in j, and the supply of local public goods in j.
Thus, we get the following two comparative static results:
dpho
dτlo
= −
∂pho
∂τlo
> 0; (5.13)
dphj
dτlo
=
phoho − r¯kkho
(1 + τlo)2
∂vj
∂yo
∂vj
∂phj
< 0. (5.14)
This means that the total response of the internal housing price on a
change of the land rent tax is positive, since we assume that the partial
response is negative. The respective total response of the external housing
price is, by contrast, negative. The extent of this response negatively depends
on the wages and on the capital rent.
5.2 Taxation of Capital Rent
In our model, capital is a variable input for the production of housing. It is
traded on a global market. For our local economy, its supply is thus perfectly
elastic; which means that housing firms can demand any amount of capital at
a fixed price. Because the local supply of land is fixed, the amount of capital
input completely determines the supply of housing. The local supply of
housing influences the use of local public goods. The optimum supply of local
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public goods depends on the capital input for housing. Therefore, it seems to
be expedient to impose a tax on the capital rent. With a capital rent tax, the
optimal amount of local public goods could be controlled. A functional link
between housing supply, local public goods consumption, and public revenue
could be formed. We may ask, however: Which are the consequences of such
a link, if local fiscal policy is made by Leviathans?
5.2.1 Housing Firms
The housing firms choose the amount of capital input which maximizes their
profits. A tax on capital rents makes capital input less profitable. Since
capital is the only variable input factor in housing production, there can be
no factor substitution. Thus, a capital rent tax affects the housing supply in
a direct way.
In formal terms, the optimization problem of a housing firm is described
and solved by:
max
kho
πho = pho(τko, Go)ho(kho, l¯ho)− r¯k(1 + τko)kho − rlol¯ho; (5.15)
pho
∂ho
∂kho
− r¯k(1 + τko) = 0;
r¯k(1 + τko) = pho
(
∂ho
∂kho
)
∗
. (5.16)
Hence, a housing firm increases its capital input, until the value of the
marginal product equals the gross capital rent. Since there will be no profits
on the competitive market, the land rent becomes:
rlo =
pho(τko, Go)ho − r¯k(1 + τko)k
∗
ho
l¯ho
;
rlo = rlo(pho(τko, Go), τko).
The comparative static result for the housing firms is the following:
dkho
dτko
=
r¯k −
∂pho
∂τko
∂ho
∂kho
pho
∂2ho
∂k2
ho
< 0. (5.17)
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We conclude that a housing firm negatively responds to a change of the
capital rent tax. The response will be the stronger, the higher the price level
on the global capital market is.
5.2.2 Households
A capital rent tax may affect the households’ consumption plans via their
income constraints. The reason is that one part of their incomes is a land
rent, which does depend on the capital rent tax.
A household optimizes its consumption as follows:
max
x1j ,x2j ,hj ,γ1
uj = u1(x1j, hj) + βu2(x2j, hj) + ug(Gj) (5.18)
subject to
y1o = γ1yo = p¯xx1j + phj(~Gj)hj
and
y2o = (1 + r¯y)(1− γ1)yo = p¯xx2j;
where
yo = w¯
(
1 +
1
1 + r¯y
)
+ (phoho − r¯k(1 + τko)kho) .
Without specifying the utility function, we are able to derive the com-
parative statics. The results are as follows:
dx1j
dτko
= 0; (5.19)
dx2j
dτko
= 0; (5.20)
dhj
dτko
= −
r¯kkho − ho
∂pho
∂τko
phj
< 0; (5.21)
dγ1
dτko
= −(1− γ1)
r¯kkho − ho
∂pho
∂τko
yo
< 0. (5.22)
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Hence, we find out that a change of the capital rent tax leaves the com-
posite private goods consumption unaffected. But, such a change affects the
housing consumption and the share of first-period expenditure negatively.
The impact on the housing consumption positively depends on the capital
rent level. The impact on the share of first-period expenditure positively
depends on the capital rent level, and negatively on the wage level.
5.2.3 Leviathans
If a Leviathan seeks to maximize his budget surplus from a capital rent tax,
then he has to consider the responses of the capital input. His optimization
problem is:
max
τko
Sko = τkor¯kokho(pho(τko, Go), τko)No(1− α¯ko). (5.23)
In his optimum:
∂Sko
∂τko
= kho + τko
(
∂klo
∂pho
∂pho
∂τko
+
∂klo
∂τko
)
= 0;
τko = −
kho
∂kho
∂pho
∂pho
∂τko
+ ∂kho
∂τko
⇒ ǫko = −1. (5.24)
Hence, the fiscal budget surplus reaches its maximum at a point where
the elasticity of the capital with respect to the capital rent tax rate is (minus)
unity. A response to a tax rate change may come from two sides: first, the
housing firms adapt the capital input; second, the households adapt their
housing demand.
5.2.4 Total Equilibrium
Our local economy with capital rent taxes reaches a total equilibrium, if the
following two conditions are satisfied:
N¯ =
∑
j
∑
o h
d
j (yo(rlo(pho(τko, Go), τko)), phj(~Gj))
hso=j(kh(pho(τko, Go)))
(5.25)
and
u∗ = vj(yo(rlo(pho(τko, Go), τko)), phj(~Gj), Gj). (5.26)
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In very few words, the local economy will be in equilibrium, if the house-
holds do not have incentives to migrate, because they already reside in the
region where they can reach their maximum utility level. Such an equilib-
rium will be mainly coordinated by the housing prices. They determine the
incomes, the housing demand, and the capital demand.
The housing prices respond to a change of the capital rent tax in the
following way:
dpho
dτko
= −
∂pho
∂τko
> 0; (5.27)
dphj
dτko
= r¯kkho
∂vj
∂yo
∂vj
∂phj
< 0. (5.28)
The internal housing price positively responds to a change of the capital
rent tax. The total response just reverses the sign of the partial response.
The external housing price, by contrast, negatively responds to such a change.
This response will be the stronger, the higher the capital rent and the lower
the wage level is.
5.3 Taxation of Housing Sales
In our general model, we assume that the households can use local public
goods only in the region where they reside. In stage 1, migration is not pos-
sible. The internal housing price in region o depends on the amount of local
public goods in o. In stage 2, migration is possible. The external housing
price in j depends on the amounts of local public goods in all regions. In
both stages, the internal relationship between local public goods and housing
demand is positive. To the extent that the housing supply is inelastic, the
provision of local public goods may capitalize into the housing prices. While
the housing suppliers lose or profit from the capitalization, the providers of
local public goods originally stay unaffected. The benefit takers do not cor-
respond to the cost takers. One method to correct this inequality could be
to impose a tax on housing sales. Such a tax creates an adaptable wedge
between the gross and the net price for housing. It connects the housing
demand with the local public goods supply. This tax may serve as a variable
entry or exit fee. But, we shall assess this idea for the case that the housing
sales tax is used by Leviathans.
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5.3.1 Housing Firms
In our models, the housing firms must take the housing prices as given. The
price that they operate with is the internal one, arising in stage 1. A sales
tax, however, is based on the external housing price, arising in stage 2. This
is the one that the households use to make their consumption plans. Let us
now check whether this use (in stage 2) refers back to the plannings of the
housing firms (in stage 1).
In our sales tax model, we treat the optimization problem of a housing
firm in the following way:
max
kho
πso = pho(Go)ho(kho, l¯ho)− r¯kkho − rlol¯ho; (5.29)
pho
∂ho
∂kho
− r¯k = 0;
r¯k = pho
(
∂ho
∂kho
)
∗
; (5.30)
rlo =
pho(Go)ho − r¯kk
∗
ho
l¯ho
= rlo(pho(Go)).
The comparative static result is:
dkho
dτsj
= 0. (5.31)
It turns out that a housing sales tax does not influence the capital input
in the housing production and thus not the offered amount of housing.
5.3.2 Households
The households must pay a sales tax when they start to consume housing. It
thus arises as a component of their first-period expenditures, in stage 2. A
sales tax works as an entry fee. This means that the households have to pay
it to use the local public goods. In stage 2, the households can choose among
regions. Thus, their decision to migrate is dependent on all tax rates and all
amounts of local public goods, in the economy. They remain land owner in
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o and become resident of j. The external housing price is now a function of
two vectors.
In this model, a household optimizes its consumption as follows:
max
x1j ,x2j ,hj ,γ1
uj = u1(x1j, hj) + βu2(x2j, hj) + ug(Gj) (5.32)
subject to
y1o = γ1yo = p¯xx1j + phj(~τsj, ~Gj)(1 + τsj)hj
and
y2o = (1− γ1)(1 + r¯y)yo = p¯xx2j;
where
yo = w¯
(
1 +
1
1 + r¯y
)
+ phoho − r¯kkho.
In a Lagrangian approach, the distinctive first order conditions are:
∂Zs
∂hj
=
∂u1
∂hj
+ β
∂u2
∂hj
− λ1phj(1 + τsj) = 0;
∂Zs
∂λ1
= γ1yo − p¯xx1j − phj(1 + τsj)hj = 0;
∂Zs
∂λ2
= (1 + r¯y)(1− γ1)
(
w¯
(
1 +
1
1 + r¯y
)
+ phoho − r¯kkho
)
− p¯xx2j = 0.
The relevant results of the comparative statics are:
dx1j
dτsj
=
phj + (1 + τsj)
∂phj
∂τsj
p¯x
∂u1j
∂hj
> 0 if (5.33)
phj > −(1 + τsj)
∂phj
∂τsj
;
dx2j
dτsj
= (1 + r¯y)
dx1j
dτsj
; (5.34)
dhj
dτsj
= −
2 + hj
∂u1j
∂hj
1 + τsj
phj + (1 + τsj)
∂phj
∂τsj
phj
∂u1j
∂hj
< 0 if (5.35)
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phj > −(1 + τsj)
∂phj
∂τsj
;
dγ1
dτsj
= −
phj + (1 + τsj)
∂phj
∂τsj
yo
∂u1j
∂hj
< 0 if (5.36)
phj > −(1 + τsj)
∂phj
∂τsj
.
Hence, if the net external housing price is greater than the partial deriv-
ative of the gross price with respect to the tax rate, we get to the following
essential conclusions: Firstly, the first-period consumption of the composite
private good reacts positively on a change of the tax rate. The extent of
this reaction negatively depends on the price for this good. Secondly, the
second-period consumption of the composite private good positively reacts
on a change of the tax rate. The extent of this reaction negatively depends
on the price for this good, and positively on the interest rate. Thirdly, the
housing consumption is negatively related to the housing sales tax. And
lastly, the share of the first-period expenditure is negatively related to this
tax. The sensitivity of this relationship negatively depends on the wage level.
5.3.3 Leviathans
The Leviathans revise their announcements of the sales tax rate at the be-
ginning of stage 2. In order to maximize their own budget surplus, they must
take into account each tax rate and each amount of local public goods in the
whole local economy. Only then, they may be able to correctly predict the
relevant housing price.
A Leviathan’s optimization calculus with a housing sales tax looks as
follows:
max
τsj
Ssj = τsjphj(~τsj, ~Gj)Hj(1− α¯sj); (5.37)
∂Ssj
∂τsj
= phj + τsj
∂phj
∂τsj
= 0;
τsj = −
phj
∂phj
∂τsj
⇒ ǫsj = −1. (5.38)
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Thus, a Leviathan maximizes his budget surplus at the point where the
tax elasticity of the external housing price is minus unity. This elasticity
arises from the coordination of all housing markets in the local economy.
5.3.4 Total Equilibrium
Our local economy with housing sales taxes reaches a total equilibrium un-
der two specified conditons. In both conditions, the external housing price
appears as a price after taxes. It must be the case that:
N¯ =
∑
j
∑
o h
d
j (yo(rlo(pho(Go))), phj(~τsj,
~Gj)(1 + τsj))
hso=j(kh(pho(Go)))
(5.39)
and
u∗ = vj(yo(rlo(pho(Go))), phj(~τsj, ~Gj)(1 + τsj), Gj). (5.40)
In such an equilibirium, it holds that:
dpho
dτsj
= 0 (5.41)
and
dphj
dτsj
= −
phj
1 + τsj
−
∂phj
∂τsj
< 0 if (5.42)
phj > −(1 + τsj)
∂phj
∂τsj
.
As we can see, a change of the housing sales tax does not refer back to
the internal housing price. The respective response of the external housing
price depends on a condition that we already have known. Thus, if the net
external housing price is greater than the partial derivative of the gross price
with respect to the tax rate, then the net price responds negatively.
5.4 Taxation of Housing Property
In our general model, the consumption of local public goods is independent
of the time. The households, however, make their consumption plans in
a life-time perspective. Therefore, it could be expedient to finance local
public goods on a multi-period schedule. Such a schedule might improve the
54
allocation of capital over time; it might strengthen the link between what
agents get and what they pay for. One way to establish a multi-period fiscal
schedule is to impose a (housing) property tax. A property tax is charged in
each period on each local housing consumer. It thus may work as a member
fee. Its base is the asset value of a housing. However, we shall keep in
mind that the housing market and the market for local public goods still
have different ways of functioning. The property tax appears as a powerful
instrument. Thus, we shall analyze its effects for the case that it is used by
Leviathans in local tax competition.
In order to optimize their housing consumption, the households have to
set up multi-period financial plans. These plans have to consider future
values of variables, such as: income, interest, prices of other goods, or taxes.
The citizens will bind themselves to their financial plans, only if they can
rely on certain rules. One salient domain for such rules is fiscal policy. If a
government may, for example, introduce or change taxes arbitrarily, then the
households will be reluctant to invest in an object that can be used as a tax
base. Losses could be particularly high for investments in housing. Hence,
we assume that Leviathans commit themselves: the tax rate must stay the
same over all periods:
τv1j = τv2j.
5.4.1 Housing Firms
In this model, we conceive the property tax as a periodical charge on the
external housing price. However, the housing firms calculate only with the
internal price. Hence, the housing production is not directly affected by the
property tax. The housing firms follow the same optimization logic as in the
case of a housing sales tax; and the results of the comparative static analysis
will be the same.
5.4.2 Households
In a local economy with property taxes, the households have to integrate
future tax payments into their consumption plans. In our model, they can
migrate only in the first period. The recipients of their tax payments will
thus remain the same. Anyway, in order to optimize their consumption, the
households have to consider the tax rates of every region j.
55
Given our specifications, T = 2 and τv1j = τv2j, a household’s optimiza-
tion calculus gets the following form:
max
x1j ,x2j ,hj ,γ1
uj = u1(x1j, hj) + βu2(x2j, hj) + ug(Gj) (5.43)
subject to
y1o = γ1yo = p¯xx1j + phj(~τvj, ~Gj)(1 + τvj)hj
and
y2o = (1− γ1)(1 + r¯y)yo = p¯xx2j + phj(~τvj, ~Gj)τvjhj;
where
yo = w¯
(
1 +
1
1 + r¯y
)
+ phoho − r¯kk
∗
ho.
From a Lagrangian function, Zv, we can derive the following distinctive
first order conditions:
∂Zv
∂hj
=
∂u1
∂hj
+ β
∂u2
∂hj
− λ1phj(1 + τvj)− λ2phjτvj = 0;
∂Zv
∂λ1
= γ1yo − p¯xx1j − phj(1 + τvj)hj = 0;
∂Zv
∂λ2
= (1 + r¯y)(1− γ1)yo − p¯xx2j − phjτvjhj = 0.
From the derivations of the first order conditions, we get to the compar-
ative static results:
dx1j
dτvj
=
((
2+r¯y
1+r¯y
phj
)
+
(
1 + τvj +
τvj
1+r¯y
)
∂phj
∂τvj
)
Ωv1
p¯x
∂u1
∂hj
> 0 if (5.44)
phj > −
1 + r¯y
2 + r¯y
(
1 + τvj +
τvj
1 + r¯y
)
∂phj
∂τvj
;
dx2j
dτvj
= (1 + r¯y)
dx1j
dτvj
; (5.45)
dhj
dτvj
= −
((
2+r¯y
1+r¯y
phj
)
+
(
1 + τvj +
τvj
1+r¯y
)
∂phj
∂τvj
)
Ωv2
phj
∂u1
∂hj
< 0 if (5.46)
56
phj > −
1 + r¯y
2 + r¯y
(
1 + τvj +
τvj
1 + r¯y
)
∂phj
∂τvj
;
dγ1
dτvj
= −
Ωv3phj + Ωv4
∂phj
∂τvj
+ Ωv5
yo
∂u1j
∂hj
. (5.47)
As we can see, a property tax implies more complicated responses by the
households. In terms of quality, the households seem to respond similarly
to this tax as to a sales tax. Under the condition that the net external
price of housing is greater than the time-weighted partial derivative of the
gross price with respect to the tax rate, a change of the tax rate leads to
a positive response of the composite private goods consumption and to a
negative response of the housing consumption. However, the ’quantity’ of
such a response is hardly predictable. As a consequence, the relationship
between the property tax and the share of first-period consumption cannot
even be qualitatively predicted.
5.4.3 Leviathans
In this model, the Leviathans make their fiscal plans in a two-period perspec-
tive. They make their plans in present value terms. We make the assumption
that the share of revenue which is spent on local public goods is constant over
time. Since the tax rates must also be constant over time, the Leviathans
merely need to account for the first-period tax rates in order to predict the
relevant housing price.
A Leviathan maximizes his fiscal surplus from property taxation in the
following formal way:
max
τvj
Svj =
(
τvj +
τvj
1 + r¯y
)
phj(~τvj, ~Gj)Hj(1− α¯vj); (5.48)
∂Svj
∂τvj
= phj + τvj
∂phj
∂τvj
= 0;
τvj = −
phj
∂pho
∂τvj
⇒ ǫvj = −1.
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Once again, a Leviathan must find the point where the tax elasticity
of the external housing price is -1. However, the partial derivative of the
housing price will depend on the time perspective.
5.4.4 Total Equilibrium
In this model, the property tax rates are announced in the first period. The
tax is payed in both periods; but it refers to a price which arises only in the
first. Thus, the coordination of all markets within our local economy takes
place in that period. The total equilibrium can be described as follows:
N¯ =
∑
j
∑
o h
d
j
(
yo(rlo(pho(Go))), phj(~τvj, ~Gj)
(
1 + τvj +
τvj
1+r¯y
))
hso=j(kh(pho(Go)))
; (5.49)
u∗ = vj
(
yo(rlo(pho(Go))), phj(~τvj, ~Gj)
(
1 + τvj +
τvj
1 + r¯y
)
, Gj
)
; (5.50)
with the comparative statics result:
dphj
dτvj
= −
2 + r¯y
1 + r¯y
phj
1 + τvj +
τvj
1+r¯y
−
∂phj
∂τvj
< 0 if (5.51)
phj > −
1 + r¯y
2 + r¯y
(
1 + τvj +
τvj
1 + r¯y
)
∂phj
∂τvj
.
As it turns out, the net external housing price negatively responds to
the property tax rate, under the condition that it is greater than the time-
weighted partial derivative of the gross price with respect to the tax rate.
This is the same condition which the responses of the households depend on.
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Chapter 6
The Choice of Local Tax Bases
The theory of optimal taxation takes the deadweight loss as a unique yard-
stick for tax bases. According to this theory, one tax base is better than
another, if it allows to raise a given amount of revenue with a lower dead-
weight loss. A deadweight loss is caused by the agents’ responses on the tax.
In general, the more the agents respond on a tax by substitution, the higher
will be the deadweight loss. In order to be able to measure a deadweight
loss, every function in the economy must be known. Thus, the theory of
optimal taxation assumes that the economy is governed by a benevolent and
omniscient dictator. This social dictator is able to exactly predict any sub-
stitution that is caused by a tax. There is nothing that prevents him from
choosing the socially optimal tax base. And there is no doubt that he will
use the tax revenue in the agents’ best interest.
By contrast, the constitutional approach assumes that the governments
are self-interested. Typically, Leviathan follows his own interest by maxi-
mizing his fiscal budget surplus. The maximum surplus is dependent on the
used tax base. Leviathan thus would choose the tax base which offers the
highest budget surplus maximum to him. The involved agents, however, may
stipulate some rules into the constitution which constrain Leviathan’s policy
options. There are two principle ways to constrain his options: a) a direct,
and b) an indirect one. a) In a direct way, a rule defines the fiscal policy
which Leviathan is or is not allowed to make. Such a rule may be related
to three fields: the tax base, the rate structure, and the amount of revenue.
b) In an indirect way, a rule defines the types of responses which the agents
are or are not allowed to give. There are two major types of responses: voice
and exit. - However, the basic problem is how to get to the best rules, to the
best constraints.
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The constitutional approach assumes that the agents form an assembly.
In this assembly, they stand behind a veil of ignorance. This means that
none of the agents knows her future social position. Thus, they all expect
to be treated by Leviathan in the same manner. Based on this assumption,
the agents could reach a consensus on what are the best rules. Moreover,
it seems consistent to assume that the agents have no specific knowledge
about the future technology in society, while they stand behind the veil of
ignorance. However, as we found out, the effects of a tax base do depend
on the relevant technology. The effects cannot be measured without specific
knowledge. Therefore, the constitutional assembly seems to be unable to
make the best choice out of the potential tax bases. It may stipulate general
rules rather than specific ones; indirect rules rather than direct ones.
The constitutional assembly derives its general or indirect rules on the
choice of local tax bases from a common theory. The common theory should
describe and explain the logic of local taxation in a consistent and reliable
way. Thus, it typically deals with issues like: objectives, incentives, (infor-
mation) asymmetries, trade-offs, equilibrium types, responses, externalities,
transaction costs, and so on. These issues might look differently for every
local tax base. Many of the aspects might be incomparable. As a conse-
quence, the theory will fail to create a unique yardstick for the evaluation of
every tax base. It seems impossible to derive and calculate a certain welfare
measure (as the deadweight loss, for instance) for each partial aspect, and to
aggregate, if necessary. Hence, the common theory may offer nothing more
than some partial results. These results may suggest to stipulate certain
general rules on the future local taxation. Some of these rules may prescribe
the way how to specify other general rules, in particular, how to choose the
tax bases.
The choice of a local tax base should serve the overall objective to reach ef-
ficiency in the provision of local public goods. In the constitutional approach,
this objective contains two central aspects: a) the coordination between de-
mand and supply on the market for local public goods; b) the potential for
the misuse of tax revenue.
a) On the market for local public goods, we encounter a specific prob-
lem: The demanders have incentives to hide their preferences; they behave
strategically. The constitutional assembly thus searches for some rules which
change these incentives. At first sight, it may look more promising to tackle
the problem via exit rules than via voice rules. When citizens move to an-
other region, they definitely reveal some of their real preferences. The Tie-
bout mechanism seems to be superior to other demand-revealing mechanisms.
60
But, the quality of the Tiebout results depends on various conditions, as for
example: information costs, mobility costs, structure of regions, sources of
income, and production technologies. Constiutional rules can only improve
some of these conditions in a general way. Some special problems arise due
to the narrow link between the local public goods market and the housing
market. Altogether, the coordination tends to remain imperfect.1
b) As long as the coordination of local public goods and of housing re-
mains imperfect, there exists some potential to misuse tax revenue. In gen-
eral, each imperfect market constellation offers a different potential for each
tax base. The quality of the choice of a tax base thus depends on the given
market constellation. A tax base ranking only holds under the ceteris paribus
assumption. If we make this assumption, then we may assess and compare
different tax bases by the potential to misuse tax revenue. To start from
a common point, we may set this potential in relation to the potential to
generate tax revenue.
Thus, in a constitutional approach, a tax base is supposed to be assessed
by the following fraction:
Sz(τz)
Rz(τz)
= (1− αz).
We can briefly illustrate the assessment of a tax base, as is done in figure
6.1. The figure contains two graphs: a standard Laffer curve (Rz(τz)), and
a modified Laffer curve (Sz(τz)). A Leviathan will search for τ
∗
z in order
to get S∗z . In this figure (unlike in our models), we assume that αz is not
constant. Hence: τ ∗z 6= τ
∗∗
z . - For each tax base (z), the two Laffer curves
have a specific shape. Each specific pair may strongly diverge from another.
Before the Leviathans start their search, the constitutional assembly has the
opportunity to influence the shapes of the Laffer curves. It may stipulate
some general rules which help to make αz as high as possible.
1Nowadays, we can find a great variety of alternative demand-revealing mechanisms
which base on voice rules. Early and important contributions to the related discussion
were made by Clarke (1971) and by Groves (1973). Nonetheless, some serious objections
could not be removed. See Mueller (2003), 160-8.
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Figure 6.1: Assessment of a Tax Base
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Chapter 7
Local Tax Competition and
Intergovernmental Grants
A Leviathan in tax competition may not encounter the right incentives to
raise the socially optimal amount of local public revenue. As a consequence,
the offered amount of local public goods may become too high or too low.
Basically, there exists one central way to tackle this problem, which is to
install a system of intergovernmental grants. A system of intergovernmental
grants can be organized according to two basic principles: horizontal or ver-
tical. Horizontal organization means that all relevant decisions on grants are
taken on one unique government level. If a Leviathan sees a reason to charge
some grants, then he may enter into negotiations with other Leviathans of
the same level. They negotiate on common specific rules on issues like: taxa-
tion, public offerings, regional structures and financial transfers. Such kinds
of negotiations tend to be complicated, especially if the Leviathans behave
in a strategic way. Then, it might become expedient to involve a third party,
an umpire into the negotiations. But, such a solution tends to engender the
vertical principle of organization. According to this principle, Leviathans
transfer decisions to a higher-level Leviathan. This Leviathan will be al-
lowed to define specific rules on the others’ local fiscal policy.
There are four major phenomena which may justify the payment of in-
tergovernment grants:
1. spillovers;
2. economies of scale;
3. income disparities;
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4. economic shocks.
First, spillovers run counter to the benefit principle. The set of beneficia-
ries gets greater than the set of contributors. Local public goods are un-
derprovided. The lack of supply is the greater, the greater the number of
non-contributors and the more extensive congestion is. Second, economies of
scale can possibly be reached on both sides of the fiscal budget. On the rev-
enue side, economies of scale typically stem from administration costs; on the
expenditure side, typically from production technology. Third, the Tiebout
mechanism promotes the local segregation of income groups. Consequently,
intergovernmental grants become more effective in reducing income dispari-
ties. A reduction of income disparities can be justified by many arguments,
such as: a decreasing marginal utility from income, a decreasing marginal
product of local public goods, or some instability of the Tiebout equilibrium.
Fourth, taxes are rather inflexible. They are narrowly restricted by legal
procedures. Their effects strongly depend on the citizens’ expectations and
behavioral patterns. Hence, grants appear to be more suitable to react on
economic shocks.1
Four major types of intergovernmental grants can be defined:
1. unconditional;
2. lump-sum conditional;
3. open-ended matching;
4. closed-ended matching.
First, an unconditional grant is a lump-sum grant without any restrictions
on how it must be spent. The receiving government thus may choose among
three general options: to increase its supply of any public good; to balance
tax cuts; to withhold the money from its citizens. The choice implies a very
high degree of power. Second, a conditional grant must be spent on a specific
public program. The specification is made by the paying government. But,
this does not necessarily make the paying government more powerful. If the
receiving government is also able to finance the public program from other
sources, then a conditional lump-sum grant might only serve as a substitu-
tion or lead to an increase of the general budget. Third, under a matching
grant, the paying government contributes a fixed proportion to the receiving
1See Brennan/ Buchanan (1980), 181-3.
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government’s costs for a specific program. If the grant is open-ended, then
the receiving government completely determines the absolute size. The pay-
ing government takes a financial risk. Fourth, a closed-ended matching grant
limits the financial risk. However, such a limit might reduce the efficiency
of the public programs. Anyway, matching grants tend to expand public
budgets. They tend to raise governmental power as a whole.2
In a constitutional approach, it can be a hazardous way to tackle the
problems of local tax competition by a system of intergovernmental grants.
Such a system may offer to Leviathans a superior platform to make collusive
arrangements which do contradict the principles of an efficient market for lo-
cal public goods. On this platform, Leviathans can coordinate their policies
to the detriment of the citizens. To avoid such negative kind of coordination,
a constitutional assembly searches for the best possible constraints. These
have to work inside the system of intergovernmental grants. Like other con-
straints, they depend on given resources and technologies. As a consequence,
the respective constitutional rules also have to remain rather general and in-
direct. Again, the constitution can only provide a general framework for the
specification of the best possible constraints. This general framework defines
the conditions under which the citizens can make their specific choices. The
choices can be by voice or by exit. In general, a system of governmental
grants tends to reduce the impact of both types.
2See: Henderson (1985a), 191-8; Mueller (2003), 215-27; O’Sullivan (2003), 545-54.
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Chapter 8
Summary
The power to tax can be justified by the task to provide local public goods.
However, in a constitutional approach, we conceive the governments as Levi-
athans. A Leviathan will try to misuse the power to tax for his own purposes.
Therefore, he should be constrained. The citizens can react on fiscal policy
by voice or by exit. Both modes of reaction may thus adopt two tasks: first,
to support the coordination on the market for local public goods; second,
to constrain the tax misuse. For a local economy, we initially regard exit as
the more fundamental mode of reaction. The citizens choose the package of
local public goods which offers them the highest utility, by migration. But,
migration also implies a shift of the housing demand. The local public goods
market and the housing market are interrelated. This interrelationship may
affect the way in which exit performs its two tasks.
Another basic method to constrain the power to tax is to stipulate (direct)
rules for fiscal policy. Such rules can be found on three fields: the tax
base, the rate structure, and the amount of revenue. From a constitutional
perspective, we consider the first field as the most fruitful one. We ask:
Which tax bases should Leviathans be allowed to use in a local economy? -
Thus, we intend to analyze and to assess the effects of different tax bases in
line with the principles of a constitutional approach. For this purpose, a new
model framework has been needed.
Our general model describes a local economy in which three types of
agents interact. The housing firms try to maximize their profits from housing
production. The households try to maximize their utility levels from the
consumption of composite private goods, housing, and local public goods.
The Leviathans try to maximize their local fiscal budget surpluses from the
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taxation of land rents, capital rents, housing sales, or housing property. The
interaction of the agents takes place in two stages: In stage 1, migration is
not possible; the land is distributed to the households; local fiscal packages
are announced; housing is produced; the land owners are paid their rents. In
stage 2, migration is possible, but only in the first period; local fiscal packages
are offered; the households earn wages; and they make their decisions on
residence, consumption, and the distribution of expenditures over time. The
local economy will be in equilibrium, when the housing markets clear and
each household reaches its maximum utility level.
Our general model is still very complex. To make a comparative static
analysis tractable, we need further simplifications. This need has been met
by the two-period tax models. We set up one two-period model for each of
the four tax bases. In the comparative statics, we analyze how the specific
tax base affects economic plans and housing prices in the local economy.
Particularly, we find the following:
1. A change of the land rent tax rate negatively affects capital input, hous-
ing demand, first-period expenditure, and external housing prices; it
positively affects internal housing prices. The composite private goods
consumption remains unaffected.
2. Qualitatively, a change of the capital rent tax rate generates the same
effects as a change of the land rent tax rate.
3. A change of the housing sales tax rate affects each of a household’s
choices and the external housing prices. The quality of the effects
depends on a condition for the external housing price function.
4. A change of the property tax rate affects the same variables as a change
of the sales tax rate. But, the condition for the external housing price
function is different. Due to the higher complexity of this tax, the con-
dition cannot be specified with respect to the first-period expenditure.
Hence, our comparative static analysis allows us to make some qualitative
statements on the effects of a certain local tax base. Moreover, we learn what
these effects depend on. But, we do not get a (common) yardstick which
helps us to assess tax bases in a quantitative manner. It remains impossible
to conclude whether one tax base might be more favorable than another.
Nevertheless, we can draw some conclusions on the general rules under which
the tax bases should be chosen. First of all, the quantitative effects of a
tax base depend on the related preferences, the resources, and technologies.
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The values of these parameters cannot be known behind a veil of ignorance.
Hence, the choice of a tax base should be made in the postconstitutional
stage. However, a constitutional assembly should stipulate general rules on
the choice, before. The constitutional rules may define who, how, and when.
Furthermore, the assembly can predict where market imperfections tend to
appear and how they affect the choice of a tax base. Information costs
and transaction costs seem to play major roles in this context. Hence, the
assembly may stipulate rules which help to diminish these imperfections.
Finally, the Leviathans are typically not interested in an efficient choice of
the tax base. They seek to distort this choice to their own favor. To avoid
this, the constitution may set (institutional) incentives which promote the
reduction of tax misuse.
We find several reasons why a local economy where the Leviathans com-
pete for higher tax base values may not reach an optimum in the provision of
local public goods; even if this type of competition takes place under optimal
tax rules. One major way to reduce tax inefficiencies could be to install a
system of intergovernmental grants. However, by looking at the basic struc-
ture of such a system, we realize that it eases the constraints for Leviathans.
The voice and exit options of the citizens become weaker. Thus, we may
suspect that a system of intergovernmental grants rather raises than lowers
the inefficiencies in the provision of local public goods.
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Part II
Leviathans and their Relative
Influence on Housing Prices
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Chapter 9
Introduction
How effectively can the citizens constrain Leviathans by migration? - We
briefly define Leviathans as monolithic and self-interested governments. The
citizens may respond to their policies in two major ways: ’voice’ and ’exit’.
By voice, the citizens seek to adapt internal rules to their preferences. By
exit, they leave the domain of the internal rules. Both ways of response
tend to be more effective on a decentralized policy level. On a local level,
a Leviathan’s main task is to provide local public goods. By definition, a
citizen can consume those goods only where she resides. Thus, there exists a
tight link between the provision of local public goods and the housing market.
A change of the local policy might affect the housing prices via migration.
Typically, a citizen seeks to reside where her public contribution is lower
or the supply of local public goods is higher than anywhere else. Hence,
local public revenue variables are supposed to capitalize negatively into the
housing prices; and local public expenditure variables positively. It is this
type of capitalization which may constrain Leviathans, in the end.
However, housing markets tend to be extremely imperfect. Due to the
’fact of location’, each housing unit represents a quasi-monopoly. On such
a monopoly market, the overall transaction costs tend to be extremely high.
We may ask now how the imperfections of the housing market affect the
provision of local public goods. - Sure, there are many different ways in
which a (local) government can attempt to reduce the imperfections of the
housing market. Each related intervention changes the choice set of the
citizens in a specific manner; each incurs its specific benefits and costs. A
part of these benefits and costs materializes into the local fiscal budget. This
is the part to which a Leviathan gives his main attention. He typically seeks
to maximize the fiscal budget surplus from his housing market interventions.
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Thus, he is interested in how a certain intervention changes his revenue and
his expenditure. He will ask for instance: What are the effects on my tax
bases? - What are the effects on my provision of local public goods? - How
are these effects related to the local policy in other regions?
One special instrument to strengthen the connection between the housing
market and the local fiscal budget is the property tax. This tax takes the
housing value as its base. The tax is charged in every period of housing
ownership. It treats housing as an asset. One part of the asset’s value
may be derived from the consumption of local public goods. Under perfect
conditions, the supply of local public goods increases the total local housing
value to the point where the property tax revenue covers the implied costs.
One special problem however is that the amount of housing consumption
may not depend on the total costs for local public goods. In order to solve
this problem, it has been suggested to combine the property tax with zoning
policy. But, such a policy tends to distort the housing market, at least if it is
oriented towards tax revenue and not towards externalities. Another special
problem is that the tax burden may not finally fall on those who consume
the local public goods. It depends on the market conditions to which degree
a housing owner can shift the burden to a respective renter or buyer.
The imperfections of the housing market make it, in general, more dif-
ficult to empirically estimate a respective price function. First, we need to
think of how to delimit our relevant market. Each housing unit represents a
quasi-monopoly. How can we best define groups of such quasi-monopolies?
- One key criterion for a delimitation is the governmental structure. Each
government tends to influence housing in a specific way. Another key crite-
rion is the user status. Rental users usually have different preferences and
means than owner occupiers. Anyway, our relevant market will keep some
degree of heterogeneity. In order to capture the respective price, we thus need
a statistical measure, as the median or the mean for example. Altogether,
we particularly encounter the following methodological problems when we
seek to empirically estimate a housing price function: first, unclear causal
directions between the explained variable and explaining variables; second,
interrelations between explaining variables; and third, impact of hidden vari-
ables.
The empirical estimation of a housing price function demands high qual-
ity of the used data. A first major demand is that the data set cover all the
theoretically relevants variables. A second major demand is that the data
set base on a consistent market concept. - In this study, we use data sets
which meet these demands to a high degree. The data is taken from two sur-
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vey programs by the U.S. Bureau of the Census: the American Community
Survey and the Census of Governments. The first program covers most of
the relevant housing market variables; the latter most of the relevant fiscal
budget variables. Both programs take (among others) the county regions as
a market concept. This concept seems highly consistent with our theoretical
approach. There are 234 larger counties in our sample. The data stems from
the years 2002 and 2003. In sum, the data set offers an extraordinarily good
basis in order to estimate housing price functions with a focus on the impact
of local fiscal policy.
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Chapter 10
Related Literature
10.1 Models and Estimations
According to the ’traditional’ theory of public finance, the incidence of a
property tax is mainly determined by its division into a tax on land and a
tax on improvements. This theory bases on a partial equilibrium analysis
which ignores the effects of a property tax on other jurisdictions. It assumes
that land is perfectly inelastic in supply, whereas the supply of improvements
is perfectly elastic - at least in the long run. In this local economy, capital
moves until its net return is everywhere the same. As a result, the part of
the property tax burden which stems from the taxation of land falls on the
land owners in the form of a lower land rent or a lower land value; and the
part of the burden which stems from the taxation of improvements falls on
the occupants, due to a fall of the capital return. The lower capital return
leads to an investment level below the initial optimum. The market price of
capital increases by the full amount of the tax, which results in a complete
forward shifting of the burden from the improvements.1
Orr (1968), however, doubted that the supply of improvements is per-
fectly elastic. Hence, he wanted to assess the incidence of a property tax,
empirically. Orr intended to test whether residential rents differ systemati-
cally with the differentials in the property tax rates. He assumed that insofar
as this was not the case, the tax burden would be borne by the property own-
ers. His sample consisted of 31 communities in the Boston area in 1959. As
dependent variable, he could use the median monthly gross rent per room in
1For a more extensive treatment of the ’traditional’ theory on property tax incidence,
see Netzer (1966).
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the taxing jurisdiction. As independent variables, the sample provided: the
average price of land per acre; a dummy for sewerage and water supply; an
index for accessibility to employment opportunities; an index for housing con-
ditions; the annual public expenditure on education per pupil; the equalized
property tax rate on all property. In order to estimate his equation, Orr used
the OLS method. He got the following results: Each regression coefficient
has its expected sign. Merely one regression coefficient is not significant: the
one of the property tax rate. The regression has a high explanatory power.
Hence, Orr concluded that a substantial part of the property tax burden
must be borne by the property owners, and not by the renters.
Heinberg and Oates (1970) expressed two major objections against Orr’s
approach: First, they criticized his operational definitions. In particular, Orr
had taken the median gross rent divided by the median number of rooms in
all (!) housing units as the dependent variable. The correct denominator,
however, would be the median number of rooms in the renter-occupied hous-
ing units. As the two authors claimed, in order to clarify the issue of property
tax incidence, empirically, data would be needed that strictly separate the
housing owners from the renters - with respect to any relevant variable. As
long as such data is not available, effort should rather be directed towards
the issue of whether property taxes are capitalized into housing values. -
Second, the two authors criticized that several of Orr’s independent vari-
ables are strongly influenced by his dependent variable. Thus, his regression
equation likely suffers from some simultaneous equation bias. To avoid such
bias, he would have to use a different estimation technique. - Based on their
criticism, Heinberg and Oates modified Orr’s approach. They used his data
in order to test whether property taxes are capitalized into housing values.
The two authors constructed an estimation equation with the median value
of owner-occupied dwellings as the dependent variable. As independent vari-
ables, they deleted four of his control variables and added three new ones.
By using the two stage least squares method (2SLS), they got to the follow-
ing results: The equalized property tax rate has a negative and significant
coefficient. Hence, there is evidence that property taxes are capitalized into
housing values.2
In 1969, Oates presented an own study on the relationship between prop-
erty values and fiscal variables. Oates set up an estimation equation in which
2Orr (1970) responded to the criticism by Heinberg and Oates (1970). In response to
the first point, he remarked that the denominator in question increases the regression’s ex-
planatory power, considerably. However, the reasons for that remain unclear. In response
to the second point, Orr claimed that the simultaneous equation bias has little relevance
for his case. As he already had checked, regressions via 2SLS showed very similar results.
74
the median home value depends on two fiscal variables: the effective prop-
erty tax rate and the annual expenditures on education per pupil. As control
variables, he included: the linear distance from the business center, the me-
dian number of rooms per owner-occupied house, the percentage of houses
built since 1950, the median family income, the percentage of families with
an annual income below a certain level. To run his estimations, Oates took a
sample of 53 municipalities in New Jersey of the period 1959-61. To exclude
any simultaneous equation bias, he used the 2SLS method. He thus got the
following results: Property taxes and property values have a significantly
negative relationship, while expeditures per pupil and property values have
a significantly positive relationship. Hence, both fiscal variables are capital-
ized. From the absolute values of the two coefficients, he concluded that the
positive effects from the expenditures on education could nearly compensate
for the large negative effects from the property taxes. Oates regarded these
results as quite robust. - Curiously, an OLS regression delivered very similar
coefficient values.
Oates’ study from 1969 has become a milestone in its field. It triggered a
wide and fruitful discussion. One early and important contribution was made
by Pollakowski (1973). He argued, above all, that Oates had incorrectly cho-
sen his right-hand variables. Firstly, from the broad range of public services,
Oates had merely included expenditures on education into his estimating
equation. But other public services determine the households’ locational de-
cisions, as well, and thus the value of residential property. Consequently,
he would have to check the relationships among the expenditures for public
services in order to correctly interpret his results. - Secondly, Oates had
taken the median family income as a control variable. Pollakowski thought
this to be inappropriate. He stressed that there probably exists a close rela-
tionship between family incomes and fiscal variables. Due to this, it seems
as we should not hold the one side constant, if we let the other side vary.
Moreover, he reminded that the property values are determined by the in-
come of all potential renters or buyers, and not as much by the income of
the actually residing families. Unfortunately, the groups of potential renters
and buyers are difficult to discern. It therefore seems we rather should focus
on the characteristics of the supply side.3
3In order to empirically assess the specification errors, Pollakowski replicated Oates’
approach with a different sample. It turned out that Oates’ specification yielded quite
unsatisfactory results, then. - Oates (1973) replied to Pollakowski’s criticism. He admitted
that it seems problematic not to include the whole public expenditure into the estimating
equation. Therefore, he revised his equation by including a variable on all other local
public expenditure. This inclusion caused two major effects: the estimated coefficient
for the property taxes became somewhat higher in absolute value; and the estimated
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Edel and Sclar (1974) argued that Oates had partially brought the Tie-
bout model into a wrong perspective, since he had neglected to consider the
supply adjustment on the market for local public goods. Oates had dealt
with the issue how different preferences for packages of local public goods
affect the housing market. From this perspective, capitalization indicates
the adjustment of the housing market to the demand for local public goods.
By contrast, Edel and Sclar assumed that the supply of local public goods
also adjusts to the demand - at least in the long run; and such adjustments
lead to reductions in capitalization. Hence, Edel and Sclar extended the
Oates model to consider changes on the supply side. They searched for cap-
italization effects in the Boston metropolitan area in five decades: 1930-79.
They set up an estimating equation in which the house prices depend on: the
(nominal) property tax rate, the expenditures on schools, the expenditures
on highway maintenance, and some control variables. The regressions show
the following:
1. The property tax rate was negatively and significantly related to the
house price in the years 1940, 1950, and 1970. The relationship was
not significant in 1930 and 1960.
2. Expenditures on schools had the expected positive and significant re-
lationship with house prices merely in 1950.
3. Expenditures on highway maintenance got insignificant coefficients for
each year.
Taking a closer look at the insignificant coefficients and some descriptive
statistics, Edel and Sclar presumed that the supply of school services adjusted
towards an equilibrium, while the supply of highways did not. In general,
the adjustment highly depends on the production function of the respective
good. Therefore, the two authors advised to be very careful when making a
judgement on the functioning of the Tiebout mechanism as a whole.
Church (1974) estimated a tax capitalization model which includes two
simultaneous equations with two endogenous unknowns: the present value of
residential property, and the effective property tax rate. The present value
of residential property is defined as: the sum of all the discounted rental
prices net of taxes and maintenance costs. It is described as a function of
ninety (!) residential property characteristics and of the effective property
tax rate. This tax rate, in reverse, depends on the property value. Due to
coefficient for the expenditures on education, too.
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this simultaneity, Church chose the 2SLS method to estimate his model. He
found out that the property tax was over-capitalized in Martinez, California,
from 1967 to 1970. Church depicted several plausible explanations for this
result. Let us remind four of them:
1. Assumptions on the discount rate or the deduction period for housing
are mistaken.
2. The housing market is in disequilibrium.
3. The deadweight loss of the property tax is additionally capitalized.
4. Property owners expect assessment methods or nominal tax rates to
change.
As Wales and Wiens (1974) asserted, Oates (1969) and other studies
on the capitalization of property taxes suffer from two major shortcomings:
First, these studies fail to isolate the effects of different fiscal variables. Resi-
dential choices might depend on several fiscal variables. These fiscal variables
are supposed to be interrelated. As a consequence, the authors used some
more specific estimation techniques to control for simultaneity, as the 2SLS
in particular. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to interpret these results. Are
they caused by some real effects or rather by the tautological nature of the
problem? - To the extent that the model reflects the tautological nature,
it biases the regressions towards a higher evidence for capitalization effects.
- Second, Oates and some other authors, later on, chose the effective prop-
erty tax rate as an explanatory variable. However, the effective tax rate also
contains the explained variable. Hence, there exists some spurious correla-
tion which supports the evidence of capitalization effects in an inadmissible
manner. It does not appear as a great alternative to choose the absolute
property tax level. The reason is that the absolute tax level tends to en-
gender the omitted variable problem. Some of the omitted variables might
be positively correlated with both, the absolute tax level and the property
values. Thus, they suppress the evidence of capitalization effects in an in-
admissible manner. - Now, the question arises: Is there any proper way out
of these two problems? - Wales and Wiens intended to circumvent the first
problem by using a particular sample. This sample stems from a single mu-
nicipality, Greater Vancouver (Canada), where the citizens were offered the
same package of local public goods, while they had to pay different prop-
erty tax rates, since the constitution allowed to deviate in the assessments
of basically identical properties. - Wales and Wiens tried to solve the second
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problem as follows: They estimated the bias of the effective tax rate; and
then corrected the respective coefficient for this bias. - Finally, by strictly
following their own approach, the two authors did not find evidence for cap-
italization. Without the correction for spurious correlation, however, there
appeared a highly significant capitalization effect.
As King (1977) emphasized, the capitalization of a tax depends on what
the potential payers perceive and expect. Generally, they rather calculate
with the tax burden than with the tax rate. The relationship between a tax
rate and the respective burden can be complicated. In particular, this holds
for the property tax. There exists, for instance, a huge variety of assess-
ment methods. Governments do have the power to change these methods or
the rate, even though it might be difficult for the owners to react on such
changes. Hence, it seems to be rational for a potential tax payer to base her
calculation on the current tax burden. - King claimed that tax capitalization
effects be measured by the tax burden. He reestimated Oates’ studies from
1969 and 1973. Instead of the effective rate, he integrated the average cur-
rent tax burden into the estimation equation. Thus, he found out that the
capitalization effects of the property tax had been overestimated by around
40%.4
Rosen and Fullerton (1977) supported the principle that capitalization
should be primarily analyzed from a demand side perspective. Citizens do not
ultimatively assess public goods according to what the governments spend
on them but to the benefit they produce. Surely, it seems easier in most
cases to measure the government spending. Oates had chosen this way by
taking the annual expenditures on education per pupil to estimate capital-
ization of a local public good. Rosen and Fullerton demonstrated that Oates’
approach can be improved by taking an ’actual’ output measure to estimate
capitalization. They first reestimated Oates’ model with a more recent data
set. Then, they replaced the expenditure variable by the test scores that the
different communities had reached in a competition. Finally, they estimated
their own model. Rosen and Fullerton got the result that about 90% of the
property tax differentials are capitalized.
4According to Hamilton (1976), there exist only three factors which generate a signifi-
cant correlation between fiscal variables and property values: 1) a lack of ’fiscal havens’; 2)
systematic differences in the conditions to raise public revenue; 3) systematic differences in
the production functions for local public goods. - Generally, Reinhard (1981) supported
King’s approach. However, he also found an econometric mistake in it. By correcting
this mistake, he came to the conclusion that former approaches understimated, and not
overestimated capitalization.
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Biases in the estimation of capitalization might occur due to the theo-
retical concept, the econometric specification, or the data. Richardson and
Thalheimer (1981) used data that seem particularly fit for an estimation of
property tax capitalization. The data stems from Fayette County, Kentucky,
and contains many details on physical and locational attributes of housing
units sold in 1973-74. In Fayette County, there existed two geographically
intermixed taxing districts, having substantially different property tax rates
but essentially the same offering of public goods. The data set thus removes
the necessity to isolate the public revenue effects from the public expenditure
effects by the econometric specification. Since the assessment methods were
the same in both taxing districts, the nominal property tax rate is equivalent
to the effective rate. It thus seems plausible to attribute a deviation of the
property tax burdens of two identical houses from two districts to govern-
ment inefficiency. Richardson and Thalheimer estimated the capitalization
with two different specifications: a linear and a multiplicative one. In the
former, capitalization does not depend on the market value of the compared
houses; in the latter, it does. With both specifications, the authors found
strong evidence that the property taxes are capitalized into the housing sales
prices. Under the multiplicative specification, the degree of capitalization
was a bit higher.
There are two major classes of government action which might take influ-
ence on the housing prices. On the one side, we have the budget variables;
on the other side, we have ’zoning’. Goodman (1983) constructed an es-
timation model which integrates both classes of government action. This
model is based on the idea of hedonic prices, adapts techniques by Box and
Cox (1962), and includes structural, neighborhood, fiscal budget, and zoning
variables. Goodman used a data set of 1,835 single-family houses in the New
Haven SMSA, sold in 1967-69. He examined variations within and among
municipalities. This means: In the former perspective, differentials of tax
bases are not considered, in the latter perspective, they are. - The author
came to the following results: The property tax is capitalized into the hous-
ing prices, with statistic significance. In the ’within’ perspective, the degrees
of capitalization range from 97.9% to 113.6%. In the ’among’ perspective,
they reach on average 60%.
Palmon and Smith (1998a) assigned former approaches on the relation-
ship between house values and (property) taxes to two major groups: amenity
models and capitalization models. They described ’amenity models’ as those
in which a tax is considered as one among several attributes of houses. They
identified three serious shortcomings of these models: First, the degree of
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tax capitalization cannot be fully determined without certain assumptions
on the discount rates and the investment horizon. Second, public goods
variables, which are highly correlated with the tax, are hardly controllable.
Third, house values may, in reverse, take influence on the tax. There is a
substantial risk that the results suffer from simultaneity bias. - Palmon and
Simth described ’capitalization models’ as those in which a housing value is
considered as the capitalized value of future housing services net of costs.
As they stated, those models may, in principle, have the same three short-
comings. But, there exist also two rather specific ones. First, the estimated
coefficient for the tax crucially depends on the conjectured proportion of net
user costs within the selected group of regressors. Second, net user costs are
usually kept constant across observations. This, however, may induce stan-
dard measurement error bias, if the unobserved net user costs are correlated
with the tax.
Thus, Palmon and Smith sought to improve the capitalization model by
several innovations. In particular, they replaced the net user cost by the
rental value. In this context, the rental value is by itself a function of the
rent-to-price ratio. By this innovation, the two authors intended to mitigate
the problem of omitted variables. They worked with a micro data set on
property characteristics in 45 suburbs of Houston, with similar demographics
and amenities. Hence, possible variations of the effective property tax rate
are not related to the provision of local public goods, which mitigates the
problem of spurious correlations. Palmon and Smith thus estimated degrees
of property tax capitalization which were around 100%. They concluded that
the housing market agents rationally deduct property tax burdens from the
house values. Only unexpected tax changes can be passed on to new home
buyers.5
There are two standard approaches to estimate housing prices: the he-
donic approach and the discrete choice approach. The hedonic price model
considers housing as a bundle of utility generating characteristics. A con-
sumer buys this bundle of characteristics rather than the product itself. The
price of this product is a function of its diverse characteristics. The discrete
choice model, in contrast, considers the characteristics of the choice. A con-
sumer attaches a certain level of indirect utility to each housing option. The
model analyzes the effects of the choice characteristics on the choice proba-
5In another study, Palmon and Smith (1998b) extended their empirical analysis in the
following directions: more suburbs in the data set, more control variables in the regressions,
and more variation in the specifications. Again, the estimated capitalization rates were
around 1. They concluded that the Tiebout hypothesis and the Ricardian equivalence
principle cannot be rejected.
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bilities. These choice probabilites determine the housing prices. - Nechyba
and Strauss (1998) judged the latter approach as more expedient for their
particular issue. They estimated the impact of local fiscal and other variables
on home values in six school districts in Camden County, New Jersey. Thus,
the two authors specified two distinct models within the discrete choice ap-
proach: the one they called ’random utility’ model, the other ’polytomous
choice’ model. In the first one, a consumer, by assumption, chooses her
housing size prior to the choice of her community. In the second model, this
assumption is relaxed. Community choice is regressed on personal, housing,
and regional variables. These regressions also help to assess the robustness
of the results from the random utilty model. Nechyba and Strauss found
out that local crime rates, commercial activity, distance from a metropolitan
area, and expenditures per pupil on public education play major roles in the
consumers’ community choices. The authors concluded that local govern-
ments should put more emphasis on public safety and educational quality.6
In general, discrete choice models of consumer community choices as-
sumed that local fiscal variables are the same within a given jurisdiction.
Uyar and Brown (2005) asserted that this assumption might oversimplify
the actual choice situation. Thus, they constructed a discrete choice model
which takes variations of the tax burdens and of the qualities of public goods
within a given jurisdiction into account. The authors tested their model
with data for 710 dwellings sold during a two year period in a mid-size city
in the U.S.A. The city is a single taxing jurisdiction and a single school dis-
trict. The data set also contains information on rejected offers. Uyar and
Brown computed the probability of a sale. They chose three local fiscal, ten
dwelling, nine neighborhood, and four personal characteristics as indepen-
dent variables. The regressions delivered, in particular, the following results:
1. The effective property tax rate is the single most important proxy for
a household’s contribution to the local public expenditures within a
given jurisdiction.
2. The condition of the streets is the best indicator for the quality of local
public goods.
3. Both variables are significant determinants of the consumers’ dwelling
choices.
4. Omitting these two internal variables may likely lead to biased estima-
tions.
6A former, salient contribution to the discrete choice approach is Quigley (1985).
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Bayoh, Irwin and Haab (2006) intended to measure the impact of local
fiscal variables on the consumers’ community choices relative to the impact
of household-level characteristics. They modified the previous discrete choice
models in such a way that local fiscal effects due to school quality, crime level,
taxes or income level can be separated from ’natural evolution’ effects due
to job location, residential filtering, or lifecycles. - To estimate their model,
the authors used a data set on 2,074 homeowners living in Franklin County,
Columbus, in 1995. They calculated the probability that a homeowner moves
within that county. Their regressions show, above all, significance for the
following variables:
1. school quality index;
2. total crime;
3. local property tax rate;
4. school district property tax burden;
5. per capita income;
6. percentage of housing stock built before 1970.
All of these variables got their expected coefficient sign. Moreover, Bayoh,
Irwin and Haab contrived an equalization scenario for those variables. The
scenario predicts, for instance, that an increase of the school quality index
by 1% raises the probabilty that a homeowner moves to the respective com-
munity by 3.75%. From all of the included regressors, school quality shows
the strongest impact on community choice. In general, the local fiscal effects
appear to be stronger than the ’natural evolution’ effects.
10.2 Lessons
The main question of the related literature could be put as follows: What
are the effects of local fiscal policy on housing demand and housing prices?
- A common base for answering this question was laid by Tiebout (1956).
His central idea was that citizens can react on local fiscal policy by ’voting
with their feet’. Tiebout wanted to show that citizens reveal their ’true’
preferences for local fiscal policy by ’voting with their feet’. Due to this type
of reaction, the whole economy may reach a Pareto optimum. - However,
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study subject model sample method
Orr (1968) incidence of property
tax
traditional theory of
public finance
31 communities, Bos-
ton area, MA, 1959
OLS
Oates (1969) fiscal variables and
property values
Tiebout, hedonic 53 municipalities,
New Jersey, 1959-61
OLS → 2SLS
Edel/
Sclar (1974)
fiscal variables, prop-
erty values, and sup-
ply adjustment
Tiebout Boston area, MA,
1930, 1940, 1950,
1960, 1970
OLS
Church (1974) capitalization of the
effective property tax
rate
hedonic, capitaliza-
tion equations
957 single family
houses in Martinez,
CA, 1967-70
OLS → 2SLS
Wales/
Wiens (1974)
capitalization of prop-
erty taxes
hedonic, market value
equations
1800 sales of residen-
tial property, Greater
Vancouver area, 1972
OLS, correction for
spurious correlation
Table 10.1: Discussed literature: summary II-A
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study explained variable explaining variable control variable result
Orr (1968) median monthly gross
housig rent
equalized property
tax rate
5 variables on: land,
local public goods,
housing, employment
large part of property
tax burden: on prop-
erty owners
Oates (1969) median home value effective property tax
rate, public expendi-
tures on education per
pupil
5 variables on: geog-
raphy, housing struc-
ture, income
expenditures on edu-
cation nearly compen-
sate for property tax
Edel/
Sclar (1974)
house prices equalized property
tax rate, specific
public expenditures
population density,
owner occupation rate
public expenditures
on schools: adjust
towards equilibrium;
highway maintenance:
not
Church (1974) property value, sales
price
effective property tax
rate
90 variables on hous-
ing conditions
over-capitalization of
property tax rate
Wales/
Wiens (1974)
(log of) market value
of improved property
property tax rate set of house, land
and location charac-
teristics
capitalization is in-
significant if corrected
for spurious correla-
tion
Table 10.2: Discussed literature: summary II-B
84
study subject model sample method
Richardson/
Thalheimer
(1981)
tax capitalization adopted from other
empirical studies
sales of residences,
Fayette County, KT,
1973-74
linear and multiplica-
tive specification
Goodman
(1983)
capitalization and dif-
ferentials in tax bases
hedonic, restatement
of Hamilton (1975)
sales of 1,835 houses,
New Haven SMSA,
CT, 1967-69
maximum likelihood
Palmon/
Smith (1998)
tax capitalization hedonic, amenity ver-
sus capitalization
sales of 449 homes, 45
suburbs of Houston,
TX, 1989
estimation of hous-
ing service values from
rental data
Nechyba/
Strauss (1998)
local public services
and community choice
community choice:
random versus indi-
rect utility
6 school districts in
New Jersey, 1987
system of equations
Uyar/
Brown (2005)
local fiscal variables
and dwelling choice
dwelling choice sales of 710 dwellings,
Midwest city
maximum likelihood
Bayoh/ Irwin/
Haab (2006)
local public goods and
community choice
hybrid conditional
logit choice
2,074 homeowners,
17 school districts in
Franklin County, OH,
1995
maximum likelihood
Table 10.3: Discussed literature: summary II-C
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study explained variable explaining variable control variable result
Richardson/
Thalheimer
(1981)
sales price of single-
family houses
dummy: tax district 32 variables on house
and neighborhood at-
tributes
capitalization is sig-
nificant: multiplica-
tive > linear specifica-
tion
Goodman
(1983)
sales price of single-
family houses
deviation of property
tax rate
21 variables on: popu-
lation, housing, hous-
ing policy
capitalization:
’within’ > ’among’
communities
Palmon/
Smith (1998a)
rent-to-price ratio property tax rate living area in square
feet, age of home, dis-
tance from CBD
capitalization rate is
close to 1
Nechyba/
Strauss (1998)
probability: choice of
a certain community
public expenditure
on schools per pupil,
other local fiscal
variables
variables on commu-
nity characteristics
expenditure on educa-
tion and on police pro-
tection → attractive-
ness
Uyar/
Brown (2005)
probability: choice of
a certain dwelling
effective property tax
rate, dummy for street
quality, school test
scores
23 variables on:
dwelling, neighbor-
hood, income
effective property tax
rate and street qual-
ity: significant
Bayoh/ Irwin/
Haab (2006)
probability: choice of
a certain community
fiscal variables community character-
istics
school quality has
strongest impact
Table 10.4: Discussed literature: summary II-D
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depending on the tasks of local fiscal policy, the citizens’ voting with their
feet implies shifts of the demand for housing. The shifts may change the
prices for housing. Here are the points where the related literature started
its analysis.
In the related literature, we can find three major subjects:
1. local fiscal variables and the community choice;
2. the capitalization of local fiscal variables;
3. the incidence of local taxes.
According to the logic of the Tiebout model, the three subjects arise in
that sequence: 1) In the real world, citizens have to account for mobility
costs when they seek to optimize their consumption of local public goods.
Moreover, income and the consumption of other goods might depend on
the location. Thus, the community choice does not depend on the local
fiscal variables, alone. We may ask how strong their real impact is. 2)
When citizens choose a different community to optimize their consumption
of local public goods, the demand for housing shifts. Depending on the
elasticity of the housing supply, the demand shift leads to a change of the
housing price. We say that the local fiscal variables ’capitalize’. In reverse,
the ’capitalization’ can also have an impact on the local fiscal variables.
Hence, we may want to know how strong capitalization is in order to predict
the equilibrium outcomes in a local economy. 3) In order to evaluate an
equilibrium outcome, we may not only refer to its efficiency, but also to its
distribution. In the original Tiebout model, the costs of local public goods
are equally shared among the users. The user charges are neutral. However,
in the real world, it might sometimes not be possible or desirable to use this
revenue instrument. In the related literature, the most intensively discussed
alternative is the property tax. The property tax puts its burden on two
factors: land or dwelling. We may be interested in how this burden is shared
between the land owners and the housing users.
The standard Tiebout model gives little advice on how to measure the
effects of local fiscal policy on housing markets, empirically. In the related
literature, we encounter two standard approaches for such a measurement,
which are: a) the hedonic approach; b) the discrete choice approach. While
the first focuses on the housing price, the latter does so on the housing de-
mand. - a) The hedonic approach describes the housing price as a function of
the utility generating housing attributes. The attributes can be assigned to
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various groups, as for example: land, house, neigborhood, and community.
Since housing is a durable good, a correct price function reflects the utility
generating attributes over the whole consumption period. It covers all dis-
counted net utility flows from the housing over time. Deductions from the
gross flows may come from taxes, property depreciation, maintenance costs,
or else. Hence, the housing price functions may differ in how they calculate
the net utility flows and how they sum them up. - The discrete choice ap-
proach typically starts with a function in which a citizen’s utility depends on
housing attributes and other consumption factors. The explaining variables
may be direct or indirect, deterministic or stochastic. The utility function
is transformed into a discrete, probabilistic choice function. This function
describes a (quantitative) connection between certain housing attributes and
the probability that a citizen chooses to live in a respective house. Generally,
it is assumed that the choice probability is independent of the attributes of
all other available alternatives. The discrete choice models may differ in how
they describe the sequence of choices, especially with respect to the housing
size and the community.7
Many aspects of local fiscal policy and housing markets can hardly be
measured. Local fiscal policy is usually combined with regulation. In our
context, zoning policy might be the most important instance. In principle,
there exists an infinite spectrum of how regulation is formulated and prac-
ticed. Dummy variables can merely give a rough idea about its extent and
effects. Housing markets always have some monopolistic elements. Land can-
not be replicated. Housing itself can be an extremely heterogeneous good.
Market transactions take place in a relatively low frequency. Thus, real hous-
ing values are difficult to measure. Altogether, it seems that any specification
of an estimation model on the effects of local fiscal policy on housing markets
will remain clearly imperfect. One has to be content with an apparently best
option out of a set which is highly open to attack.
In the related literature, there exists a strong variety of specifications.
This variety can only partially be explained by the differences in the under-
lying models. In particular, each specification seems to be strongly influenced
by the limitations of the used data. All these data sets have in common that
they are taken from small, densely populated, North American geographical
units. But they differ a lot in the choice of the measured variables. Some
data sets stem from general surveys, others from internally related hous-
ing sales. Each data set transfers its limits to the estimating equation. -
7The assumption of ’independence of irrelevant alternatives (i.i.a.)’ has widely been
used in evolutionary game theory.
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The related literature often specifies the dependent variable of the estimat-
ing equation as: median housing rent, median housing value, housing sales
price, or probability of choosing a certain dwelling. A serious problem with
the first three specifications is that they tend to exclude a large part of the
total housing stock. By contrast, the last one, the probability, implies seri-
ous problems with its calculation. Here, we need to clarify what the right
time framework for the choice of a dwelling is. - It is the main task of these
estimating equations to explain the variation of their dependent variable by
some specific local fiscal variables. As explaining variables have in particular
been chosen: the property tax rate (nominal or effective), the property tax
revenue, and the public expenditure on education. A general problem with
local fiscal variables is that they tend to be interrelated. Because of this
problem, it may become difficult to assess the real importance of a single
local fiscal variable for the housing market. - Anyway, housing demand and
housing prices are not only influenced by local fiscal variables. Hence, one
needs to include some control variables to increase the explanatory power
and the reliability of the estimations. As important control variables, we
often find in the related literature: age of housing, owner occupation rate,
distance from the CBD, household income, poverty rate, and some more.
There are many plausible reasons why the causal relationship between
local fiscal policy and housing markets may not be uni-directional, as for
instance: One local government raises its expenditures on education. This
measure causes some households to move into this community. Then, the tax
base and the usage of the infrastructure increase, there. The local govern-
ment takes the additional tax revenue to spend more on parks and streets.
Hence, when we seek to estimate the effects of local fiscal variables on hous-
ing markets, we have to deal with the problem of simultaneous equations
bias. In the related literature, this problem has been intensively discussed.
Unfortunately, this discussion has not yet reached a consensus on how to min-
imize the risk to get some simultaneous equations bias. Still, four different
estimation methods are proposed:
1. OLS: justification: Monte Carlo studies show that OLS estimators are
in general less sensitive to violations of assumptions than other estima-
tors.
2. 2SLS: justification: this method selects the ’best’ instrumental variables
for the estimation; the estimator is consistent and quite robust.
3. Maximum likelihood/ limited information: justification: with normally
distributed disturbances, this method is efficient among single-equation
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estimators.
4. Systems methods: justification: these methods incorporate all avail-
able information; they have a smaller variance-covariance matrix than
single-equation estimators.
Which method should be preferred, depends on the estimation model and on
the data set. Thus, there exists merely a case-wise best method. Probably,
the major way to find this one, is to test, to control, to vary and to compare
each of them.8
The related literature has responded to the high complexity of the real
relationship between local fiscal policy and housing markets with various
models, various specifications, various sample structures, and various econo-
metric methods. This variety has not yet led to a broad consensus about
the correctness of the results. Let us now look at some of the controversial
results, assigned to their specific subject:
1. Local fiscal variables and the community choice: In the literature, prop-
erty taxes, education, security, and transportation turn out to be im-
portant criteria for why a citizen chooses to live in a certain community.
A local government can influence these criteria and change the prob-
ability to attract citizens. However, it remains unclear how relevant
such a change of the probability is for the local government.
2. The capitalization of local fiscal variables: Property taxes and the ex-
penditures on education are strong candidates for capitalization. The
regressional results are transferred into a (standardized) nominal scale.
The related studies present property tax capitalization rates in a range
from 0 to greater than 1. But in any case, it seems more suitable to
use an ordinal scale for such a complex issue.
3. The incidence of local taxes: Here, the key question is: How elastic is
the housing supply in comparison to the housing demand? - As the dis-
cussion has shown, it is extremely difficult to measure these elasticities.
Therefore, it seems more expedient to develop some indirect indicator
for the tax incidence. One possible way is to compare housing rents
with housing values. A housing value should appear as the discounted
8For a discussion of the problem in the specific context, see: Heinberg/ Oates (1970);
Orr (1970); Pollakowski (1973); King (1977); Gronberg (1979). For a general discussion
of the simultaneity problem, see: Kennedy (1998), chapter 10; Green (2000), chapter 16.
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sum of its (potential) rent. Unfortunately, it also can be difficult to
measure the potential rent for an owner occupied house.
All these three special subjects are closely related to the issue of how effi-
ciently local governments work in reality. Nevertheless, the related studies
hardly present any explicit conclusions about this issue. In the following, we
shall take up this task.
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Chapter 11
Local Governments and
Housing Markets
The need for housing plays a salient role in a typical household’s economic
plannings. On the one hand, the housing consumption may by itself con-
tribute a salient part to the household’s total utility, on the other hand, it
may highly affect other options in the total consumption plan. The consump-
tion of housing has three central dimensions: dwelling, site, and financing.
Firstly, a housing offers certain conditions to dwell; and a dwelling has multi-
ple features, like: size, layout, design, utilities, or structural integrity. Based
thereon, the household searches for the combination of dwelling features that
fits closest to its preferences. Secondly, a housing is connected with a certain
site; and a site has also multiple features. These can be divided into four
categories: natural, social, political, and economic environment. As some
salient features, we shall mention: business structure, climate, demography,
income, jobs, local public goods, political power, public rules, neighborhood,
shopping, and social status. In contrast to the dwelling, each combination
of these features must be unique, because each site has its own specific envi-
ronment. Therefore, two households with identical preferences cannot reach
the same optimum. Finally, housing causes particular challenges to finance
it. Housing is durable. It claims a salient portion of a typical household’s
life-time income. The household may choose between renting and buying.
The first option implies less financial responsability. However, it also gives
less power to decide on special features of the dwelling. As an owner, a
household may profit from the housing as an asset. It can integrate this
asset into the financing of its housing. A housing loan that is backed by
the related housing asset is called a mortgage. A mortgage tends to incur
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a lower financial burden than an alternative loan construction. A mortgage
can be standardized and traded on a secondary market. Both, debtors and
creditors, have an interest in a positive development of the housing market.1
When a household demands housing, it normally must take the site di-
mension as given. The only possibility to coordinate its preferences with the
site features is to move. Thus, households with similar preferences tend to
move to the same location. The totality of households sorts itself into local
groups of more homogenous housing preferences. The basic logic behind this
type of sorting has been explained by Tiebout (1956). However, he referred
to merely one site feature, namely to local public goods. In his model, Tie-
bout made three important assumptions about the demand for local public
goods. First, households are perfectly mobile. Second, they have perfect
knowledge of all community characteristics. Third, a household’s income
does not depend on where it resides. Furthermore, Tiebout made several
assumptions on the supply of local public goods. The model shows the fol-
lowing: In an equilibrium, the number of locations has to be equal to the
number of preference groups. Tiebout admitted that his assumptions were
rather strict. Nevertheless, he believed that the sorting mechanism could be
strong enough to determine the demand for local public goods in a real world
local economy. However, let us recall that local public goods are just one out
of many possible site features. It thus seems necessary that there exist as
many communities as there exist households in order to reach a Tiebout
equilibrium. Nevertheless, we can widely observe phenomena of sorting in
real local economies. For instance, households are locally concentrated with
respect to: income, education, ethnicity, size, age structure, or else. It seems
plausible that these characteristics are closely related to the preferences for
site features.2
A dwelling is a durable good which normally declines in value over time.
The reason for the decline is that the amounts of services which a dwelling
offers get smaller over time due to factors like physical deterioration, changes
in technology, or changes in fashion. For some parts, a fall in value can be
avoided by maintenance work. Such work, however, incurs costs. From a
certain point on, it is more profitable for a household to invest into a new
1For more details on housing finance, especially on the relationships between housing
ownership, mortgages and housing markets, see Mills/ Hamilton (1994), chapter 11.
2When a household has chosen its housing, it may have some options to influence the
site features. These can be described as ’voice’ options. Typically, the voice options are
less costly but weaker than the exit options. - In the real world, snob effects tend to be
important for the housing choice. Such effects rather weaken the efficiency of the Tiebout
mechanism.
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dwelling than to invest into the maintenance of an old dwelling. The position
of this point crucially depends on the household’s income. Generally, the
higher its income is, the higher are its opportunity costs, the more it invest
into a new dwelling. After a shorter time of usage, a household moves into
a new dwelling and sells the old one to a household with a lower income.
This way, dwellings are ’handed down’ and the maintenance work reduced.
It arises a kind of filtering process. The filtering model helps to explain
some widely spread phenomena on real world housing markets. One of these
phenomena is that higher income households live in lower age dwellings.
Another one is that higher income households tend to live in greater distance
to the city center. Typically, cities are built outwardly in circles, over time.
Thus, the closer one moves to a city center, the older the housing stock is.
Very often, the filtering model appears as a powerful tool to analyze the
interaction of different segments on a market for housing.3
There are at least five reasons why housing markets work in a special way:
First, housing is immobile; it is fixed to its own site. Therefore, a demander
needs to adapt more strongly to the supply than on other markets. Second,
housing has particularly many features; the number of possible combinations
is particularly high. Therefore, the supply of housing is more heterogeneous
than the supply of other goods. Each supplier has some monopoly power.
Third, housing is durable. It involves long investment horizons. The invest-
ment risk becomes typically high. The changes in the housing stock are slow;
new investments are made in a low frequency. Fourth, housing tends to be
highly affected by externalities. Negative externalities arise in the form of:
pollution, noise, crime, disease infection, or visual aspects. There are various
ways how to internalize externalities. But these ways have to be found com-
monly by the whole affected group. Organizational problems may appear.
Fifth, housing is costly. A typical household pays a large part of its income
on housing. As a side effect of the consumption, the household may develop
some personal attachment to it. Such attachment can be interpreted as a
type of capital which gets lost when the household moves. But, moving also
incurs monetary costs which are mainly related to transportation. To find an
optimal housing, a household needs to invest in information. Due to various
asymmetries, the information costs on the housing market tend to be very
high.
Due to all of these reasons, a free housing market tends to generate sub-
3The filtering model also explains why lower-income households rather tend to rent
than to own a housing. Renting incurs a moral hazard problem. Due to this, renters
have less incentives to invest in the maintenance of a dwelling. For an older dwelling,
maintenance is usually less profitable.
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optimal outcomes; the price for housing by itself might coordinate demand
and supply in an inefficient manner. The ’fair’ value of a certain housing
can only be assessed. There are three different valuation approaches: sales
comparison, cost, and income capitalization. Each approach has its specific
limits and drawbacks. Very often, they lead to highly deviating results for
one and the same object. Hence, the ’fair’ value remains quite uncertain.
Moreover, its real determinants may change rather quickly and strongly. As
a result, housing prices tend to fluctuate a lot. Such fluctuations destabilize
the market. They may give wrong signals to the decisions on housing invest-
ment. This can lead to problems such as: abandonment, forming of ghettos,
homelessness, discrimination, or congestion. Hence, it seems to be neces-
sary that the government intervenes into the housing market. Four types of
respective interventions have been widely practiced:
1. Housing assistance: The government offers financial aid to the deman-
ders for housing. This can be in the form of: rent grants, ownership
grants, mortgage programs, tax deductions, etc.
2. Housing development programs: The government subsidizes housing
construction under certain conditions. The conditions can be put on:
location, size, structure, inputs, etc.
3. Rent control policy: The government dictates the level or the develop-
ment of a rent.
4. Public housing: The government itself enters the market as a supplier.
It thus puts downward pressure on the rents. Furthermore, it can
guarantee some affordable dwelling to a specific group of citizens.
All these four types of interventions have specific drawbacks. In general, it
is difficult to judge whether their net welfare effect is positive or negative.
But, it should be possible to measure their effects on the housing prices.4
4For more on housing valuation methods, see Lusht (1997). - For more on housing
policies, see O’Sullivan (2003), chapter 18.
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Chapter 12
The Data
Based on the theoretical concept of the three central dimensions of housing
(dwelling, site, financing), one can derive a huge range of potentially impor-
tant determinants of the housing prices. Therefore, if one estimates a housing
price function empirically, the quality of the results highly depends on how
well the used data set covers the range of all theoretically important deter-
minants. Moreover, it is essential that the data set follows the same market
concept. Every empirical variable should be defined on the same distinctions
of geographical areas, population groups, or governmental units. Our data
set seems to fulfill both criteria (coverage of theoretical range of variables,
same market concept) to a very high degree. The data set is constructed from
two distinctive survey programs: the ’American Community Survey (ACS)’
and the ’Census of Governments (CoG)’. Both programs are run by the U.S.
Bureau of the Census.
The U.S. Census Bureau has fully implemented the ACS as a part of the
’2010 Decennial Census Program’ since 2005. There are three main intentions
behind the ACS: a) to deepen the results from the Decennial Census; b) to
keep pace with developments of population and housing inside the U.S.A.;
and c) to guide scientific effort towards lower level objects. The Bureau
has planned to collect a ’full’ list of data for each area in the U.S.A. with
a population of 65,000 or more, starting in 2006. For the years 1999 to
2004, the Census Bureau already offers data for most areas in the U.S.A.
with a population of 250,000 or more, plus several selected areas between
65,000 and 250,000. The earlier data, however, partly base on extrapolations.
Nonetheless, they can be regarded as highly reliable.
The U.S. Census Bureau has guided a CoG since 1957 at five-year inter-
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vals. The CoG from 2002 covers the whole range of state and local govern-
ment financial activities in the fiscal year 2001-02. In 2002, there were in
total 87,525 local governments in the U.S.A., namely on five distinct levels:
3,043 on counties, 19,429 on municipalities, 16,504 on townships, 13,506 on
school districts, and 35,052 on special districts. These governments received
in total a revenue of USD 1,083,129 millions; of which the highest share went
to the school districts (32.4%), the second to the municipalities (31.2%) and
the third to the counties (24.0%). The local governments differ quite strongly
in the functions that they perform, even those on the same level. The legal
’constitution’ of a local unit, its degree of autonomy, crucially depends on
the state law. Under its given constitution, however, each unit may specify
the government actions by itself, with respect to the specific local conditions.
Hence, it often turns out to be difficult to compare data from single local
governments. - Anyway, the U.S. Census Bureau aggregated the budget fig-
ures of all local governments in the respective county area. County areas are
spread over nearly the entire U.S.A., and they are mutually exclusive. This
aggregation makes local policy easier to compare. It offers to us a common
base for the ACS data.1
1The U.S. Bureau of the Census distinguishes between: ’general-purpose governments’
(counties, municipalities and townships) and ’limited-purpose governments’ (school dis-
tricts and special districts). This (rough) distinction, however, seems to distort the ’real
picture’ quite strongly.
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Chapter 13
Descriptive Statistics
A housing price is the price which an economic entity pays for the right
to consume services from a certain housing object. Since housing objects
may offer very different services, each object basically has its own price.
However, the services from different objects may also be related to each
other; especially via the site dimension. Under a given perception of such a
relationship, we can define a housing market. Nonetheless, a certain housing
market does not need to have a unique price. Thus, we generally use certain
statistical measures in order to describe the price situation on a housing
market. There are two principle ways to obtain the right to consume services
from a certain housing object: either purchase or rent. Only under very
restrictive conditions, the purchasing price is the present value of all arising
rental payments. For various reasons, such as information asymmetry, risk
inclination, taxation, or regulation, the purchasing price and the rent price
usually are not equivalent. Therefore, a housing market may split into two
sub-markets: one for ownership, the other for renting.
In our sample, the housing markets are delimited by county areas. There
are five distinctive statistical measures for the housing prices. Three of these
measures refer to the ownership sub-markets (the lower value quartile, the
median value, the upper value quartile); and the other two to the renting
sub-markets (the median contract rent, the median gross rent). The tables
13.1 to 13.3 give some detailed information about these five housing price
variables in 2002 and 2003. As we can see, the housing value variables have
highly different properties than the housing rent variables. The housing
value variables are more dispersed and less symmetric. Thus, the standard
deviation of a housing value variable is more than 50% of its mean; for a rent
variable, it is less than 30%. - The joined range of the second and the third
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quartile of the median housing values in 2002 (HSVALM02) is about 75%
of its median; for the gross median rent in 2002 (RENTGM02), the range is
about 42%. - All the five variables are skewed to the right and non-normally
distributed; but the housing values are clearly more so. From 2002 to 2003,
the housing values grew on average by around 10%, the rents by just around
4%. Each of the five variables became more symmetric distribution. In sum,
housing values seem to be less stable and more dispersed than housing rents.
variable mean std. dev. skewness J.-Bera
HSVALL02 126767 66591 1.878 370
HSVALM02 172595 91255 1.913 343
HSVALU02 244671 130008 1.813 249
RENTCM02 623.85 173.44 0.943 51.0
RENTGM02 711.85 163.36 0.976 56.2
HSVALL03 140797 79273 1.705 235
HSVALM03 191668 106134 1.707 213
HSVALU03 270519 146860 1.643 177
RENTCM03 642.98 174.70 0.721 21.0
RENTGM03 737.25 169.12 0.714 20.4
Table 13.1: Housing prices in 2002 and 2003
Fiscal budgets may reflect the essence of public policies, but they hardly
reveal everything about the power of the respective governments. The power
of a government also depends on the rules which define its allowed connec-
tions to the citizens or to the other governments. Such rules may be various,
extensive, and complicated, which makes it difficult to extract their effects
from the budget figures. Nevertheless, the local fiscal budget is supposed
to be the principal base in order to analyze the effects of local policy on
housing prices. Some selected local fiscal variables for the U.S.A. in 2002
are presented by the tables 13.4 to 13.6. The two major sources of local
public revenue were intergovernmental transfers (IGMREV) and property
taxation (PPTAX). Together, they amount to nearly two thirds of the total
revenue. These two sources show comparatively little dispersion and moder-
ate asymmetry, as both, per capita values (c) and budget shares (b). While
in the distribution of the intergovernmental revenue per capita, there ap-
pears one outlier, District of Columbia, its joined range of the second and
the third quartile is a bit smaller than the one of the property tax revenue
per capita. Other taxes (OTHTAX) and current charges (CUCHAR) appear
as two highly dispersed and asymmetric variables; the first especially as a per
capita variable, the latter as a budget share. The distribution of the total
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rank HSVALM02 county
1 608,833 San Mateo (CA)
2 571,708 Santa Clara (CA)
3 530,662 San Francisco (CA)
... ... ...
23 321,327 Norfolk (MA)
... ... ...
59 198,260 Washtenaw (MI)
... ... ...
117 146,452 Maricopa (AZ)
118 146,303 Lane (OR)
... ... ...
176 114,172 Clayton (GA)
... ... ...
212 90,600 Polk (FL)
... ... ...
232 61,914 Cameron (TX)
233 61,468 Hidalgo (TX)
234 60,854 Jefferson (AK)
Table 13.2: Ranking of the median housing values in 2002
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rank RENTGM02 county
1 1,398 San Mateo (CA)
2 1,300 Santa Clara (CA)
3 1,185 Fairfax (VA)
... ... ...
23 945 Solano (CA)
... ... ...
59 808 King (WA)
... ... ...
117 690 Orange (NY)
118 689 El Paso (CO)
... ... ...
176 589 Onondaga (NY)
... ... ...
212 531 Oklahoma (OK)
... ... ...
232 442 Cameron (TX)
233 435 Luzerne (PA)
234 378 Schuylkill (PA)
Table 13.3: Ranking of the gross median rents in 2002
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expenditure (TLEXPD) resembles the one of the total tax revenue. In sum,
local governments do rely more on intergovernmental transfers and property
taxes than on other sources of revenue.
variable mean std. dev. skewness J.-Bera
IGMREV02c 1.2938 0.5923 1.961 649
IGMREV02b 0.3451 0.1033 0.244 2.33
TLTAX02c 1.3788 0.5534 2.673 2721
TLTAX02b 0.3779 0.1163 0.203 3.63
PPTAX02c 1.0445 0.4434 1.073 64.7
PPTAX02b 0.2912 0.1207 0.635 15.7
OTHTAX02c 0.3344 0.3684 5.781 31769
OTHTAX02b 0.0867 0.0680 1.225 83.1
CUCHAR02c 0.5331 0.4273 4.063 7021
CUCHAR02b 0.1380 0.0822 3.719 4760
TLEXPD02c 3.9112 1.2758 2.7710 2790
Table 13.4: Local fiscal variables: 2002
Housing prices and fiscal variables may form various impact structures
(over time). This is mainly because both, housing markets and fiscal bud-
gets, are subject to complexity increasing forces. Some complexity increasing
forces of housing markets are: technological progress, population growth, en-
vironmental change, and regulation. A higher complexity also leads to a
higher differentiation of prices. Housing values become more volatile and
more difficult to assess. Thus, the relationships between different prices be-
come less determinate. Some complexity increasing forces of fiscal budgets
are: political party competition, bureaucracy, rent seeking, and information
asymmetry. A higher complexity of a fiscal budget also means that a single
fiscal variable becomes more interrelated with other fiscal variables. It there-
fore gets more difficult to predict how a change of one variable will affect
the others. Since budgets have to be balanced, we first suppose that a fiscal
revenue variable is positively related to the public expenditure. But, this
revenue variable can be negatively related to other revenue variables. Thus,
the total impact on the public expenditure will not be clear. Such an increase
in uncertainty carries over to the impact on housing prices. In general, we
suppose that the fiscal revenue is negatively related to housing prices, and
that the fiscal expenditure is positively related to housing prices. But, such
a general rule may find some narrow limits at the balanced budget rule and
the various interdependencies of single fiscal variables.
Table 13.7 gives some first indications for the common dependency struc-
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rank IGMREV02c county
1 5.030 District of Columbia (DC)
2 3.438 Suffolk (MA)
3 3.221 Tulare (CA)
... ... ...
23 1.946 Santa Cruz (CA)
... ... ...
59 1.531 Washoe (NV)
... ... ...
117 1.172 Guilford (NA)
118 1.170 Polk (IO)
... ... ...
176 0.909 Ada (ID)
... ... ...
212 0.723 DuPage (IL)
... ... ...
232 0.333 Denton (TX)
233 0.312 Collin (TX)
234 0.199 Honolulu (HW)
Table 13.5: Ranking of intergovernmental revenue per capita in 2002
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rank PPTAX02c county
1 2.767 Nassau (NY)
2 2.523 Westchester (NY)
3 2.425 Morris (NJ)
... ... ...
23 1.603 Essex (NJ)
... ... ...
59 1.267 Cuyahoga (OH)
... ... ...
117 0.953 Dauphin (PA)
118 0.949 Contra Costa (CA)
... ... ...
176 0.740 Seminole (FL)
... ... ...
212 0.547 Hidalgo (TX)
... ... ...
232 0.316 Mobile (AL)
233 0.313 Madison (AL)
234 0.186 Jefferson (AR)
Table 13.6: Ranking of property tax revenue per capita in 2002
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ture of housing prices and fiscal variables in US-counties in 2002. A correla-
tion coefficient of nearly 0.9 indicates a narrow relationship between the me-
dian housing value (HSVALM02) and the median gross rent (RENTGM02).
Thus, these counties seem to define housing markets which hardly segregate
between ownership and renting. From the figures in that table, we may adopt
the following indications for the dependencies between the fiscal variables: a)
Intergovernmental revenue (IGMREV02) has a high correlation (0.71) with
total expenditure (TLEXPD). It thus looks as if intergovernmental transfers
are rarely used as substitutes for other sources of revenue. b) The property
taxes (PPTAX02) have a high impact on the total tax revenue (TLTAX02).
This impact surely results from being the largest part of it. But, these taxes
do not show a high influence on other sources of revenue, neither on total
expenditure. c) In contrast to property taxes, other taxes (OTHTAX02)
show a significant influence on the intergovernmental revenue. The respec-
tive coefficient is 0.33. Their influence on the total expenditure even seems
much stronger, with a coeffiencent of 0.61. - In our sample, some of the
correlations between fiscal variables and housing prices do not correspond to
what we would expect, based on our general theoretical rule. Especially, the
property tax revenue is positively correlated with the housing prices; and the
respective coefficients are higher than those of other fiscal variables, total
expenditure included.
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HSVALM RENTGM IGMREV TLTAX PPTAX OTHTAX TLEXPD
HSVALM02 1.0
RENTGM02 0.883 1.0
IGMREV02c 0.149 0.018 1.0
TLTAX02c 0.398 0.441 0.146 1.0
PPTAX02c 0.436 0.516 -0.090 0.749 1.0
OTHTAX02c 0.073 0.042 0.329 0.602 -0.079 1.0
TLEXPD02c 0.309 0.236 0.710 0.579 0.212 0.611 1.0
Table 13.7: Correlations: housing prices and fiscal variables: 2002
10
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Chapter 14
Regressions
Housing consumption has three key dimensions, namely: dwelling, site, and
financing. A local government may be allowed and also able to intervene into
all of these dimensions by various measures. Let us mention some important
types of intervention: a) A local government stipulates specific rules on the
site and the structure of a house by zoning policy. Thus, the stock of housing
becomes more homogeneous. b) A local government stipulates certain taxes
or certain fees: A property tax influences the prices for housing. A sales tax
changes the households’ consumption structures. An income tax lowers the
households’ consumption levels. Finally, a fee determines the demand for the
local public goods and thus their degrees of congestion. c) A local govern-
ment decides on the provision of local public goods. Thus, it determines one
site feature, directly, but also other features, indirectly, as for instance: the
business structure, demography, employment, or political power. - In sum,
there are various public measures to influence the housing market. Each of
them might have its own specific influence. Each of them might somehow
be related to the fiscal budget variables. Hence, let us ask at first: What
influence does one specific fiscal variable take by itself on the housing prices?
Table 14.1 presents five simple regressions of the median housing value,
and table 14.2 five of the median gross rent. Each of the five fiscal variables
was logarithmized when this could improve its performance as a single regres-
sor. Regarding both dependent variables, the fiscal variables performed as
follows: The property tax revenue (PPTAX02c) gets the highest explanatory
power. Its regression coefficients have the highest significance. Furthermore,
Ramsey’s RESET test does not indicate misspecification. But, this variable
also creates the residuals with the highest skewness. The (logit) total tax
revenue (TLTAX02c) is nearly as strong in explanatory power and in the sig-
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nificance of its regression coefficients. Its residuals are rather weakly skewed.
In the logit form, the variable does not show clear evidence for misspecifica-
tion, anymore. The total expenditure (TLEXPD02c) seems to have moderate
relevance for the housing prices. While its residuals show highly symmetrical
distributions, it generates the least significant constant values. However, this
weakness seems not to stem from the chosen specification. The two remain-
ing local fiscal variables, intergovernmental revenue (IGMREV02c) and other
tax revenue (OTHTAX02c), finally turn out to have little relevance for the
housing prices.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
c 152035 159903 79735 185192 32382
(9.22) (20.4) (5.0) (19.75) (1.01)
IGMREV02c 30633
(2.64)
ln 123899
TLTAX02c (6.91)
PPTAX02c 107169
(7.15)
OTHTAX02c 19366
(1.03)
ln 120474
TLEXPD02c (5.09)
R-squ. 0.029 0.171 0.20 0.005 0.10
J.-Bera 168 195 344 197 122
RESET 0.025 1.525 0.278 0.001 0.474
Table 14.1: Simple regressions: median housing value in 2003 on fiscal vari-
ables
There are five key reasons why housing markets work in a particular way,
namely: immobility, heterogeneity, durability, high costs, and externalities.
The first four of them are rather independent of each other. However, each
of them invigorates the fifth reason. Consequently, externalities normally
play a central role on housing markets. The problems which they cause tend
to be more difficult to solve than those on other local markets. Typical
instances for externalities on housing markets stem from: the housing size,
its layout, its design, its structural integrity, the social status of the dwellers,
and the local public goods. All of these factors may be interrelated. They all
may affect the prices of other, nearby housing. Unfortunately, some of them
could do this in a negative and distortionary way. Immobility, heterogeneity,
durability, and high costs on housing markets make it more difficult for the
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involved agents to assess and to correct the given externalities. In general,
the government might be able to reduce such externality problems by fiscal
policy or regulation (zoning in particular). The government will be the more
successful with its interventions, the more it considers the given interrelations
on the housing market.
The particular features of a housing market may cause severe method-
ological problems for the estimation of a hedonic housing price function. Such
problems may generally appear in three distinct forms:
1. some explaining variables are interrelated;
2. the causal link between an explaining and the explained variable is
unclear;
3. the function is decisively influenced by some hidden variables.
In order to tackle these problems, we will follow a special methodological
approach. This approach shall help to analyze the role of fiscal variables in
the determination of housing prices in relation to other determinants. The
central issue in this context is how to avoid distortions from simultaneity or
endogeneity. Our approach is divided into four steps:
1. We select all non-fiscal variables which have a higher correlation with
the housing prices than the fiscal variables. Then, we regress the hous-
ing prices on the whole set of the selected variables.
2. We remove all redundant non-fiscal variables by a redundancy test.
The gives us a presumably reliable non-fiscal control function.
3. We integrate each fiscal variable separately into the control functions;
we estimate these new equations with the OLS method.
4. We estimate the new equations with the 2SLS method.
What we seek to evaluate is the relative influence of local fiscal variables
on the housing prices. Our methodological approach can thus be justified by
the following reasons: Step 1 and step 2 jointly offer a simple but also effec-
tive way to select the most important non-fiscal determinants of the housing
prices, out of all available variables. This type of selection supports the de-
gree of determination for the related regressions. Furthermore, it suppresses
the appearance of biasing regressors. Step 3 offers some preliminary and
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exploratory insights on the specific roles of the fiscal variables. Surely, there
are many (strong) theoretical indications that some endogeneity is involved
in such estimations. Thus, the endogenous variables may become random,
such that a change in any disturbance term changes all the endogenous vari-
ables, simultaneously. The OLS estimator becomes (even) asymptotically
biased. However, the real endogeneity structure can hardly be identified.
There remains some doubt. Moreover, alternative estimators may perform
worse under specific conditions. Step 4 uses a specific simultaneous equa-
tions estimator. The 2SLS is a instrumental variable technique. It estimates
a function via a set of instrument variables. In general, one such variable is
the more expedient, the higher it is correlated with its regressor for which it
acts. Hence, the determination of the regressions also depends on the avail-
able exogenous variables. Nevertheless, the 2SLS estimator is consistent and
quite robust.1
In table 14.3, we can see some results of step 1. Out of 27 non-fiscal
variables, there are 8 which have a higher correlation with the housing prices
than the fiscal variables. 6 of them belong to the income category; 2 to the
mobility category. Together, the 8 variables reach more explanatory power
for the median gross rent (RENTMG03) than for the median housing value
(HSVALM03). This corresponds to the observation that the regression of
RENTMG03 is more likely to be linear.
Some results of step 2 are shown by the tables 14.4 (1) and 14.5 (1). By
removing the redundant variables, we keep three non-fiscal variables in both
cases. These three reach an explanatory power which is nearly as high as the
one of the eight. By far the biggest contribution comes from PCINC03 or
HHMINC03, respectively. The removal of the redundant variables changes
little with respect to the linearity of the regressions.
The columns (2) to (5) in the tables 14.4 and 14.5 present some results
derived by step 3. Now, the four most important fiscal variables are sepa-
rately integrated into the two control regressions. The OLS method is (still)
used. As it turns out, ln TLEXPD02c is the only fiscal variable which reaches
significance in the regression of HSVALM03. It is the only variable which
gives a positive contribution to the explanatory power. The integration of the
fiscal variables shows little impact on the RESET values. The specification
problem remains evident. In the regressions of RENTGM03, the two fiscal
variables ln TLTAX02c and ln TLEXPD02c reach significance on a 1%-level;
ln PPTAX02c on a 5%-level. By each fiscal variable, the explanatory power
1For a more extensive discussion of the simultaneity problem and various related treat-
ments, see Kennedy (1998), chapter 10.
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becomes somewhat higher. In two cases, there arises stronger evidence for
misspecification.
In step 4, we estimate our housing price functions with the 2SLS method.
Some of the results are shown in table 14.6 and 14.7. In the 2SLS regres-
sions of HSVALM03, the local public expenditure for education per capita
(EDUCAT02c) is used as the instrument variable for each of the four fiscal
regressors. Thus, each fiscal regressor becomes significant. But, the gain in
significance for the first three variables is accompanied by a loss in signifi-
cance for PCINC03. As a result, the explanatory power of each respective
regression falls. In the 2SLS regressions of RENTGM03, the fraction of work-
ers that use public transportation (WKPBTRP03) is used as the instrument
variable for each fiscal regressor. Thus, each fiscal regressor becomes more
significant such that it reaches a level of 1%. In particular, it holds for the re-
gressions (2) and (3) that the gain in significance for the fiscal variable comes
along with a loss in significance for HHMINC03 and a loss in explanatory
power. The coefficient for the constant c becomes insignificant in regression
(2).2
2As already mentioned, there are two criteria for the choice of an instrument variable:
first, it must be correlated with the explanatory variable in the regression; second, it
must be uncorrelated with the disturbances in the regression. EDUCAT02c and WKPB-
TRP03 appear as the best respective choices from our data; although their limitations as
instruments are quite obvious.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
c 738.8 676.2 523.3 732.2 547.2
(61.9) (57.0) (21.8) (48.9) (10.5)
ln -9.212
IGMREV02 (-0.35)
ln 129.9
TLTAX02c (8.76)
PPTAX02c 204.8
(9.70)
OTHTAX02c 15.24
(0.51)
ln 143.7
TLEXPD02 (3.72)
R-squ. 0.001 0.248 0.288 0.001 0.056
J.-Bera 21.2 11.9 41.7 19.3 15.6
RESET 2.494 0.069 0.444 0.296 0.573
Table 14.2: Simple regressions: median gross rent in 2003 on fiscal variables
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HSVALM03 RENTGM03
c -406594 -33.579
(-8.30) (-0.51)
FGBORN03 463710 604.36
(8.78) (8.52)
BACHPL03 -375597 -55.894
(-4.80) (-0.53)
AVTRTM03 820.22 6.8748
(0.66) (4.14)
SFEMPL03 1099974 948.06
(8.27) (5.31)
INTRST03 204239 159.90
(2.43) (1.42)
BELPOV03 413306 -116.64
(3.22) (-0.68)
PCINC03 13.31 0.0059
(6.55) (2.18)
HHMDINC03 1.5427 0.0054
(2.15) (5.58)
adj. R-squ. 0.758 0.828
RESET 45.6 0.916
Table 14.3: Multiple regressions: housing prices in 2003 on non-fiscal vari-
ables: OLS
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
c -236646 -244289 -237031 -248358 -269315
(-11.54) (-10.75) (-11.49) (-9.90) (-10.53)
ln -11106
TLTAX02c (-0.78)
PPTAX02c -2421.1
(-0.20)
ln -9782.5
PPTAX02c (-0.81)
ln 29612
TLEXPD02c (2.11)
FGBORN03 518239 524065 520236 524996 484248
(11.21) (11.19) (11.0) (11.18) (9.96)
SFEMPL03 1016567 990522 1008519 988632 1022859
(7.60) (7.18) (7.22) (7.15) (7.70)
PCINC03 10.101 10.610 10.244 10.646 9.971
(13.37) (10.63) (9.93) (10.52) (13.25)
adj. R-squ. 0.720 0.720 0.719 0.720 0.724
RESET 32.8 31.8 32.8 31.4 35.5
Table 14.4: Multiple regressions: median housing value in 2003 on fiscal
variables and on control variables: OLS
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
c 93.655 109.31 89.420 115.79 10.307
(3.81) (4.44) (3.63) (4.24) (0.31)
ln 49.756
TLTAX02c (3.15)
PPTAX02c 21.447
(1.52)
ln 26.011
PPTAX02c (1.81)
ln 66.261
TLEXPD02c (3.62)
FGBORN03 636.63 607.23 619.95 619.52 551.84
(10.30) (9.90) (9.90) (9.96) (8.54)
SFEMPL03 830.44 918.01 893.47 894.47 817.63
(4.69) (5.22) (4.93) (4.98) (4.74)
HHMINC03 0.0097 0.0090 0.0092 0.0091 0.0098
(22.30) (18.61) (17.24) (17.48) (23.12)
adj. R-squ. 0.807 0.817 0.808 0.809 0.817
RESET 0.90 0.751 0.868 1.412 1.458
Table 14.5: Multiple regressions: median gross rent in 2003 on fiscal variables
and on control variables: OLS
115
(1) (2) (3) (4)
c -170571 -229492 -172291 -320832
(-3.75) (-10.62) (-4.08) (-6.42)
ln 96009
TLTAX02c (1.68)
PPTAX02c 44996
(1.82)
ln 53753
PPTAX02c (1.78)
ln 76309
TLEXPD02c (1.85)
FGBORN03 467875 481128 481107 430648
(7.84) (9.24) (9.04) (6.46)
SFEMPL03 1241723 1166132 1170065 1032780
(6.19) (7.23) (7.05) (7.58)
PCINC03 5.695 7.434 7.102 9.767
(2.07) (4.47) (3.80) (12.38)
adj. R-squ. 0.650 0.699 0.686 0.711
Table 14.6: Multiple regressions: median housing value in 2003 on fiscal
variables and on control variables: 2SLS
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
c 135.27 54.119 295.51 -131.64
(4.86) (1.56) (3.68) (-1.97)
ln 132.27
TLTAX02c (3.71)
PPTAX02c 200.21
(2.96)
ln 237.22
PPTAX02c (2.77)
ln 175.70
TLEXPD02c (3.86)
FGBORN03 558.47 480.94 480.60 407.45
(8.27) (5.0) (4.69) (4.51)
SFEMPL03 1063.2 1418.8 1414.4 795.81
(5.48) (4.66) (4.37) (4.27)
HHMDINC03 0.0078 0.0052 0.0048 0.0101
(11.45) (3.27) (2.58) (21.47)
adj. R-squ. 0.792 0.673 0.628 0.786
Table 14.7: Multiple regressions: median gross rent in 2003 on fiscal variables
and on control variables: 2SLS
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Chapter 15
Summary
Which role do housing markets play in local fiscal competition? - The citizens
may respond to local fiscal policy by migration. Migration implies shifts of
the housing demand. Local fiscal policy capitalizes into housing prices. Ba-
sically, one presumes that fiscal revenue variables get negative capitalization
rates; and fiscal expenditure variables positive ones. However, housing mar-
kets have special features; some of which could impair capitalization. We
thus ask: How effectively do the citizens constrain Leviathans by migration?
A citizen optimizes her housing demand in three dimensions: dwelling,
site, financing. Local fiscal policy is just one feature of the site dimension.
In sum, there are many features and thus many reasons why a citizen may
adapt her housing demand. Anyway, she will face a market which has the
following special features: immobility, heterogeneity, durability, proneness to
externalities, cost extensiveness. On a free market, these special features al-
together tend to create coordination problems. To solve these problems, one
can consider various types of local government intervention, as for instance:
housing assistance, housing development programs, rent control, public hous-
ing. But, if a local government behaves as a Leviathan, then it might misuse
its interventions in order to ease its constraints which are generated by mi-
gration.
In general, a Leviathan profits from high housing prices in his region.
Therefore, he has an interest that the (internal) capitalization rates of his lo-
cal fiscal variables are high (in absolute terms). One variable which normally
forms a particularly strong connection with the housing prices is the property
tax. Under perfect market conditions, the property tax would capitalize into
the housing prices at a rate of -1. Then, every Leviathan would be forced
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to choose the socially efficient tax rate. Migration would work as a perfect
constraint. - However, as long as there are imperfections on the housing
markets, the Leviathans have some chances to raise the capitalization rate
of the property taxes, and of all the other fiscal variables.
Thus, we empirically analyze a Leviathan’s relative influence on the hous-
ing prices. We work with data on 234 US-counties in the years 2002 and 2003.
The samples consistently take the counties as the relevant markets; each of
them contains 46 theoretically relevant variables, which can be assigned to
the following eight categories: housing prices, local fiscal budget, dwelling,
demography, income level, income status, employment, geography. The cate-
gory of housing prices distinguishes between two sub-markets: the ownership
and the rental market. A descriptive analysis shows that the prices on the
first sub-market are more dispersed and less symmetric than those on the
latter. A descriptive analysis of the fiscal budget variables shows in particu-
lar the following: The local governments have two major sources of revenue:
first, intergovernmental transfers, second, property taxes. As budget shares,
both variables reveal nearly normal distributions. As per capita values, they
have somewhat higher degrees of dispersion and of asymmetry. But, these
degrees are still below those of the respective other fiscal variables.
When we empirically estimate a housing price function, we may encounter
three methodological problems: first, some explaining variables are interre-
lated; second, the causal link between an explaining and the explained vari-
able is unclear; and third, the function is decisively influenced by some hidden
variable. To tackle these problems, we follow a four-step approach:
In the first step, we select eight non-fiscal variables which are highly
correlated with the housing prices. We regress the housing prices on those
variables. Thus, the variation of the median housing value in 2003 is ex-
plained by around 76%; and the variation of the median gross rent in 2003
by around 83%. In the second step, we construct the respective non-fiscal
control equations by removing the redundant independent variables. Now,
the regression of the median housing value reaches an explanatory power of
72%; the regression of the median gross rent of 80.7%. In the third step, we
integrate every fiscal variable which has a significant correlation coefficient
with the housing prices separately into the control equations. We first esti-
mate these new equations with the OLS method. As a result, the property
tax revenue gets mostly insignificant. The total tax revenue gets significant
in the regression of the median gross rent, but not in the regression of the
median housing value. The total expenditure reaches significance in both re-
gressions; which somewhat increases their explanatory power. In the fourth
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step, we estimate the new equations with the 2SLS method; which is specif-
ically constructed for simultaneous systems. Now, the regression coefficients
of all those fiscal variables get significant. However, the t-values of the con-
trolling income variables decrease; in particular where they meet with the
property tax revenue. The 2SLS regressions of the housing prices on the
property tax revenue reveal much lower explanatory power.
We may interpret the results of our empirical analysis as follows: The
highest impact on the housing prices comes from the personal income; the
second from the personal mobility. The impact from the fiscal policy is quite
diverse. Out of the fiscal variables, the property tax revenue has the strongest
connection with the housing prices. In contradiction to the ’traditional’ the-
ory, this connection is positive. Moreover, it remains quite unclear whether
the first determines the latter, or the other way round. Anyway, this con-
nection seems highly related to the average income. In addition, we observe
that the property tax is more strongly connected with the housing rent than
with the housing value. This suggests that the tax burden rather falls on the
housing owners. The total public expenditure has a lower but more reliable
impact on the housing prices. In agreement with the traditional theory, this
impact is positive. Hence, the citizens do care about local public goods, when
they make their housing decisions. However, we cannot say in detail which
types of local public good they prefer.
Overall, a Leviathan might take a ’medium’ influence on the housing
prices. The form of this influence is rather complex. He faces strong incen-
tives to promote the average income in his region. The citizens’ exit option
is rather weak as a constraint for his power to tax.
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Part III
Leviathans, Income Deviations,
and the Sources of Local Public
Revenue
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Chapter 16
Introduction
How can governments be best characterized? - A constitutional approach
characterizes governments as monolithic, self-interested entities. They call
such an entity ’Leviathan’. This type of characterization can be justified
by four reasons: First, this type is rather simple. It reduces complexity
for the analysis of its interaction with elements of its environment. Second,
this type is rather consistent. In general, economic theory assumes that
firms, households, or other agents are monolithic and self-interested. To treat
governments with different basic tools is at odds with this general approach.
Third, Leviathan is rather counterproductive. Thus, the predictions that we
can make on his actions tend to be pessimistic. The conclusions match with
a risk-averse political attitude. And finally, Leviathan is rather dominant.
In an evolutionary approach, we can derive many plausible conditions under
which a Leviathan will reach higher payoffs than other types of government.
If governments are assumed to be Leviathans, how can we best specify
their self-interests? - The constitutional theory usually describes a Leviathan
as a maximizer of his fiscal budget revenue or his fiscal budget surplus. If
there exists a constant relationship between both objectives, then they lead to
the same (overall) results. A key task of the constitutional theory is to search
for the best constraints on Leviathan’s revenue or surplus maximization. The
theory can treat any possible constraint in isolation; there is no doubt about
the government’s objective. In the real world, however, we encounter a given
multitude of (interrelated) constraints on governments. Here, we do not a
priori know what a government’s objective is. Typically, if a government
behaves as a fiscal revenue or surplus maximizer, then it will seek to hide
this. Therefore, to find out to what degree governments really behave as
Leviathans, we need some special method.
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In the related literature, most authors sought to test or to measure the
’real existence’ of Leviathans via a particular hypothesis by Brennan and
Buchanan (1980). This hypothesis states that fiscal power is negatively re-
lated to fiscal decentralization. According to this, fiscal decentralization
works as a steady and dominant constraint on the Leviathans. The more
decentralized a government structure is, the more Leviathans stand in com-
petition to each other, the less fiscal power they have. Hence, a government’s
objective becomes revealed due to the market structure. However, govern-
ment structures tend to be complex. Thus, it may become difficult to find
an expedient measure for fiscal decentralization. Moreover, there are good
reasons why a higher degree of centralization may also be in the interest of
the citizens. Due to these two and some further problems, the related tests
or measurements came to rather contradictory results.
This study develops a new method to measure the ’real existence’ of
Leviathans. We specify a Leviathan’s objective as the maximization of his
personal income. We make the assumption that under perfect conditions,
a government agent’s personal income stands in a constant relation to the
average income of all citizens in his jurisdiction. The deviation of his income
from the average income is an expression of his social power. We can conclude
that the higher the relative deviation is, the more social power the agent has.
In a next step, we examine what a Leviathan’s social power depends on. Here,
we focus on the sources of public revenue. We will ask: How much social
power can a Leviathan derive from a certain source of public revenue?
To perform our empirical examination on Leviathans, social power, and
the sources of public revenue, we use county data from the U.S. Bureau of
the Census. In the U.S.A., local governments are relatively independent in
their policies. They thus can take a rather strong influence on the social
conditions in their jurisdictions. The Bureau of Census provides a broad
range of high-quality data on the local policy and the social conditions. In
particular, it runs a survey program on public employment at a 5-year in-
terval. This program covers detailed information on the earnings of public
employees. Thus, for our empirical examination, we work with samples of
234 US-counties in the periods 1989/ 1992 and 1999/ 2002. Each of the two
samples contains 56 variables. Our empirical examination will be divided
into five major steps: first, derivation and description of the relative devia-
tions of local officals’ earnings; second, description of the local fiscal policy;
third, correlation analysis of income deviations and fiscal policy; fourth, re-
gressions of income deviations with full samples; and fifth, regressions of
income deviations with stratified samples.
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Chapter 17
Related Literature
17.1 Ideas and Estimations
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) introduced Leviathan as an essential element
of a constitutional approach. They explained why Leviathan may serve as
the right tool in the analysis of social rules, even if government agents do
not show perfectly rational and self-interested behavior. Major reasons stem
from ideas of social evolution and of the precautionary principle. The two
authors conceived Leviathan as a monolithic entity which seeks to maximize
its fiscal budget surplus. They assumed that there exists a positive and
strong relationship between the fiscal budget surplus on the one side and a
government agent’s power, income or utility on the other side. In the basic
constitutional model, the fiscal budget surplus is defined as tax revenue mi-
nus expenditure for public goods. In practice, however, this surplus does not
openly appear on the fiscal balance sheet. Since Leviathan is not almighty,
he has an interest to hide this surplus from the citizens. In order to cir-
cumvent this problem, one may assume under special conditions that there
exists a constant relationship between budget surplus and tax revenue. Le-
viathan, thus, becomes a maximizer of tax revenue who can be constrained
by constitutional rules on the use of tax instruments.1
Brennan and Buchanan asked whether freedom of migration could serve
as a substitute for overt constitutional constraints on the power to tax. They
1One idea is that rational behavior eliminates non-rational behavior in the social evo-
lutionary process, because the first generates higher payoffs than the latter. Another idea
is that a constitution should not be based on any risky assumptions. Instead, its task is
to support a higher minimum level of social outcomes in a long-term perspective.
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maintained that the classical version of the Tiebout model is not the right
starting point to answer this question. They regarded this model as a limiting
case of a non-spatial world of clubs. In this sense, if one departs only slightly
from the extremely restrictive assumptions of the model, then the club man-
agers will be able to extract some extra rent from the club members. Anyway,
it is essential to consider the consequences of various imperfections. It seems
likely that imperfections have a strong influence on the total outcome in a
spatial world. Brennan and Buchanan introduced four main categories:
1. the costs of mobility;
2. the potentiality for collusion;
3. the ranges of publicness/ spillovers;
4. economies of scale in administration.
All these four categories depend on the federal structure of the respective
state. The first two seem to have a monotonically negative relationship to
the number of jurisdictions in the state. The last two, in contrast, seem to
have a U-shaped relationship. In sum, Brennan and Buchanan presented the
following hypothesis (which we shall call ’BBLD’): A Leviathan will reach the
more (fiscal) power, ceteris paribus, the more homogeneous are the separate
jurisdictions, the higher is the number of jurisdictions, and the more decen-
tralized are the fiscal responsabilities. - Based on this conception, several
authors sought to measure the existence of Leviathans.2
A path-breaking study was made by Oates (1985). In this study, he
examined the relationship between government size and the degree of decen-
tralization of the public sector, using two different samples: the one of the
48 (contiguous) states in the U.S.A., and the other of 43 countries around
the world. Using the first sample, he specified the government size by the
aggregate state-local tax receipts in each state as a fraction of the personal
income. As indicators for the degree of centralization of the public sector,
he took the state share of state-local general revenues, the state share of
state-local total expenditure, and also the number of government units in
the state sector. Each of the three indicators has a negative correlation with
the government size variable, but on a low level. In his regressions, Oates
included four control variables: percentage of urban residents in each state,
2In the related literature, the focus is usually put on the relationship between fiscal
power and the fiscal federal structure. They call the respective statement ’Leviathan
hypothesis’.
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total population size of the state, state personal income per capita, and in-
tergovernmental grants as a percentage of state-local general revenue. - The
regressions of the government size find negative coefficients for each decen-
tralization variable. However, these coefficients are not significantly different
from zero. The results contradict the ’BBLD’ hypothesis.
Using the other sample, Oates specified the government size by the total
public revenue as a fraction of GDP. Here, he considered merely two indi-
cators for centralization: the central government share of total government
revenue and of the total expenditure. Oates formed two subsamples: one for
industrialized, the other for developing countries. While the correlations be-
tween the government size variable and each government structure variable
are negative for the industrialized countries, both are positive for the devel-
oping countries. However, each correlation coefficient is close to zero. Hence,
the regression analysis does not reveal any significant relationship between
government size and fiscal (de-)centralization. Again, the ’BBLD’ hypothesis
is not confirmed.3
Nelson (1987) reconsidered Oates’ (1985) study. He argued, in particular,
that Oates had not chosen an expedient concept of government structures to
test the given hypothesis. Oates had not taken the different responsibilities
of jurisdictions into consideration. Nelson, thus, distinguished between two
dimensions of government structure: on the one side, the vertical division of
responsibilities between jurisdictions, and on the other side, the horizontal
division of responsibilities. Taking these dimensions into account, it may
become crucial to separate the general-purpose from the single-function ju-
risdictions, when investigating the government structure of the U.S.A. Nelson
mentioned two reasons why it becomes crucial in the present case: First, mo-
bility typically exerts less constraining power on single-function jurisdictions,
because the benefit it offers to residents is less. Second, the two types of ju-
risdictions face very different cost conditions with respect to administration
as well as intrinsic public good production.
Thus, Nelson re-examined the relationship between government size and
fiscal centralization, using the same US-sample as Oates. As dependent vari-
able, Nelson alternatively chose Oates’ variable, a total expenditure variable,
and the local expenditures on fire protection as a fraction of personal income.
As indicators for fiscal centralization he chose the number of residents per
general-purpose jurisdiction, and the number of residents per single-function
3The industrialized countries were characterized by a larger relative government size
and a lower degree of centralization. Let us remind, however, that the sample size of these
countries was only 18.
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jurisdiction. He included the same control variables as Oates did - plus the
number of state expenditure mandates to local governments. In his regres-
sion analysis, Nelson found that all coefficients for the number of residents
per general-purpose jurisdiction were positive, and most of them significantly.
By contrast, the coefficients for the number of residents per single-function
jurisdiction had non-uniform signs, which were all insignificant. - In sum,
Nelson (1987) offers some support to the ’BBLD’ hypothesis.4
In another study, Nelson (1986) reminded that Brennan and Buchanan
had also mentioned some constraints on Leviathan other than fiscal decen-
tralization. Particularly, they had modeled fiscal revenue as a function of:
the allowable revenue bases, the allowable rate structures, and the number of
competing jurisdictions within the state. Nelson examined this function em-
pirically. He made, above all, the following assignments of empirical variables
to the three determinants:
1. Constitutional constraints on the revenue bases: comprehensive per-
sonal income tax (dummy); corporate income tax (dummy); inclusion
of services in the state’s sales tax (dummy).
2. Constitutional constraints on the budget structures: restrictions on
property tax rates, total property tax levies, or total expenditures
(dummy); limits on state borrowing (dummy).
3. (De-)centralization of fiscal authority: state share of total state and lo-
cal taxes; average number of state residents per county; average number
of state residents per special district.
Nelson chose the state and local taxes per capita as the dependent variable.
He worked with cross-sectional US-data (1976-77) and got the following re-
sults:
1. While the personal income tax has a significantly positive coefficient
sign, the corporate income tax has a significantly negative one.
2. While a restriction on the property tax has no significant influence on
the total tax reveneue, a limit on state borrowing has a significantly
negative one.
4Fire protection is the function that is taken over by the highest number of general-
purpose jurisdictions. The regressions of fire protection generate a bit more of significance.
But, intergovernmental grants had to be excluded due to data problems.
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3. While the average number of state residents per county is positively
related to the total tax revenue, the state share of total state and local
taxes is negatively related. The average number of state residents per
special district shows no significant relationship.
Overall, Nelson’s study from 1986 rather gives support to several hypotheses
on Leviathan by Brennan and Buchanan.
It has been widely argued that Oates (1985) and Nelson (1986, 1987)
did not choose the right government level for their empirical analyses. They
both analyzed Leviathan’s behavior on a state level. Eberts and Gronberg
(1988) regarded this as wrong, because migration costs are (still) very high
on this level. Citizens rarely move to sanctionize comparatively bad state
government policy. Eberts and Gronberg used a US-sample of 2,900 counties
and 280 SMSAs from 1977 to test the ’BBLD’ hypothesis. The government
performance was specified by the local expenditures on the major public
services as percentage of personal income. As indicators for fiscal decentral-
ization, they took the number of general-purpose jurisdictions, the number
of single-function jurisdictions. Their main regression delivered a positive
and significant coefficient for the first independent variable, and a negative
and significant one for the second. Hence, the general conception by Oates
and by Nelson could be confirmed on a local level.5
Marlow (1988) criticized that Oates and Nelson had not included the
federal government level into their analyses. Marlow’s main focus was on
whether the ’BBLD’ hypothesis could help to explain the observed universal
growth of the public sector (’Wagner’s Law’). This focus also justified three
methodological changes: Firstly, the author tested the ’BBLD’ hypothesis in
a time series approach. He worked with a US-data series, constructed over
the period 1946-85. Secondly, he compared the results from two related esti-
mating equation: one consisting of absolute values, the other of the respective
growth rates. Finally, as dependent variable, he chose the total government
expenditure as a share of GDP instead of the tax revenue, since he intended
to emphasize that public sector growth may also stem from other sources of
revenue. Based on these three changes, Marlow reached the following result:
The share of the state and local expenditure in total government expendi-
ture is negatively related to the share of the total government expenditure
in GDP. This holds for both absolute values and growth rates. - Hence, the
5Eberts and Gronberg calculated the elasticities from the regression coefficients. They
showed that these elasticities are of similar magnitudes for different types of local juris-
dictions: single-purpose or multiple-purpose, metro or non-metro.
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’BBLD’ hypothesis gets also support from a time series perspective.6
For an extensive cross-sectional test of the ’BBLD’ hypothesis, Zax (1989)
stressed that the degree of a Leviathan’s monopoly power depends on two
dimensions: the first dimension is the size of a jurisdiction relative to a higher
or a lower government level (’centralism’); and the second is the number
of jurisdictions on a certain government level (’fragmentation’). These two
dimensions influence the relationship between Leviathan’s power and the
gains from scale economies. As Zax explained, the relationship is not always
strictly positive. For his empirical analysis, Zax specified the total cost of
a local government to its citizens as the aggregate own-source revenue for
all (!) governments in the respective county. As a possible determinant
of the total cost of a local government, he observed the share of revenue
from grants in the total revenue of all (!) governments in the respective
county. Clearly, this specification refers to the ’centralism’ dimension. Four
key determinants that refer to the ’fragmentation’ dimension were derived as
combinations of government units per capita/ per square mile and general-/
single-purpose government. Moreover, the author integrated a large number
of control variables into his estimating equations, which can be assigned to
four categories:
1. variations in the citizens’ preferences for local public services;
2. dummy variables that capture variations in arrays of local public ser-
vices;
3. different government functions;
4. citizens’ degree of mobility.
Thus, a key result of the regressions is that the county share of total local
revenue has a positive and significant relationship with the total cost of the
county government. However, the relationship between the relative number
of government units and the total cost of the county government is not clearly
significant. In the case of general-purpose governments it seems to be rather
negative; in the case of single-purpose governments rather positive. Zax thus
concluded his empirical study by a strong suspicion that Leviathan does exist
in our neighborhoods.
Forbes and Zampelli (1989) gave special attention to the market defi-
nition problem in their analysis of competition between governments. As
6This approach ignores the idea that citizens may defend themselves against Leviathan
by taking the exit option.
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they pointed out, not all the jurisdictions within a certain state stand in
competition to each other. Jurisdictions may offer different kinds of local
public goods, which creates different kinds of markets. Forbes and Zampelli
sought to mitigate the market definition problem in their empirical analy-
sis by choosing a sample that includes only such counties which are part
of a SMSA. They specified the county government size in three alternative
versions:
1. as the logistical transformation of county tax revenue per dollar of
income;
2. as the logistical transformation of county own-source revenue per dollar
of income;
3. as county taxes per capita.
The key explanatory variable was the total number of counties in the SMSA.
In addition, the estimating equation included measures of: geography, pop-
ulation, household income, housing stocks, input costs of local public goods,
and fiscal responsibilities. Forbes and Zampelli realized that they could have
run into a destructive problem, if they had relied in their empirical analysis
on this estimating equation, alone. The problem is that the competition be-
tween governments might affect the public sector size through its impact on
the wages of public employees. To avoid this problem, the two authors set
up a second function where the wages of public employees depend especially
on: the wages in the private sector, the rate of unionization, and the total
number of counties in the SMSA. - Overall, Forbes and Zampelli found a
positive relationship between the competition among jurisdictions and the
size of the governments. They concluded that Leviathan might be - after all
- a mythical beast.7
Leviathans have two possible ways to collude. The first is to choose
identical tax bases and rate structures. This way, however, there may exist
incentives to deviate. These incentives will be the stronger, the higher the
number of jurisdictions on the potential market is. The second is to set up
7Oates (1989) commented on the past discussion on the existence of Leviathan, putting
a focus on Zax (1989) and on Forbes and Zampelli (1989). Here, Oates emphasized that
the competition among jurisdictions has two dimensions: ’intra’ and ’inter’. He remarked
that Zax had analyzed the effects of intracounty competition, whereas Forbes and Zampelli
the effects of intercounty competition. The choice of the subject, intra or inter, was mainly
implied by the respective specification of the dependent variable. Oates claimed that the
intracounty dimension seems more appropriate to estimate the existence of Leviathans.
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a common system of grants. It may serve to equalize the outcomes of dif-
ferent tax systems. As already mentioned, such a system can be justified
in our context by the problem of externalities. Leviathans, however, might
seek to misuse a system of grants to generate own funds which lie beyond
the amount needed to internalize given externalities. - Grossman (1989a)
gave two central reasons why a system of grants might tend to inefficiently
increase the public sector size. Firstly, grants weaken the bond between tax-
ing and public spending, and thus weaken fiscal transparency and discipline.
Secondly, grants strengthen the power of the higher level governments. This
concentration of power gets used to expand the public sector’s range of ac-
tivities. To test an extended version of the ’BBLD’ hypothesis, Grossman
used a US time series data set over 1946 to 1986. As dependent variable,
Grossman chose the total government expenditure as share of GDP. As ex-
plaining variables, he chose the share of state and local expenditure in total
government expenditure, and the share of federal grants to state and local
units in the total state and local receipts. Some control variables were also
included. Grossman constructed two estimation equations: one in absolute
values, the other in growth rates. Both equations showed a negative and
significant regression coefficient for the first independent variable. For the
second independent variable, the respective coefficients were positive but only
partially significant. - Hence, this study by Grossman offered evidence that
the structure of the tax system exerts a higher impact on the size of the
public sector than the system of grants.8
Joulfaian and Marlow (1990) maintained that Grossman’s aggregate time
series approach has a serious downside: It implicitly assumes that govern-
ments do face similar constraints. Then, fiscal variables of individual juris-
dictions can simply be summed up. But, as the two authors stressed, in the
real world, governments encounter different revenue or spending constraints,
especially if they belong to different levels. Therefore, Joulfaian and Marlow
used a set of disaggregated cross-sectional data to test a similar version of
the ’BBLD’ hypothesis. They constructed two estimating equations which
differ in how they specify the degree of fiscal (de-)centralization. In the first
equation, it is specified as the ratio of state and local public expenditures to
8Grossman (1989b) extended his analysis from 1989a. The extension offers similar
results; but it also emphasizes the impact of grants on the public sector size. - Grossman
(1992) did not find similar evidence for Australia in the period 1950-84. He offered three
explanations for this: first, a relatively small number of local governments; second, a
relatively low economic weight of local governments; third, relative immobility of the
citizens. - Grossman and West (1994) analyzed a sample from Canada in the period
1958-87. The two authors especially accounted for two crucial tax reforms in this period.
Overall, the analysis gave support to the ’BBLD’ hypothesis.
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total public expenditures for each state; in the second, as the total number of
state and local governments for each state. Both equations include the ratio
of federal grants to state and local public revenue as another independent
variable. - Based on this conception, Joulfaian and Marlow came to similar
results as Grossman. They offered some further evidence that the structure
of the tax system has more influence on the size of the public sector than the
system of grants.
17.2 Lessons
In principal, the related literature analyzes empirical relationships between
the government size and the government structure. The analysis is mainly
based on the BBLD hypothesis which predicts, above all, that fiscal decen-
tralization reduces fiscal power. The related studies follow different ways to
specify the terms ’fiscal decentralization’ and ’fiscal power’. Furthermore,
they follow different ways to control for other empirical effects on the fiscal
power. Considered control dimensions are for instance: income level, mar-
ket for local public goods, other fiscal budget variables, demography, and
geography. Working with samples from different jurisdictions and different
government levels, the related studies come to quite diverging results. In the
course of the discussion, evidence in favor of the BBLD hypothesis might
have become a bit stronger. Nonetheless, it still seems difficult to give a
reliable statement about the extent to which governments really behave as
Leviathans. This is because there are still many shortcomings in the related
literature; especially with respect to the specification of ’fiscal power’ and of
’fiscal decentralization’.
In the related literature, the fiscal power is usually specified as a fiscal
budget value in relation to a general social-economic value. Major examples
for a chosen fiscal budget value are: the tax revenue, the fiscal own-source
revenue, or the public expenditure. As a general social-economic value, we
often find: the population size, the total personal income, or the gross domes-
tic product. Each specification surely depicts one specific aspect of the total
fiscal power in the given jurisdiction. However, none of them clearly divides
between the different potential representatives of fiscal power. In a federal
system, governments on the different levels can be such representatives. Fur-
thermore, fiscal power could remain in the hands of the people due to the
democratic process. Generally, power is not a question of who administers,
but of who chooses. Power implies that one party is able to impose its choice
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study sample explained
variable
explaining
variable
result
Oates (1985) 48 states, U.S.A.,
1977
state-local tax rev-
enue per GDP
a) state revenue per
state-local revenue,
b) state expenditure
per state-local ex-
penditure c) # gov-
ernments in state
a) to c) insignificant
43 countries, world,
1980
total government
revenue per GDP
a) federal revenue
per total revenue,
b) federal expendi-
ture per total expen-
diture
a) and b) insignifi-
cant
Table 17.1: Discussed literature: summary III-A
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study sample explained
variable
explaining
variable
result
Nelson (1986) 50 states, U.S.A.,
1977
state-local tax rev-
enue per population
a) dummies for
constitutional con-
straints, b) state
tax revenue per
state-local tax rev-
enue, c) state POP
per # counties, d)
state POP per #
single-purpose JD
a) diverse, b) neg-
ative, some signifi-
cant, c) positive, sig-
nificant, d) insignifi-
cant
Nelson (1987) 48 states, U.S.A.,
1977
1) state-local tax
revenue per GDP,
2) state-local ’ad-
justed’ expenditure
per GDP, 3) local
expenditure on fire
protection per GDP,
a) state POP per #
general-purpose JD,
b) state POP per #
single-purpose JD
a) positive, signifi-
cant, b) insignificant
Table 17.2: Discussed literature: summary III-B
13
4
study sample explained
variable
explaining
variable
result
Eberts/
Gronberg
(1988)
2,900 counties and
280 SMSAs, U.S.A.,
1977
local expenditure
per GDP
a) # general-purpose
JD in state, b) #
single-purpose JD in
state
a) negative, signifi-
cant, b) positive, sig-
nificant
Marlow (1989) U.S.A., 1946-85 total expenditure
per GDP
state-local expendi-
ture per total expen-
diture
negative and signif-
icant (absolute and
growth values)
Zax (1989) 3,022 counties,
U.S.A., 1982
local own-source rev-
enue per GDP
a) county revenue
per total local
revenue, b) #
general-purpose JD
in county per POP
c) # single-purpose
JD in county per
POP
a) positive and sig-
nificant, b) insignifi-
cant, c) insignificant
Table 17.3: Discussed literature: summary III-C
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study sample explained
variable
explaining
variable
result
Forbes/
Zampelli (1989)
345 counties inside
157 SMSAs, U.S.A.,
1977, 1983
1) county tax rev-
enue per GDP, 2)
county own-source
revenue per GDP, c)
county tax revenue
per POP
# counties in SMSA positive, significant
Grossman
(1989a)
U.S.A., 1946-84 total expenditure
per GDP
a) state-local expen-
diture per total ex-
penditure, b) grants
to state-local units
per total revenue
a) positive, signif-
icant, b) positive,
some significant
Joulfaian/
Marlow (1990)
50 states, U.S.A.,
1981, 1984
total expenditure
per GDP
a) federal grants
per state-local rev-
enue, b) state-local
expenditure per
total expenditure,
c) # state-local
governments
a) insignificant, b)
negative, significant,
c) negative, signifi-
cant
Table 17.4: Discussed literature: summary III-D
13
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on another party. Its choice is based on its preferences. However, it might
be too difficult to directly treat the involved fiscal preferences, in an empiri-
cal study. Nonetheless, it seems possible to find out which party specifically
profits from fiscal decisions. What we need is another specification of ’fiscal
power’, another explained variable.
The related studies usually specify ’fiscal decentralization’ in three gen-
eral ways: a) as the share of public revenue on the lower government level
in the total public revenue; b) as the share of public expenditure on the
lower government level in the total public expenditure; or c) as the number
of government units on the lower government level (per resident). The spec-
ifications refer to different dimensions of decentralization: a) and b) refer
to the vertical dimension; c) to the horizontal dimension. It seems highly
plausible that these two dimensions might not be independent of each other
in the real world. Just as one example: An increase in the number of gov-
ernment units could lead to more competition in the horizontal dimension.
But, this increase in competition could imply a decrease in competition in
the vertical dimension. Tax capacity that is not used by the one govern-
ment level is now used by another level. The related literature neglected
to consider such interdependencies. - Anyhow, each of these specifications
of fiscal decentralization rather describes the given administration structure
than real responsabilities. But, the administration structure might have less
impact on the competition among government units and thus on the fiscal
power. The fiscal power might depend more on the decentralization of certain
responsabilities. - We therefore shall look for other specifications of ’fiscal
decentralization’, or for other explaining variables.
The empirical relationship between fiscal power and fiscal decentraliza-
tion is probably not independent of third variables. This relationship might
depend on variables such as: preferences for local public goods, income, de-
mography, or geographical conditions. With respect to a test of the BBLD
hypothesis, the question arises how these variables are related to the mobility
in the observed area. Generally, it is presumed that the higher the mobility is,
the higher, ceteris paribus, will be the impact of fiscal decentralization. The
problem, however, is that many of the factors which influence fiscal power
via mobility also directly influence fiscal power. The direct and the indirect
impact may either strengthen or weaken each other. For example: A higher
degree of urbanization leads to a higher mobility. Usually, urbanization is
also positively connected with the provision of local public goods. Hence, on
an indirect way, urbanization reduces fiscal power, and on a direct way, it
raises fiscal power. Due to this problem, a test of the BBLD hypothesis is
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usually highly sensitive towards the choice of the control variables. In the
related literature, this sensitivity has hardly been discussed. While some
studies work with a very small number of strictly selected control variables,
other studies apparently try to include the whole range of determinants.
Thus, we still search for the best strategy to choose the control variables in
a test of the BBLD hypothesis.
The BBLD hypothesis is supposed to serve as a tool for testing whether
governments behave as Leviathans. If there exists a positive connection be-
tween fiscal decentralization and fiscal power, then the governments do be-
have as Leviathans. However, we shall remind that a higher degree of fiscal
decentralization does not always lead to a higher degree of efficiency. Two
central reasons for that are: a) economies of scale, and b) spillovers. a)
Economies of scales can be reached where the provision of different (local)
public goods implies similar administrational work. Specialization in admin-
istration increases the total efficiency, with the basic functions performed by
the central government. A crucial problem however is that the agents who
decide on the specialization structure are in general not identical with those
who bear the administration costs. - b) Spillovers may cause inefficiencies in
the provision of local public goods. The principle of fiscal equivalence says
the following: The size of each jurisdiction should be such that it exactly
includes all the users of its local public goods. This principle, however, does
not consider any aspects of fiscal power. It merely describes a technological
optimum of the government structure. As an alternative, one could accept
spillovers in favor of less fiscal power and install a system of intergovernmen-
tal grants which compensates for the costs from spillovers. Here, the crucial
problem is that such a system might be a new source of fiscal power. - In
sum, as a tool for testing whether governments behave as Leviathans, the
BBLD hypothesis reveals some major drawbacks.9
9We may think of a situation in which economies of scale are reached by raising the
number of lower-level governments and reducing their common share in the overall fiscal
budget, at the same time.
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Chapter 18
The Assignment of Functions
to Local Governments
In a constitutional approach, we deal with the issue which functions should be
performed by governments. We make the assumption that governments be-
have as Leviathans. This bases on the concept of rational and self-interested
individuals. It seeks for a high consistency in the treatment of the public and
the private sector. There are three categories where we can find functions
that are in general better performed by governments: allocation, distribu-
tion, and stabilization. When we believe to have found such a function, we
may ask: Which type of government should be assigned this function? - In
a federal system, functions can be performed on various government levels -
under various constraints. Here, we mainly deal with two issues: the optimal
size of a jurisdiction and the optimal constitutional relationships between
the jurisdictions. What we search for, are general principles which specify
an optimal federal system. Referring to the allocational functions, one such
principle was introduced by Olson (1969). Olson claimed to provide public
goods in such a way that there are no more economies of scale and no exter-
nalities between jurisdictions. Basically, this implies that there needs to be
an own, separate government unit for each public good. Thus, the citizens
who benefit from the public good do match with those who pay for it. There
exists ’fiscal equivalence’. As Olson emphasized, this principle could lead
to a very complex system of overlapping jurisdictions. However, we should
note that the governments need not be independent. They may be allowed
to create some (constitutional) relationships which lower administrational
costs.
There are three major criteria for the assignment of governmental func-
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tions:
1. diversity in demand,
2. economies of scale, and
3. externalities.
Let us briefly look at these criteria with regard to the provision of local public
goods.
1) Normally, the citizens have different preferences for local public goods.
If a citizen is asked to pay a fair contribution to the provision of public
goods, she will seek to hide her true preferences, because there is an option
to free-ride. Tiebout (1956) suggested to solve this problem in the following
way: There exists a multitude of jurisdictions. Each offers a specific, fixed
package of public goods. Each citizen moves to the jurisdiction which offers
the package that fits her specific preferences best. By moving, she reveals her
true preferences. Each government can cover its costs by charging each of its
residents an equal contribution. Since the governments compete with each
other for residents, the total economy reaches a Pareto equilibrium. - But,
in the extreme case where the preferences of each citizen differ from those of
all the others, there have to be as many jurisdictions as there are citizens.
Moreover, the Pareto optimal outcome hinges on several strict assumptions,
out of which two are: no economies of scale and no externalities between
jurisdictions.
2) Each public good has a specific cost function. Normally, this function
will not be linear. Marginal costs may vary between rising and falling sec-
tions. A cost function may change over time, due to technological change.
Basically, we can divide between three cost factors: the initial production,
maintenance, and administration. The respective marginal cost functions
could highly diverge. Administration, in particular, tends to be connected
with economies of scope. Usually, the three factors do depend on each other.
Therefore, economies should be realized, only if they outweigh diseconomies
from the other factors. In practice, major problems may stem from the dif-
ferent transparency and the different flexibility of the three factors.
3) Externalities change partial equilibria. In order to assess such changes,
we consider two distinctions for the types of externalities:
a) Pecuniary versus technological externalities: A pecuniary externality
directly influences market prices. This type is the key force of an interde-
pendent price system. If the standard neo-classical assumptions are fulfilled,
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this type of externalities leads an economy into a Pareto optimal equilibrium.
A pecuniary externality arises for example, when a citizen moves from one
jurisdiction (A) to another (B). The price for the local public goods will,
ceteris paribus, decrease in A and increase in B. - A technological external-
ity generates its impact without directly referring to the prices. Normally,
this type pushes an economy away from a Pareto optimal outcome. If the
externality is positive (negative), then it tends to cause an underprovision
(overprovision) of the affected good. For instance: We consider a congestible
public good. Here, the use by one citizen could negatively affect the utility
for all other citizens. There is no price reaction. The public good will be
underprovided.
b) Intrajurisdictional versus interjurisdictional externalities: If an exter-
nality takes its influence in only one jurisdiction, then we call it ’intrajuris-
dictional’. A solution can be found under a unified legal framework. For
instance: The residents of one jurisdiction cause congestion on their own
local public good. To solve this problem, the local government could au-
tonomously increase the amount of this local public good. - If an externality
affects more than one jurisdiction, then we call it ’interjurisdictional’. In
order to get a solution, it could be necessary to coordinate different legal
frameworks. For instance: Some residents of jurisdiction A use a public
good in jurisdiction B, which raises congestion. Then, the local government
of B has no means to force the ’foreign’ citizens to pay.
A technological externality distorts the market allocation, because it leads
to a divergence between the private and the social costs of the affected goods.
Coase (1960) maintained that such market distortions could be corrected by
decentral internalization agreements. The main reason is that each affected
party has an incentive to come to such an agreement, because a correction of
the market outcome generates a welfare gain. How this welfare gain is divided
between the parties depends on the prior assignment of the property rights.
By contrast, the corrected market allocation will be independent of the prior
assignment. - We shall recall, however, four key assumptions underlying the
Coasian approach:
1. There are no transaction costs.
2. Every party’s preferences over the bargaining outcomes are common
knowledge.
3. There is a perfect correspondence between the interests of the bargain-
ing agents and those of their principals.
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4. Agreements can be enforced without costs.
Hence, we can see that the underlying assumptions are very demanding. In
the real world, the chances to come to a decentral internalization agreement
will be the smaller, the larger the number of affected parties is. If this number
is critically large, then a rather central and non-voluntary approach will do
better. Let us note that this holds for any type of affected party: households,
firms, or governments.
Thus, there are three major criteria for an assignment of governmental
functions. The three criteria may stand in conflict with each other in vari-
ous ways. Such conflicts can hardly be solved by changing the sizes of the
jurisdictions. Some imperfections in the combinations of sizes and functions
may justify compensations. Compensations can possibly be determined in
voluntary bargains between the affected parties. But, as we saw, agreements
are difficult to reach under certain conditions. An umpire might be needed to
get a solution. If the affected parties are governments, then the best umpire
most likely will be a higher-level government. Which government exactly
this will be, can be stipulated in the constitution. Altogether, it seems ex-
pedient to set up a constitutional framework for compensations, in general,
and for intergovernmental grants, in particular. In the particular case, one
can choose between four methods to pay compensation: an unconditional, a
conditional, an open-ended matching, and a closed-ended matching. Which
type of grant is best, depends on the type of conflict which is supposed to be
solved.
But, a system of intergovernmental grants is hardly ever a perfect so-
lution for externality problems. It might bring some own distortions into
the economy. Such distortions tend to be particularly strong, when govern-
ments do behave as Leviathans. There are many ways in which Leviathans
can use a system of intergovernmental grants to push their own interests to
the detriment of the citizens. Leviathans can hide their special interests not
only behind some common goals of allocation, but also of distribution and of
stabilization. Altogether, they might become able to guide big parts of the
domestic product into the system of grants, and misuse some parts of these
parts for their special interests. But basically, Leviathans also compete for
grants. Thus, they will seek to form cartels. According to a general the-
ory of collective action, small Leviathans will have more relative bargaining
power than big ones. Anyway, the outcome of the bargaining will hardly be
optimal. In sum, we may state that an unconstrained system of grants offers
large rooms to Leviathans to misuse resources.
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Thus, how should a system of intergovernmental grants be constrained
to avoid the misuse of resources? - First of all, a constitutional assembly
may search for some optimal rules on the process and the outcomes of the
system. They could suggest, for example, which goals may be followed by
the use of grants, or how the decisions must be made, or which relative
size the grants may reach. Then, the apparently best rules could be fixed
into the constitution. The question however arises: Who should guard these
rules? - Respective problems come from two directions. On the one hand,
it is not in the Leviathans’ specific interest to do this. They would rather
newly interpret the rules in favor of expansion. Furthermore, the principle of
checks and balances might have little impact, if it involves merely Leviathans.
Rather than checking each other, they would be busy with pork-barreling.
On the other hand, the citizens have high relative costs of guarding the
rules. Due to this cost position, they tend to be rationally ignorant. As
a consequence of rational ignorance, they might suffer from ’fiscal illusion’.
In our context, this would mean that they systematically underestimate the
costs which the system of grants generates. Another consequence of rational
ignorance is that the citizens are reluctant to revise their decisions. This
paves the way for the often observed ’flypaper effect’. Grants stick where
they land (even if their rationale fades). We conclude that a system of
intergovernmental grants remains to some degree open for misuse, even if
the system is (constitutionally) constrained.1
1For more details, see Mueller (2003), 215-27.
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Chapter 19
The Data
In general, a Leviathan chooses those sources of public revenue which gener-
ate his highest possible budget surplus. He can use this surplus for his own
personal income. However, the effectiveness of a source of public revenue
depends on specific market conditions, which may change over time. On the
search for an optimal tax constitution, we need to account for the relevant
changes of market conditions. In an empirical study, the capacity to do this
highly depends on the sustainability of the data concept. For our purposes,
a most sustainable data concept was contrived by the U.S. Bureau of the
Census. The Bureau developed, in particular, three groups of data sets that
we base our study on. These are:
1. Census of Government: Public Employment;
2. Census of Government: Government Finances;
3. Decennial Census: Population and Housing.
In the U.S.A., a ’Census of Government’ has been taken since 1957, at
5-year intervals. Each census covers the following main subjects: govern-
ment organization, public employment, and government finances. The local
governments under observation are of five different types: counties, munici-
palities, townships, school districts, and special districts. In the more recent
censuses, the highest attention was given to the first type. Overall, the Cen-
sus Bureau provides a broad range of data on county governments. In 2002,
they were 3,043 counties. Few of them did not have an own government.
The number of county governments in a given state ranged from 1 (District
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of Columbia) to 254 (Texas). The average population size of such a county
was around 83,000.
In its ’Compendium of Public Employment’, the U.S. Bureau of the Cen-
sus shows data on local government employment and payrolls in each county.
It defines local government employees as persons who regularly perform a lo-
cal public service, including persons paid from federally funded programs.
In order to make comparisons between employment levels easier, the Bureau
calculated the ’full-time equivalent employment’. This term describes the
number of employees that would have been employed, if the reported num-
ber of hours had been worked by full-time employees, only. Furthermore,
the Bureau divided the total number of full-time equivalent employment for
each county according to some selected functions, as for instance: education,
social sevices, public safety, housing/ environment, and public administra-
tion. The payroll numbers refer to gross payments, which include all salaries,
wages, fees, etc., paid to the employees during a fixed period. The average
monthly earnings represent the quotient of the full-time employee payroll
divided by the number of full-time employees.
The ’Compendium of Government Finances’ contains information on lo-
cal government budgets for individual counties in a certain fiscal year. The
budgets are structured according to three major categories: revenues, ex-
penditures, and indebtedness. - Revenues are defined as actual receipts of a
government and its agencies. Hence, the following amounts are subtracted
from gross collections: tax refunds to citizens, receipts from the issuance of
debt, the sale of securities, and taxes collected on behalf of other govern-
mental units. The Bureau subdivides total public revenues into four distinct
classes: intergovernmental revenue, taxes, charges, and miscellaneous gen-
eral revenue from own sources. - Expenditures are defined as the actual
payments of a government and its agencies. The Bureau distinguishes nine
major classes of public expenditure: capital outlay, education services, social
services/ income maintenance, transportation, public safety, environment/
housing, government administration, interest on general debt, and non-direct
general expenditure. Intergovernmental expenditure shows little relevance on
the county level. - Finally, public indebtedness is subdivided into: long-term
debt, and cash/ securities. The total long-term debt comprises general oblig-
ation bonds.
In the U.S.A., a decennial census on population and housing has been
taken since 1790. The Bureau of the Census has been responsible for that
since 1975. The latest census (for 2000) comprises above all 171 population
items and 56 housing items as 100-percent data, which is information com-
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piled from questions asked of all people and about every housing unit. These
questions dealt with some main characteristics of people and housing, as for
instance: age, origin, on the one hand, and tenure, occupancy, on the other
hand. Additionally, the Bureau asked questions on a specific sample of peo-
ple and housing units. These questions dealt with more specific subjects, as
for example: sources of income, family status, labor force status, educational
attainment, housing equipment, or housing costs.
The U.S. Bureau of the Census offers three groups of high quality data
sets which match well with our purposes. Nonetheless, we also shall recognize
the limitations of the data. For our purposes, the limitations seem to be
most relevant in the field of intercounty comparisons. Four of them shall be
mentioned: First, every monetary value is measured in current US-dollars.
They do not consider price differences among counties or among periods.
Second, the counties may adopt different functions. Local governments may
contract in or out various functions, even within the same state. Third,
if a government does not respond to the census, the Bureau estimates the
respective values, based on former responses. Clearly, such estimates are
more likely to be biased. Fourth, the data partially refer to various periods.
Some counties, for example, start their fiscal year in a different month than
others. The decennial census measures income for the former year, but most
of the other variables for the current year. Generally, the decennial census
values lag behind the census of government values by two to three years.
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Chapter 20
Descriptive Statistics
We assume that all individuals have the same preferences for income, and
that all behave as income maximizers. Then, it holds that an individual with
a higher income reaches a higher utility level. There are two main reasons
why one individual would get a higher income than another: first, she is
more productive; second, she has more social power. Table 20.1 presents
some descriptive statistics on income levels in 234 US-counties in the periods
1989 to 1992 and 1999 to 2002. There are three income variables which cover
three distinctive groups of income recipients, namely: a) the local government
officials, b) the population, and c) the households. a) The officials’ average
earnings from full-time employment (OFFEARN) refer to merely one specific
source of income for one specific population group. This variable shows the
lowest relative standard deviation and the highest degree of symmetry, out
of the three. Hence, we presume that OFFEARN has some specific determi-
nants. b) The per capita income (PCINC) includes all sources of income and
the total population. In many analytical contexts, PCINC is taken as the
standard measure for social welfare. In our data, it appears to be far from
being normally distributed. c) The household median income (HHMINC)
describes the budget of a key economic decision unit. This variable highly
depends on the size of that unit and on how many members are employed.
In table 20.1, HHMINC has the highest relative standard deviation and the
highest skewness.
How much should officials earn? - We may answer: Like anybody else,
officials should be paid according to their productivity. However, it seems
hardly possible to measure an official’s productivity. The central reason is
that his product does not have a market price. The costs that he generates
are basically covered by taxes. Since taxes are involuntary contributions,
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they do not directly reflect the preferences of the contributors. Clearly, it
seems wrong to estimate an official’s product by the costs. This also would
set negative incentives: Each official would seek to maximize his costs. -
Therefore, it seems reasonable to estimate an official’s productivity by an
overall product value. One can argue as follows: Governments have great
responsibility for the overall productivity in their jurisdictions. Therefore,
each official should be paid according to the respective domestic product. On
a disaggregated level, one might consider, for instance, the per capita income
or the median household income. Thus, we will base our empirical analysis on
the following postulate: The relative deviation between the officials’ average
earnings and a disaggregated measure of the domestic product should in
each jurisdiction be approximately the same. The higher such a deviation is,
the greater tends to be the social power of the respective officials. - In this
empirical analysis, we will work with four such variables, with four indicators
of governments’ social power:
• OFFPCI92 = (OFFEARN92 - PCINC89) / PCINC89;
• OFFHHMI92 = (OFFEARN92 - HHMINC89) / HHMINC89;
• OFFPCI02 = (OFFEARN02 - PCINC99) / PCINC99;
• OFFHHMI02 = (OFFEARN02 - HHMINC99) / HHMINC99.
The tables 20.2 to 20.4 present some statistical information on these four
indicators: We can see that the relative deviations of local officials’ earnings
were lower in 2002 than in 1992. The distributions, however, were more
asymmetric in 2002. The standard deviations had changed little after ten
years. OFFPCI reached higher values than OFFHHMI in each of these sta-
tistics. None of the variables revealed strong outliers. - Finally, we may state
that none of our indicators for officials’ social power shows any problematic
particularity. Nonetheless, we need to remind that it actually is problematic
to interpret any comparison between different indicators in terms of social
power. The reason is that the indicators are constructed out of different
components which underly different influences, as in partiuclar: the non-
labor income, the population size, and the household size.
Which sources can a local government use to generate fiscal income? - In
the theory, we find four major sources of local public revenue, namely: local
taxes, intergovernmental grants, user charges, and loans. If the government
behaves as a benevolent social welfare dictator, then each of these sources can
be justified under fairly broad and clear conditions. But, if the government
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variable mean std. dev. skewness J.-Bera
OFFEARN92 2665.51 488.95 0.253 3.78
PCINC89 1303.02 272.48 0.701 30.2
HHMINC89 2814.82 662.11 0.716 20.4
OFFEARN02 3563.67 604.10 0.266 3.99
PCINC99 1946.87 401.93 0.659 24.6
HHMINC99 3946.10 898.47 0.682 18.1
Table 20.1: Income levels of distinctive groups
variable mean std. dev. skewness J.-Bera
OFFPCI92 1.089 0.381 0.453 8.02
OFFHHMI92 -0.027 0.181 0.256 4.41
OFFPCI02 0.879 0.384 0.951 46.0
OFFHHMI02 -0.069 0.188 0.521 13.9
Table 20.2: Relative deviations of local officials’ earnings
rank OFFPCI02 county
1 2.135 Kern (CA)
2 2.081 Fresno (CA)
3 2.020 Hidalgo (TX)
... ... ...
23 1.418 El Paso (TX)
... ... ...
59 1.083 Lancaster (PA)
... ... ...
117 0.817 St. Joseph (IN)
118 0.814 Douglas (NE)
... ... ...
176 0.620 Dane (WI)
... ... ...
212 0.431 Anoka (MN)
... ... ...
232 0.226 Williamson (TX)
233 0.102 Collin (TX)
234 0.077 Madison (MS)
Table 20.3: Ranking of OFFPCI02
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rank OFFHHMI02 county
1 0.584 Philadelphia (PA)
2 0.548 St. Louis City (MS)
3 0.448 Baltimore City (MD)
... ... ...
23 0.209 San Bernardino (CA)
... ... ...
59 0.038 Hampden (MA)
... ... ...
117 -0.087 Macomb (MI)
118 -0.088 East Baton R. (LA)
... ... ...
176 -0.183 Tarrant (TX)
... ... ...
212 -0.303 Morris (NJ)
... ... ...
232 -0.462 Madison (MS)
233 -0.481 Collin (TX)
234 -0.504 Williamson (TX)
Table 20.4: Ranking of OFFHHMI02
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behaves as a Leviathan, then the justifying conditions shift and get more
restrictive. Table 20.5 and table 20.6 offer some information on the sources
of local public revenue in the U.S.A. in the years 1992 and 2002: From 1992
to 2002, the total county revenue per capita (TLREV-c) rose on average by
45%. The revenue structure of the local budgets remained roughly the same.
Nonetheless, it seems worthwile to highlight some smaller changes: Inter-
governmental grants raised their share on the total revenue (IGMREV-b)
from 30.4% to 34.5%. By contrast, property taxes (PPTAX-b) lost relative
weight; their share fell from 30.3% to 29.1%. The share of current charges
(CUCHAR-b) stayed around the same (around 14%); the distribution, how-
ever, became even more unequal. Other sources of revenue were generally of
little importance for the local fiscal budgets.
variable mean std. dev. skewness J.-Bera
TLREV92c 2.571 0.773 2.247 1708
IGMREV92c 0.779 0.342 1.383 140
TLTAX92c 0.963 0.396 2.535 2208
PPTAX92c 0.756 0.351 1.050 61.2
OTHTAX92c 0.207 0.221 5.120 21746
CUCHAR92c 0.358 0.193 1.767 286
TLREV02c 3.750 1.186 2.638 2607
IGMREV02c 1.294 0.592 1.961 649
TLTAX02c 1.379 0.553 2.673 2721
PPTAX02c 1.045 0.443 1.073 64.7
OTHTAX02c 0.334 0.368 5.781 31790
CUCHAR02c 0.533 0.427 4.063 7021
Table 20.5: Sources of local fiscal revenue: per capita values
variable mean std. dev. skewness J.-Bera
IGMREV92b 0.304 0.097 0.439 8.58
PPTAX92b 0.303 0.129 0.589 13.9
OTHTAX92b 0.080 0.067 1.436 125
CUCHAR92b 0.139 0.060 1.945 472
IGMREV02b 0.345 0.103 0.244 2.33
PPTAX02b 0.291 0.121 0.635 15.7
OTHTAX02b 0.087 0.068 1.225 83.1
CUCHAR02b 0.138 0.082 23.8 4761
Table 20.6: Sources of local fiscal revenue: budget shares
What we deal with, are the relationships between the local governments’
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social power and the sources of local public revenue. To measure the social
power, we constructed two indicators: OFFPCI and OFFHHMI. As sources
of public revenue, our samples offer especially the following variables: IGM-
REV, PPTAX, OTHTAX, and CUCHAR. Thus, let us now look at the cor-
relation between the six variables in the tables 20.7 and 20.8. The two tables
show, first of all, that the two indicators for social power are very highly
correlated with each other. This might confirm that they both effectively
measure the same theoretical construct. The tables also show that each in-
dicator for social power is highly correlated with IGMREV-c. In contrast,
all the other correlations are low. The property tax revenue (PPTAX-c), for
instance, seems to be negatively related to the governments’ social power; the
respective correlation coefficients, however, are hardly significant. In sum, it
seems expedient to focus on the relationships between the intergovernmental
revenue and the governments’ social power.
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OFFPCI OFFHHMI IGMREV PPTAX OTHTAX CUCHAR
OFFPCI92 1.0
OFFHHMI92 0.831 1.0
IGMREV92c 0.610 0.565 1.0
PPTAX92c -0.188 -0.185 -0.018 1.0
OTHTAX92c -0.023 0.190 0.186 -0.099 1.0
CUCHAR92c 0.011 0.159 0.220 -0.066 0.128 1.0
Table 20.7: Correlations: deviations of officials’ earnings and public revenue: 1992
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OFFPCI OFFHHMI IGMREV PPTAX OTHTAX CUCHAR
OFFPCI02 1.0
OFFHHMI02 0.835 1.0
IGMREV02c 0.641 0.641 1.0
PPTAX02c -0.292 -0.265 -0.090 1.0
OTHTAX02c 0.004 0.218 0.327 -0.080 1.0
CUCHAR02c 0.061 0.158 0.185 -0.131 0.146 1.0
Table 20.8: Correlations: deviations of officials’ earnings and public revenue: 2002
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Chapter 21
Regressions
Our regressions shall help us to explain how intergovernmental revenue de-
termines the social power of local governments. As a real determinant, inter-
governmental revenue might stand in interaction with other factors. Thus,
we shall search for these other factors. We will ask: What does the interac-
tion between the determinants look like? Which explanatory power do the
determinants have? - We will proceed as follows: We insert all the potential
determinants of a sample, other than IGMREV, into an estimation equa-
tion. We sort out all the redundant variables by a redundant variables test.
We estimate various non-redundant equations. Then, we can compare these
equations by four criteria: the adjusted R-squared, the Akaike information
criterion, the Jarque-Bera test on the residuals, and Ramsey’s RESET test.
The overall most powerful and most reliable one is taken as our ’control equa-
tion’. Next, we integrate the (main) explaining variable, IGMREV, into this
equation. There are two forms of IGMREV in our samples: IGMREV-c, the
intergovernmental revenue per capita, and IGMREV-b, the intergovernmen-
tal revenue as a fraction of the total public revenue. Both are considered and
compared. Thus, we get the estimation results that we intend to interpret.
Using the full samples, we can compute eight specific estimating equa-
tions on the impact of intergovernmental revenue on local governments’ social
power. The major results are presented in the tables 21.1 to 21.4. They can
briefly be described as follows:
IGMREV gets a positive and significant coefficient in each estimating
equation. The level of significance reaches 1% in six out of eight equations.
The level is higher for the period 1999/ 2002 than for 1989/ 1992; for re-
gressions of OFFPCI higher than for OFFHHMI. IGMREV-c reaches higher
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levels in regressions of OFFPCI; IGMREV-b in regression of OFFHHMI.
The number of control variables varies between three and four. The only
one which appears in each equation is the percentage of people with a pub-
lic assistance income (PUBASS). The only variable which changes its sign
from the correlation to the regression is the percentage of people with an
interest, dividends, or rental income (INTRST). The explanatory power of
the eight regressions on IGMREV ranges from adjusted R-squared = 0.589
to adjusted R-squared = 0.755. The value of 0.755 is reached by the regres-
sion of OFFHHMI02 on ln IGMREV02b. In each of the eight, IGMREV
provides some additional explanatory power; which means that the adjusted
R-squared value is higher than for the related control equation. Similarly,
the AIC indicates a higher goodness of fit due to the integration of IGMREV.
The Jarque-Bera test offers high evidence for non-normally distributed resid-
uals in the regression of OFFPCI92. The Ramsey RESET test causes little
concern about misspecification of the regressions, except for OFFPCI02 on
IGMREV02c.
(1) (2) (3)
c 0.4311 0.4073 0.6819
(2.95) (2.95) (4.16)
IGMREV92c 0.3185
(5.38)
ln 0.1927
IGMREV92b (3.16)
BACHPL90 -1.7907 -1.8797 -1.4685
(-6.48) (-7.19) (-5.07)
INTRST90 1.2327 1.1314 1.1653
(4.46) (4.32) (4.29)
PUBASS90 8.2628 5.8226 7.3914
(12.28) (7.46) (10.33)
R-squ. adj. 0.5738 0.6199 0.5898
AIC 0.0740 -0.0363 0.040
J.-Bera 49.32 96.92 47.14
RESET 0.0368 0.0539 0.0054
Table 21.1: Regressions of OFFPCI92: full sample
Our dependent variables are constructed distribution variables. Each of
them consists of two income variables. Now, it seems expedient to check how
the functional relationships of our dependent variables depend on the level of
their components. We will do this by a sampling stratification method: We
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(1) (2) (3)
c 0.7894 0.8643 0.8772
(6.53) (6.86) (7.0)
ln 0.0462
IGMREV92c (1.97)
ln 0.0554
IGMREV92b (2.36)
ln 0.1404 0.1084 0.1540
TLEXPD90c (5.88) (3.77) (6.33)
ln 0.2043 0.2082 0.2078
MVSMCT90 (5.66) (5.79) (5.81)
WGSAL90 -1.0220 -1.0266 -1.0254
(-8.13) (-8.22) (-8.24)
PUBASS90 2.2726 1.9557 1.9061
(8.75) (6.43) (6.35)
R-squ. adj. 0.7042 0.7079 0.710
AIC -1.7787 -1.7871 -1.7943
J.-Bera 4.866 8.865 9.847
RESET 0.5139 0.1032 0.0262
Table 21.2: Regressions of OFFHHMI92: full sample
(1) (2) (3)
c 0.8847 0.8007 1.1396
(11.8) (11.4) (13.1)
IGMREV02c 0.1860
(6.52)
ln 0.2544
IGMREV02b (5.08)
NUSCIT00 2.0043 1.6805 2.0224
(6.32) (5.68) (6.71)
BACHPL00 -1.7019 -1.7690 -1.4140
(-8.35) (-9.42) (-7.01)
PUBASS00 10.942 7.1682 9.2419
(10.6) (6.43) (8.90)
R-squ. adj. 0.6794 0.7285 0.7106
AIC -0.1986 -0.3604 -0.2967
J.-Bera 1.712 10.79 1.304
RESET 0.1431 3.0416 1.1510
Table 21.3: Regressions of OFFPCI02: full sample
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(1) (2) (3)
c 0.4816 0.4636 0.5570
(4.34) (4.30) (5.10)
IGMREV02c 0.0707
(3.89)
ln 0.0876
IGMREV02b (3.98)
TLEXPD00c 0.0344 0.0154 0.0382
(6.63) (2.18) (7.46)
MVSMCT00 0.8648 0.8927 0.8688
(5.55) (5.90) (5.76)
WGSAL00 -1.3138 -1.2802 -1.2719
(-10.5) (-8.22) (-10.5)
PUBASS00 4.5209 3.4734 3.6555
(9.82) (6.66) (7.36)
R-squ. adj. 0.7391 0.7542 0.7549
AIC -1.8255 -1.8812 -1.8840
J.-Bera 3.372 8.280 6.267
RESET 0.0493 0.1371 0.4577
Table 21.4: Regressions of OFFHHMI02: full sample
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stratify each sample into four quartiles of the dependent variable components
(OFFEARN, PCINC, or HHMINC). Then, we estimate our equations with
the stratified sub-samples. Finally, we compare the sub-sample results with
the total sample results.
The sub-sample results of the regressions of OFFHHMI02 on IGMREV02b
are shown in the tables 21.5 and 21.6. This is our regression with the highest
R-squared value. Each of the lowest (1) and the highest (4) quartile contains
59 counties, each of the two others, 58. The results can be summarized as
follows:
Based on the stratification of the sample by the county officials’ average
monthly earnings (OFFEARN02), IGMREV02b becomes clearly less signifi-
cant as a regressor of OFFHHMI02. In (1) and in (3), its coefficient reaches
a signficance level of 10%; in (2) and in (4), it is insignificant. The control
variables also get lower t-values due to the stratification. The only variable
out of these which turns into the status of insignificance, exactly in three
cases, is TLEXPD02c. The explanatory power increases from the first to
the fourth quartile. Compared to the non-stratified regression, the adjusted
R-squared is even higher in (3) and (4). The AIC values are always lower in
the stratified regressions. They do not perfectly correspond to the adjusted
R-squared values. The Jarque-Bera test provides clear evidence for a non-
normal distribution of the residuals in (1) and in (2). The Ramsey RESET
test indicates serious specification problems in (4).
Based on the stratification by the household median income (HHMINC99),
IGMREV02b gets less significant, but not as much as before. In (1) and in
(3), its coefficient reaches a 1% signficance level; in (2) and in (4), it is
insignificant. Now, TLEXPD02c remians a strong control variable. Weak-
nesses are shown by MVSMCT00 in (1) and (2), and by PUBASS00 in (4).
Compared to the non-stratified regression, the adjusted R-squared is higher
merely in (4). There is no clear relationship between the HHMINC99 and the
explanatory power. The AIC does not perfectly correspond to the adjusted
R-squared. Furthermore, its values are lower than without stratification in
(2) to (4). The Jarque-Bera test indicates non-normality of the residuals for
(1) and (2). For none of all four, Ramsey’s RESET test indicates misspeci-
fication.
The sample stratification by the components of their respective dependent
variable leads to similar results for the other regressions from the tables 21.1
to 21.4.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
c 0.3351 0.5578 0.6794 1.5583
(1.90) (3.08) (2.64) (5.48)
ln 0.0790 0.0002 0.0870 0.0524
IGMREV02b (1.70) (0.004) (1.88) (0.95)
TLEXPD02c 0.0311 0.0110 0.0471 0.0105
(1.33) (0.64) (3.62) (1.58)
MVSMCT00 1.0021 0.8906 0.9227 0.8136
(3.16) (2.92) (2.71) (2.97)
WGSAL00 -1.0604 -1.3252 -1.4529 -2.3560
(-5.62) (-6.45) (-5.28) (-6.97)
PUBASS00 3.1070 4.7279 3.4585 3.9618
(3.71) (3.26) (3.59) (4.59)
R-squ. adj. 0.6917 0.7336 0.8238 0.8326
AIC -1.8925 -2.0619 -2.0128 -2.1010
J.-Bera 11.80 4.510 1.775 1.277
RESET 1.2486 0.0567 1.2046 4.6349
Table 21.5: Regressions of OFFHHMI02 on ln IGMREV02b: sample strati-
fied by OFFEARN02
(1) (2) (3) (4)
c 0.4860 0.0417 0.5514 1.0278
(1.87) (0.20) (2.44) (4.82)
ln 0.2030 0.0686 0.1171 0.0286
IGMREV02b (3.54) (1.61) (2.88) (0.94)
TLEXPD02c 0.0759 0.0294 0.0417 0.0289
(5.38) (3.56) (3.69) (3.36)
MVSMCT00 0.0618 0.5711 1.0085 0.7139
(0.13) (1.55) (3.51) (2.80)
WGSAL00 -0.8459 -0.4844 -1.2626 -1.8134
(-2.04) (-1.88) (-4.65) (-7.65)
PUBASS00 2.8361 3.7950 2.7161 1.8254
(2.97) (3.29) (2.55) (1.53)
R-squ. adj. 0.6374 0.5837 0.5788 0.7840
AIC -1.4220 -1.9640 -2.0215 -2.7505
J.-Bera 2.666 5.577 0.532 0.107
RESET 0.0012 0.9701 0.0552 0.0737
Table 21.6: Regressions of OFFHHMI02 on ln IGMREV02b: sample strati-
fied by HHMINC99
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Chapter 22
Summary
In a constitutional approach, a government is considered as a monolithic and
self-interested entity, called Leviathan. There are at least four theoretical
reasons which justify such a characterization, namely: simplicity, consistency,
pessimism, and evolutionary dominance. Now, we ask: Do governments
really behave as Leviathans? And how can we check this?
It has been suggested to check the real behavior of governments via the
BBLD hypothesis. The BBLD hypothesis asserts that fiscal power is neg-
atively related to fiscal decentralization. Fiscal decentralization promotes
competition among governments; such competition works as a steady con-
straint to fiscal power. Leviathans can be identified by the maximization of
their fiscal power. The related empirical model has to specify the two theo-
retical constructs. Usually, fiscal power is specified as a fiscal budget value
in relation to a social-economic value; fiscal decentralization is specified as
the share of certain government levels on an aggregate fiscal budget value,
or as the number of government units on certain levels. - However, we find
severe shortcomings of this approach. In particular, it does not adequately
consider the interests of the citizens. Two instances are: Firstly, the citizens
could agree to a relative increase of the fiscal budget because of the given
preferences and technology. Secondly, they could agree to a less decentralized
government structure because of the given diversity in preferences, economies
of scale, or externalities.
Thus, we develop a new approach to check the real behavior of govern-
ments. Our basic hypothesis is that a government’s social power depends on
its sources of revenue. Leviathans can be identified by their maximization of
social power. We specify social power as the relative deviation of an agent’s
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personal income from his productivity level. However, since a government
agent does not offer his services on a free market, his productivity is hardly
measurable. Therefore, we make the assumption that his productivity is
constantly related to the average income in his jurisdiction. It follows from
this that the more a government agent’s income relatively deviates from the
respective average income, the higher is his social power. - We deal with two
issues: firstly, the extent of such social power; and secondly, how the social
power depends on the sources of public revenue.
For our empirical analysis, we use two samples on the local governments
in the U.S.A. In the U.S.A., the local governments are comparatively inde-
pendent in their policies. They take up multiple tasks which are of major
importance to the citizens. The two samples are taken from 234 counties
in the periods 1989/ 1992 and 1999/ 2002. They follow a consistent and
sustainable concept; and comprise 56 variables, out of which the key variable
is the local officials’ average march/ october full-time earnings.
In our descriptive analysis, we compare the officials’ average earnings
with the per capita income and the median household income. We can state
that the first variable has the lowest relative standard deviation and the
highest degree of symmetry, out of the three. Next, we construct the relative
deviation variables. It turns out the following: The relative deviation of
the officials’ average earnings from the per capita income shows a higher
mean, a higher standard deviation, and a higher degree of skewness than
the relative deviation from the median household income, in both periods.
An analysis of the correlation coefficients shows that the relative deviation
variables are significantly related to just one public revenue variable, namely
intergovernmental grants. Nevertheless, this relationship seems markedly
strong and multisided.
We further examine the relationship between social power and intergov-
ernmental grants in our regression analysis. Here, we work with four depen-
dent variables (OFFPCI92, OFFHHMI92, OFFPCI02, OFFHHMI02) and
four (main) explaining variables (IGMREV92c, IGMREV92b, IGMREV02c,
IGMREV02b). The regression analysis is made in two steps: In step 1, the re-
gressions are run on the full samples. In a first sub-step, we select the control
variables according to a specified procedure. The selection is made for each
dependent variable. We thus get three or four powerful, reliable regressors.
The only variable which belongs in each case to this group is the percentage
of households with public assistance income (PUBASS). In a second sub-step,
we integrate the explaining variables into the regression analysis. We thus
get four plus eight estimating equations. Overall, these equations show the
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following results: The variation of the relative income deviation is explained
by 57% to 76%. The explanatory power of the regressions is higher for 1999/
2002 than for 1989/ 1992, higher for OFFHHMI than for OFFPCI. The main
explainig variables have positive and significant coefficients. They raise the
explanatory power of the regressions. In step 2, we check how the regres-
sion results depend on the individual components of the dependent variable.
We stratify the samples along these components. Overall, our sub-sample
estimates reveal the following: The explaining variable tends to reach higher
degrees of significance in lower sub-samples. However, this tendency seems
not to be linear. A stratification along OFFEARN is more detrimental to
the significance than along the other respective component.
We may interpret the results of our empirical analysis in the following
way: A local government can reach a substantial degree of social power, in-
dicated by the relative deviation of its personal earnings. The richest source
of its social power is, by far, intergovernmental revenue. While property
taxes serve as an important source of public revenue, a local government
can hardly derive any social power from them. Thus, property tax compe-
tition seems to work as an effective constraint to Leviathans. Now, the key
question is: What engenders this competition? - We found evidence that it
is rather engendered by voice than by exit options. Here, we assume that
voice options are strongly related to the educational level and the citizenship.
Furthermore, the misuse of local public revenue is strongly connected with
public assistance payments. Overall, a government’s social power clearly de-
pends on the citizens’ sources of income. The citizens’ sources of income
determine their ways to respond to local policy. It is more the source itself
than the level of income which determines social power. Nonetheless, Levi-
athans have somewhat better chances to misuse public revenue in low-income
jurisdictions than in high-income jurisdictions.
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Part IV
Concluding Remarks
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This thesis seeks to contribute to an optimal fiscal constitution. Our main
task is to find optimal rules for the provision of local public goods. To solve
the inherent free-rider problem, the local governments are given the power
to tax. However, we assume that governments behave as Leviathans. Hence,
we search for some optimal constraints on the power to tax.
In this thesis, we analyze the effects of certain constraints. Generally, we
distinguish between direct and indirect ones: Direct constraints define which
fiscal measures governments are allowed to take or not. Indirect constraints
define which responses citizens are allowed to give or not. In this thesis, we
focus on two specific constraints: the stipulation of a tax base (direct); and
the exit option (indirect).
In part I, we theoretically analyze the effects of four distinctive tax bases,
which are all closely related to the housing market. We construct four dis-
tinctive tax models in which the citizens are allowed to migrate. This option
generates competition among the Leviathans. In each model, the following
assumptions are made: every region has the same size and structure; every
citizen gets the same initial endowment; every citizen has the same skills and
preference structure; private goods are homogeneous and globally tradeable;
housing is homogeneous and regionally tradeable; the capital rent, the in-
terest rate, and the wage are exogenous; the share of a specific tax revenue
spent on local public goods is exogenous. We thus find out that the citizens
may respond to the changes of the different tax bases in very different ways.
In many cases, a response depends even qualitatively on the specific prop-
erties of a price function. However, such properties cannot be predicted in
a constitutional approach. Moreover, there exists no common yardstick to
aggregate and assess the different responses. Hence, we cannot decide which
tax base should be stipulated into a constitution.
Based on part I, we may suggest the following issues for future research:
First, the regions could be different in size and structure. How does a Le-
viathan’s optimal policy depend on the size and the structure? - Second,
the citizens could be different in endowment, skills and preference structure.
Which patterns of migration do result from this? - Third, the private goods
could be heterogeneous and involve transportation costs. How do the re-
lated differences affect housing decisions? - Fourth, there could be regional
sub-markets for housing. A salient example is the separation between an
ownership and a rental market. Which specific effects does a sub-market
create? - Fifth, the housing units could exist for longer than a household
generation. How is housing traded between different generations? - Sixth,
the local tax competition could also be generated by voice decisions. What
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are their distinctive effects? - Seventh, intergovernmental grants could be an
internal part of the tax system. How do those affect the incentives of each
involved type of agent?
In part II, we empirically analyze the relative influence of local fiscal
policy on housing prices. We seek to find out to what extent the citizens
might constrain local Leviathans by migration. This is done in view of the
special features of housing markets. By estimating housing price functions,
we encounter three major problems: unclear causal directions, interrelations,
and hidden variables. We try to solve these problems in four preassigned
methodological steps. By using data on US-counties in the years 2002 and
2003, we get the following results: The property tax revenue has a positive
relationship with the housing prices. However, this relationship is dominated
by the impact of income and mobility; its causality works in both directions.
The relationship between total public expenditures and the housing prices is
positive, less strong, but more robust. Overall, migration appears as a rather
weak constraint for Leviathans.
Based on part II, the following issues seem to claim further treatment:
First, the role of regulation: One could integrate regulation dummies into
the estimating equations. Second, the role of housing market imperfections:
One could construct a common index for the degree of imperfection. Third,
the role of housing sub-markets: One could strictly delimit each variable for
certain relevant sub-markets. Fourth, the determinants of housing demand:
One could integrate data from relevant opinion surveys into the samples.
Fifth, the role of dynamics: One could use time series data to estimate the
equations. Sixth, the role of country specific features: One could use data
from other countries.
In part III, we empirically examine to what extent governments really
behave as Leviathans. Leviathans are assumed to be maximizers of their
own social power. Hence, we develop a new approach to measure social
power. In general, social power is specified as the deviation of income from
the respective productivity. We make the assumption that the productivity
of a government stands in a constant relationship to the average income in its
jurisdiction. In addition, we set up the hypothesis that a government’s social
power is dependent on its sources of revenue. For our empirical analysis, we
use samples of 234 US-counties in the periods 1989/ 1992 and 1999/ 2002,
which especially comprise a variable on the local officials’ average earnings.
We thus find the following: A local government can reach a substantial degree
of social power. By far the richest source of social power is intergovernmental
revenue; especially, if it is conditioned for public assistance. In general, a
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Leviathan is somewhat less constrained in lower-income jurisdictions.
Based on part III, the follwing issues seem particularly worthwile for fu-
ture reseach: First, the choice of income variables: One could take income
variables which consist of more similar components. Second, the choice of
government levels: One could integrate governments from other levels. Spe-
cific differences could be indicated by dummy variables. Third, the choice
of government functions: One also could use dummy variables in order to
distinguish the effects of different government functions. Fourth, the choice
of control variables: One could integrate data from opinion surveys about
public policy. Fifth, the choice of specifications: One could use a different
specification for the social power of a government, which in particular hinges
less on the productivity assumption.
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Appendix A
Computations for the
Two-Period Tax Models
Section 5.1: Taxation of Land Rent
Subsection 5.1.1: Housing Firms
Fl1 = pho(τlo, Go)
∂ho
∂kho
− r¯k = 0
dkho
dτlo
= −
∂Fl1
∂τlo
∂Fl1
∂kho
Subsection 5.1.2: Households
Al1dl1 = zl1 ⇒ A
−1
l1 zl1 = dl1
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Subsection 5.1.4: Total Equilibrium
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Section 5.2: Taxation of Capital Rent
Subsection 5.2.1: Housing Firms
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∂2u1
∂h2j
=
phj(1 + τsj)
p¯x
∂2u1
∂x1j∂hj
− β
∂2u2
∂h2j
Subsection 5.3.4: Total Equilibrium
As2ds2 = zs2 ⇒ A
−1
s2 zs2 = ds2
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As2 =


∂vj
∂yo
ho (1 + τsj)
∂vj
∂phj∑
o
∂hj
∂yo
−
P
o hj
∂ho
∂kho
∂kho
∂pho
h2o
(1 + τsj)
P
o
∂hj
∂phj
ho


ds2 =
(
dpho/dτsj
dphj/dτsj
)
zs2 =

 − ∂vj∂phj
(
phj + (1 + τsj)
∂phj
∂τko
)
−
∑
o
∂ho
∂phj
1
ho
(
phj + (1 + τsj)
∂phj
∂τko
)


Section 5.4: Taxation of Housing Property
Subsection 5.4.2: Households
Av1dv1 = zv1 ⇒ A
−1
v1 zv1 = dv1
Av1 =


∂2u1
∂x2
1j
0 ∂
2u1
∂x1j∂hj
0
−p¯x 0
0 β ∂
2u2
∂x2
2j
β ∂
2u2
∂x2j∂hj
0
0 −p¯x
∂2u1
∂hj∂x1j
β ∂
2u2
∂hj∂x2j
∂2u1
∂h2j
+ β ∂
2u2
∂h2j
0
−phj(1 + τvj) 0
0 0 0 0
1 −(1 + r¯y)
−p¯x 0 −phj(1 + τvj) yo
0 0
0 −p¯x −phjτvj −(1 + r¯y)yo
0 0


dv1 =


dx1j/dτvj
dx2j/dτvj
dhj/dτvj
dγ1/dτvj
dλ1/dτvj
dλ2/dτvj


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zv1 =


0
0
λ1
(
∂phj
∂τvj
(1 + τvj) + phj
)
+ λ2
(
∂phj
∂τvj
τvj + phj
)
0
hj
(
∂phj
∂τvj
(1 + τvj) + phj
)
hj
(
∂phj
∂τvj
τvj + phj
)


∂2u1
∂x21j
=
p¯x
phj
(
1 + τvj +
τvj
1+r¯k
) ∂2u1
∂hj∂x1j
∂2u2
∂x22j
=
p¯x
phj
(
1 + τvj +
τvj
1+r¯k
) ∂2u2
∂hj∂x2j
∂2u1
∂h2j
=
phj
(
1 + τvj +
τvj
1+r¯k
)
p¯x
∂2u1
∂x1j∂hj
− β
∂2u2
∂h2j
Ωv1 =
(
1 + τvj +
τvj
1+r¯k
)
+
τvj
1+r¯k
hj
∂u1j
∂hj
1 + τvj
Ωv2 =
2 + hj
∂u1j
∂hj
1 + τvj
+
τvjhj
∂u1j
∂hj
(1 + τvj)
(
1 + τvj +
τvj
1+r¯k
)
(1 + r¯k)
Ωv3 =
(2 + r¯y)
(
1 + 2τvj + (2r¯y + r¯
2
y)(1 + τvj)
2
)
(1 + r¯2y)(1 + r¯y + 2τvj + r¯yτvj)(1 + τvj)
Ωv4 =
1 + r¯y + 2τvj + r¯yτvj + τvjhj
∂u1j
∂hj
(1 + r¯2k)(1 + r¯y + 2τvj + r¯yτvj)(1 + τvj)
∗
∗
1 + 2τvj + (2r¯k + r¯
2
y)(1 + τvj)
2
(1 + y¯2k)(1 + r¯y + 2τvj + r¯yτvj)(1 + τvj)
Ωv5 =
hj
(
(1 + 3τvj + r¯
2
y(1 + τvj)
2 + r¯k(2 + 5τvj + 2τ
2
vj)
) ∂u1j
∂hj
(1 + r¯2y)(1 + r¯y + 2τvj + r¯yτvj)(1 + τvj)
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Subsection 5.4.4: Total Equilibrium
Av2dv2 = zv2 ⇒ A
−1
v2 zv2 = dv2
Av2 =


∂vj
∂yo
ho
(
1 + τvj +
τvj
1+r¯k
)
∂vj
∂phj∑
o
∂hj
∂yo
−
P
o hj
∂ho
∂kho
∂kho
∂pho
h2o
(
1 + τvj +
τvj
1+r¯k
) P
o
∂hj
∂phj
ho


dl2 =
(
dpho/dτvj
dphj/dτvj
)
zv2 =

 − ∂vj∂phj
(
phj
(
1 + 1
1+r¯y
)
+
(
1 + τvj +
τvj
1+r¯y
)
∂phj
∂τvj
)
−
∑
o
∂ho
∂phj
1
ho
(
phj
(
1 + 1
1+r¯y
)
+
(
1 + τvj +
τvj
1+r¯y
)
∂phj
∂τvj
)


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Appendix B
List of Empirical Variables
local fiscal budget
CUCHAR current charges
DEBTSV total government debt services
EDUCAT expenditure: educational sevices: education
FINADM expenditure: government administration: finan-
cial administration
HEALTH expenditure: social sevice and income mainte-
nance: health
HIGHW expenditure: transportation: highways
HSDEVM expenditure: housing and community development
IGMREV total intergovernmental revenue
OSCREV total general revenue from own sources
OTHADM expenditure: other government administration
OTHTAX revenue from other taxes
POLICE expenditure: public safety: police protection
PPTAX total property tax revenue
RECRTN expenditure: environment and housing: parks and
recreation
TLDEBT total government indebtness
TLEXPD total expenditure
TLREV total revenue
TLTAX total tax revenue
UTREV utility revenue
housing prices
189
HSVALL specified owner-occupied housing units: lower
value quartile
HSVALM specified owner-occupied housing units: median
value
HSVALU specified owner-occupied housing units: upper
value quartile
RENTCM specified renter-occupied housing units paying
cash rent: median contract rent
RENTGM specified renter-occupied housing units paying
cash rent: median gross rent
dwelling
DETDHS housing units: percent detached
HSAGE median age of housing structure
HSDEBT specified owner-occupied housing units: percent
with a mortgage contract to purchase, or simlar
debt
MDNRR median number of rooms
OCCDUR owner occupied housing: median duration of occu-
pancy
OCC1PS occupied housing units: percent 1-person house-
hold
OWNOCC occupied housing units: percent owner occupied
REINC specified renter-occupied housing units paying
cash rent: median gross rent as a percentage of
household income
RM3OL housing units: percent 3 rooms or less
VACHS housing units: percent vacant
demography
BACHPL population 25 and over: percent bachelors degree
or higher
FGBORN population: percent foreign born
HHWMIN total households: percent with one or more people
under 18 years
HHWSEN total households: percent with one or more people
65 years and over
MINOR total population: percent of people under 18
MVSMCT population 5 years plus: percent moved within
same county within last 5 years
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MV1DCT population 1 year and over: different house 1 year
ago in the same county
NUSCIT population: percent not a U.S. citizen
ONEPHH total households: percent of one-person house-
holds
SMHS5Y population 5 years plus: percent have lived in the
same house for 5 years
WHITE total population: percent of white population
income level
HHMINC household median income
OFFEARN local officials: average march/ october earnings,
all full-time employees
OFFHHMI deviation of officials’ average earnings from house-
hold median income
OFFPCI deviation of officials’ average earnings from per
capita income
PCINC total population: per capita income
income status
BELPOV population for whom poverty status is determined:
percent income in the past 12 months below
poverty level
INTRST total households: percent with interest, dividends,
or net rental income
LABFC total population: percent in labor force
PUBASS total households: percent with public assistance
income
RETIRE total households: percent with retirement income
SFEMPL total households: percent with self-employment in-
come
UNEMPL population in labor force: percent unemployed
WGSAL total households: percent with wage or salary in-
come
employment
AVTRT workers 16 years and over who did not work at
home: average travel time to work
HIEMPL population 16 years and over: usually worked 35
or more hours per week, 50 to 52 weeks per year
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UNEMPL families: percent husband, wife or single house-
holder are unemployed
WKCTRSD workers 16 years and over: worked in the county
of residence
WKPBTRP workers 16 years and over: percent used public
transportation
WKWALK workers 16 years and over: percent walked
geography
DSHS housing units: density per acre of land
DSPOP population: density per acre of land
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Appendix C
List of Abbreviations
ACS American Community Survey
AIC Akaike information criterion
adj. adjusted
AL Alabama, U.S.A.
AR Arkansas, U.S.A.
AZ Arizona, U.S.A.
BBLD Brennan Buchanan Leviathan decentralization
CA California, U.S.A.
ch. chapter
CO Colorado, U.S.A.
CoG Census of Government
CBD Central Business District
DC District of Columbia, U.S.A.
FL Florida, U.S.A.
GA Georgia, U.S.A.
GDP gross domestic product
HI Hawaii, U.S.A.
IA Iowa, U.S.A.
ID Idaho, U.S.A.
IL Illinois, U.S.A.
IN Indiana, U.S.A.
J.-Bera Jarque-Bera (statistic)
JD jurisdiction
KY Kentucky, U.S.A.
LA Lousiana, U.S.A.
MA Massachusetts, U.S.A.
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MD Maryland, U.S.A.
MI Michigan, U.S.A.
MN Minnesota, U.S.A.
MS Mississippi, U.S.A.
NC North Carolina, U.S.A.
NE Nebraska, U.S.A.
NH New Hampshire, U.S.A.
NJ New Jersey, U.S.A.
NV Nevada, U.S.A.
NY New York, U.S.A.
OK Oklahoma, U.S.A.
OLS Ordinary Least Squares
PA Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
POP population
RESET regression specification error test
R-squ. R-squared
SMSA Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
TX Texas, U.S.A.
U.S.A. United States of America
USD United States dollar
UT Utah, U.S.A.
VA Virginia, U.S.A.
WI Wisconsin, U.S.A.
2SLS two-stage least squares
# number of
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Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Doktorarbeit versteht sich als ein Beitrag zur Diskussion um
eine optimale finanzpolitische Verfassung. Eine solche Verfassung dient der
Aufgabe, die Steuergewalt zu beschra¨nken. Die Steuergewalt kann dadurch
gerechtfertigt werden, dass sie zur Lo¨sung des Trittbrettfahrer-Problems bei
der Bereitstellung lokaler o¨ffentlicher Gu¨ter geeignet ist. Beschra¨nkungen
werden dann notwendig, wenn sich die staatlichen Akteure eigeninteressiert
verhalten; also insgesamt als ’Leviathane’.
Teil I befasst sich mit der Festlegung von lokalen Steuerbasen in die Ver-
fassung. Wir analysieren modelltheoretisch die Eigenschaften von vier ver-
schiedenen Basen, welche sind: Bodenertrag, Kapitalertrag, Wohnungsum-
satz und Wohnungswert. Wir konstruieren dazu vier zwei-Stufen-Modelle,
in denen jeweils eine dieser Basen vorgegeben ist und die Leviathane den
entsprechenden Steuersatz bestimmen du¨rfen. Die Haushalte streben danach,
ihren Nutzen aus den lokalen o¨ffentlichen Gu¨tern, den Wohnungen und kom-
binierten Privatgu¨tern zu maximieren. Da Haushalte lokale o¨ffentliche Gu¨ter
(per Definition) nur dort konsumieren ko¨nnen, wo sie wohnen, nehmen fi-
nanzpolitische Entscheidungen Einfluss auf die Wohnungsma¨rkte. Somit un-
tersuchen wir im Besonderen, wie Wohnungsfirmen, Haushalte und Woh-
nungspreise auf Steuersatza¨nderungen reagieren. Wir finden heraus, dass
einige Reaktionen qualitativ von bestimmten Bedingungen abha¨ngen. Gema¨ß
einem verfassungstheoretischen Ansatz lassen sich die Einzelwirkungen in
ihren Ergebnissen nicht aggregieren. Wir ko¨nnen aus ihnen jedoch einige all-
gemeine und abstrakte Regeln fu¨r die Wahl einer Steuerbasis ableiten. Eine
finanzpolitische Verfassung mag diese Regeln schu¨tzen.
Bu¨rger haben die Mo¨glichkeit, durch Migration auf lokale Finanzpoli-
tik zu reagieren. Aus einer solchen Reaktion ergeben sich A¨nderungen der
Wohnungsnachfrage. In Teil II versuchen wir, die Wirkungen lokaler fiskali-
scher Variablen auf die Wohnungspreise zu scha¨tzen. Bei diesen Scha¨tzungen
ko¨nnen wir uns auf eine breite Diskussion um die Kapitalisierung der Grund-
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steuer stu¨tzen. Es zeigt sich, dass dieses Untersuchungsfeld mit mehreren
ernsthaften methodologischen Problemen verbunden ist. In Teil II bewerten
wir einige der vorgeschlagenen Lo¨sungen. Von dort aus suchen wir nach
einer geeigneten Methodik fu¨r unsere eigenen Scha¨tzungen. Unsere Scha¨tzun-
gen basieren auf Stichproben aus 234 US-amerikanischen Grafschaften in
den Jahren 2002 und 2003. Wir messen Kapitalisierungseffekte durch die
Grundsteuer und andere fiskalische Variablen in vier Schritten. Dabei stellt
sich heraus, dass die Grundsteuer mit den Wohnungspreisen eher positiv
verbunden ist. Doch erscheint diese Verbindung von anderen Determinan-
ten dominiert; insbesondere aus den Bereichen Einkommen und Mobilita¨t.
Von allen fiskalischen Variablen zeigen die o¨ffentlichen Gesamtausgaben die
gro¨ßte Robustheit. Auf Grundlage dieser Ergebnisse beabsichtigen wir zu
beurteilen, wie effektiv die Bu¨rger Leviathan durch Migration beschra¨nken.
In einem verfassungstheoretischen Ansatz betrachten wir den Staat als
monolithisches und eigeninteressiertes Gebilde namens Leviathan. Dessen
Eigeninteresse a¨ußert sich im Allgemeinen in der Maximierung der eigenen
fiskalischen Haushaltseinnahmen oder des Haushaltsu¨berschusses. Zentrale
Grundlagen fu¨r eine o¨konomische Theorie der Verfassung wurden von Bren-
nan und Buchanan (1980) geschaffen. Sie stellten im Besonderen die Hy-
pothese auf, dass fiskalische Dezentralisierung und die Macht der Leviathane
in einem negativen Verha¨ltnis zueinander stu¨nden. Auf diese Hypothese
gestu¨tzt, unternahmen es einige Autoren, spezifische Tests fu¨r die ’reale
Existenz’ von Leviathanen zu entwickeln. In Teil III werden diese Tests
pra¨gnant diskutiert. Wir legen dar, weshalb diese Tests insgesamt unzurei-
chend sind. Als Konsequenz fu¨hren wir einen neuen Testansatz ein. Dieser
Ansatz behauptet, dass sich die soziale Macht eines Leviathans u¨ber die rela-
tive Abweichung seines perso¨nlichen Einkommens vom Durchschnittseinkom-
men in seiner Gebietsko¨rperschaft messen la¨sst. Das Ausmaß seiner sozialen
Macht steht zudem in Abha¨ngigkeit von den Quellen seiner fiskalischen Ein-
nahmen. Um diese Abha¨ngigkeit zu messen, arbeiten wir mit Stichproben
aus 234 US-amerikanischen Grafschaften in den Perioden 1989/ 1992 und
1999/ 2002. Unser Hauptergebnis la¨sst sich wie folgt formulieren: Lokale
Leviathane beziehen mehr soziale Macht aus zwischenstaatlichen Transfers
als aus Grundsteuern oder aus anderen Quellen fiskalischer Einnahmen.
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